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ABSTRACT
In the first essay, I show that the transition to public equity markets have im-
portant implications to firms’ innovative process. To establish a causal effect of the
IPO, I compare the long-run innovation of firms that completed their filing and
went public with that of firms that withdrew their filing and remained private. I
use NASDAQ fluctuations during the book-building period as a source of exoge-
nous variation that affects IPO completion but is unlikely to affect long-run inno-
vation. Using this approach, I find that the quality of internal innovation declines
by 50 percent relative to firms that remained private. The decline in innovation is
driven by both an exodus of skilled inventors and a decline in productivity among
remaining inventors. However, going public allows firms to attract new human
capital and purchase externally generated innovations through mergers and acqui-
sitions.
In the second essay, we explore the effects of private equity investments on
the industries they invest at. This analysis looks across nations and industries to
assess the impact of private equity on industry performance. Industries where PE
funds have invested in the past five years have grown more quickly in terms of
productivity and employment. It is hard to find support for claims that economic
activity in industries with private equity backing is more exposed to aggregate
iii
shocks. The results using lagged private equity investments suggest that the results
are not driven by reverse causality.
Finally, in the third essay we model situations in which a principal offers a set of
contracts to a group of agents to participate in a project. Agents’ benefits from par-
ticipation depend on the identity of other participating agents. We show that when
assuming multilateral externalities, the optimal contracts’ payoff relies on a rank-
ing of the agents, which can be described as arising from a tournament among the
agents. Rather than simply ranking agents according to a measure of popularity,
the optimal contracting scheme makes use of a more refined two-way comparison
between the agents. We derive results on the principal’s revenue extraction and the
role of the level of externalities’ asymmetry.
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1. DOES GOING PUBLIC AFFECT INNOVATION?
1.1 Introduction
Does the transition to public equity markets affect innovation? Although a large
body of research examines the performance of firms around their initial public of-
ferings (IPOs), little is known about the effects of going public on innovation. This
question is particularly relevant given the reliance of young and entrepreneurial
firms on public equity issuances to fund their R&D investments,1 and the critical
role of innovation in promoting economic growth (Solow 1957). This paper stud-
ies the effects of going public on three important dimensions of firms’ innovative
activity: internally generated innovation, productivity and mobility of individual
inventors, and acquisition of external innovation.
Theoretically, in frictionless financial markets selling equity publicly should
have no bearing on subsequent innovative activity. However, two broad views
suggest that going public should in fact matter.
The “financing” view suggests that going public may enhance innovation by
overcoming financing frictions and easing access to capital. As argued by Arrow
(1962) and demonstrated empirically,2 R&D is likely to be more sensitive to financ-
1 See Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009). In fact, Brown and Petersen (2009) demonstrate that
young firms’ dependence on public equity markets to finance R&D expenditure has even increased
over past decades.
2 See, for example, Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009), Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), and
1
ing constraints than other forms of investments. For instance, debt financing of
R&D may be limited due to associated information problems, skewed and uncer-
tain returns, and the potentially scant collateral value of intangible assets. Equity
financing, on the other hand, allows investors to share upside returns and can ease
the financing of R&D investments by transferring idiosyncratic innovation risk to
diversified investors through public equity markets. Therefore, the financing view
suggests that going public may enhance internally generated innovation and may
even facilitate technology acquisitions.
Alternatively, the “incentives” view suggests that ownership dilution and changes
in governance may lead to a decline in the quality of innovation. Following the
IPO, inventors may face weaker incentives to pursue novel projects as their claims
on subsequent innovations become smaller. Increases in wealth and the ability to
cash out may weaken inventors’ incentives even further. In addition, since equity
markets may fail to correctly evaluate innovation even when outcomes are pre-
dictable and persistent (Cohen, Diether, and Malloy, 2011), career concerns and
takeover threats may pressure managers to select less novel projects that are more
easily communicated to stock market investors3 (Stein, 1989; Ferreira, Manso, and
Silva, 2010). Interestingly, the benefits of accessing public markets can be tied to
its costs. Managers may prefer to exploit improved access to capital to acquire
ready-made technologies rather than innovating internally, as this strategy is more
transparent to the stock market and potentially less prone to failure.
To shed light on these two views, I use standard patent-based metrics to study
Mulkay, Hall, and Mairesse (2001). For detailed surveys of the literature see Bond and Van Reenen
(2007) and Hall and Lerner (2009).
3 Minton and Kaplan (2008) demonstrate that turnover rates in publicly traded firms are high and
significantly related to a firm’s stock performance. Additionally, Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2011)
find that low stock prices strongly affect the likelihood of takeover threats.
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the effects of going public on innovation. Consistent with the incentives view, the
main finding of the paper illustrates that going public changes firms’ strategies in
pursuing innovation. Following the IPO there is a substantial decline in the novelty
of internally generated innovation which is partially mitigated by the increased
likelihood to acquire innovation externally.
Estimating the effects of going public on innovation is challenging due to an
inherent selection bias associated with the decision to go public. A standard ap-
proach in the literature uses within-firm variation to study the dynamics of firm
outcomes around the IPO.4 But, as noted by Jain and Kini (1994), this approach
is likely to reveal biased IPO effects due to the selection of firms to go public at a
specific stage in their life cycle. For instance, firms may choose to go public follow-
ing an innovative breakthrough, as hypothesized by Pastor, Taylor, and Veronesi
(2009).5 In that case, the post-IPO performance may be affected by reversion to the
mean, reflecting life cycle effects in addition to the IPO effects.
To overcome this selection bias, I construct a novel dataset of innovative firms
that filed an initial registration statement with the SEC and either completed or
withdrew their filing. This sample allows me to compare the innovative activity
of firms that went public with private firms at a similar stage in their life cycle,
namely, firms that intended to go public at the same time but withdrew their fil-
ing. But this does not completely eliminate the selection bias as the decision to
withdraw may be related to a firm’s R&D policy and innovative opportunities.
I use the two-month NASDAQ fluctuations following the IPO filing date as an
4 See, e.g., Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah
(1997), Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998), Pastor, Taylor, and Veronesi (2009), and Chemmanur,
He, and Nandy (2009).
5 Chemmanur, He, and Nandy (2009) find that firms go public following productivity improve-
ments, and experience a decline in productivity following the IPO.
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instrument for IPO completion. The instrument relies on the sensitivity of filers
to stock market movements during the book-building phase (Busaba, Beneveniste,
and Guo, 2000; Benveniste et al., 2003; Dunbar, 1998; Dunbar and Foerster, 2008;
Edelen and Kadlec, 2005). These fluctuations provide a plausibly exogenous source
of variation that affects IPO completion and is unlikely to be related to innovation.
One concern regarding the instrument might be that the exclusion restriction
does not hold; i.e., that two-month NASDAQ returns may relate to innovation
measures through channels other than the IPO completion (see Section 2.C for a
detailed discussion). There are several reasons this may not be the case. First,
the analysis compares firms that filed to go public in the same year. I find that the
characteristics of filers that experienced a NASDAQ drop during the book-building
phase do not differ significantly from other firms that filed to go public during the
same year but did not experience such a decline.6 Second, the analysis uses firm
innovation measures that are in relative terms, scaled by the average innovation
measures of all patents granted in the same year and in the same technology class.7
Therefore, even if two-month NASDAQ returns contain information about aggre-
gate changes in innovative opportunities, such a change should affect all firms
conducting research in the same area, and is therefore unlikely to affect relative
innovation measures.
Using this instrumental variables approach, I find that going public caused a
substantial decline of approximately 50 percent in innovation novelty as measured
by patent citations. At the same time, I find no change in the scale of innovation,
6 These characteristics include: firm innovation in the three years before the IPO filing, firm finan-
cials at the time of the IPO filing, venture capital backing, age, underwriter ranking, and location
within the IPO wave.
7 Technology classes are defined by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and
capture thechnological essence of an invention.
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as measured by the number of patents. These results suggest that the transition
to public equity markets leads firms to reposition their R&D investments toward
more conventional projects. Such findings cannot be explained by the financing
view which suggests that improved access to capital may enhance innovative ac-
tivities.
To uncover the channels driving the decline in innovative activity, I study the ef-
fects of going public on individual inventors’ productivity and mobility over time.
Consistent with the incentives view, I find that the quality of innovation produced
by inventors who remained at the firm substantially declines following the IPO
and key inventors are more likely to leave. These effects are partially mitigated by
the ability of public firms to attract new inventors.
I also find a stark increase in the likelihood that newly public firms acquire com-
panies in the years following an IPO, particularly privately held targets. To better
understand whether these acquisitions are used for purchasing new technologies,
I collect information on targets’ patent portfolios. I find that public firms acquire
a substantial number of patents through M&A: acquired patents constitute more
than one-fifth of firms’ patent portfolio in the five years following the IPO. The ac-
quired patents are more likely to be in technologies that are only weakly related
to a firm’s previous patents and are of higher quality than the patents produced
internally. These findings are broadly consistent with both the financing and the
incentives view.
To further investigate the underlying causes, I propose two incentives-related
explanations. The first explanation suggests that career concerns lead managers to
select more incremental projects, while the second explanation suggests that after
the IPO inventors are facing weaker incentives to pursue high-quality innovation.
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While the two explanations are likely to co-exist, I find supportive evidence
for the first explanation indicating that changing managerial incentives and public
market pressures affect innovation at public firms. If managerial incentives are
an important determinant of innovation, firms with more entrenched managers
should be less sensitive to market pressures and therefore may invest in more novel
projects. As a proxy for managerial entrenchment, I use cases in which the CEO
also serves as the chairman of the board. I find that when managers are more
entrenched, the negative effect of going public on innovation novelty is weaker
and inventors are less likely to leave the firm.
The paper is related to several strands in the literature. First, the IPO literature
documents a post-IPO decline in firm performance measures such as profitability
and productivity.8 This paper adds to the literature by demonstrating a post-IPO
decline in innovation. Perhaps more importantly, the paper establishes that this
decline is caused by the IPO, rather than being a symptom of a particular stage
of the firm life cycle. This paper is also related to a number of papers studying
withdrawn IPOs.9 By using patent data, this study is the first to investigate the
performance consequences of the decision to withdraw an IPO.
The paper reveals a complex trade-off between public and private ownership.
While private firms are able to generate higher quality innovation and retain skilled
inventors, public firms can acquire technologies externally and attract new human
capital. In that regard, the paper is also related to a growing literature that com-
8 Several papers report a post-IPO decline in profitability: Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), Jain
and Kini (1994), Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997), Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998), and Pas-
tor, Taylor, and Veronesi (2009). Chemmanur, He, and Nandy (2009) reach similar findings regarding
firm productivity.
9 For example, Benveniste et al. (2003), Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo (2000), Busaba (2006), Dunbar
(1998), Dunbar and Foerster (2008), Edelen and Kadlec (2005), and Hanley (1993).
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pares the behavior of public and private firms along various dimensions such as
investment sensitivity, capital structure, and dividend payouts.10 Additionally, this
work contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature that explores the role of
governance, capital structure, and ownership concentration on corporate innova-
tion.11
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the main iden-
tification strategy. Section 1.3 explains the various data sources used to construct
the sample. Section 1.4 presents the results on the effects of going public on inter-
nal innovation, inventors’ mobility and productivity, and firm reliance on external
technologies. Section 1.5 discusses several theoretical explanations and Section 1.6
provides a conclusion.
1.2 Empirical Strategy
In this section, I discuss the standard patent-based metrics used in the analysis
to measure firm innovation. Then, I describe the empirical strategy and the instru-
mental variables approach used in the paper.
1.2.1 Measuring Innovative Activity
An extensive literature on the economics of technological change demonstrates
that patenting activity reflects the quality and extent of firm innovation. I use
10 Several aspects of firm behavior are considered in that literature. Asker, Farre-Mensa, and
Ljungqvist (2010), and Sheen (2009) focus on investment sensitivity, Saunders and Steffen (2009) and
Brav (2009) study debt financing and borrowing costs, Michaely and Roberts (2007) explore dividend
payouts, and Gao, Lemmon, and Li (2010) focus on CEO compensation.
11 See Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2009), Atanassov, Nanda, and Seru (2007), Belenzon,
Berkovitz, and Bolton (2009), Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006), Chemmanur and Jiao (2007), Ful-
gheieri and Sevilir (2009), Fang, Tian, and Tice (2010), Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg (2010), and
Tian and Wang (2010).
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widely accepted patent-based metrics to measure firm innovative activity (Hall,
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001; Lanjouw, Pakes, and Putnam, 1998). These measures
not only capture firms’ technological contribution but are also economically mean-
ingful and have been shown to translate into firm market value (see, e.g., Trajten-
berg, 1990; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005).
The most basic measure of innovative output is a simple count of the number
of patents granted. However, patent counts cannot distinguish between break-
through innovation and incremental discoveries (see, e.g., Griliches, 1990). The
second metric, therefore, reflects the importance or novelty of a patent by counting
the number of citations a patent receives following its approval.12 Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg (2005) illustrate that citations are a good measure of innovative quality
and economic importance.13
Both citation rates and patent filing propensity vary over time and across tech-
nologies. Variations may stem from changes in the importance of technologies over
time or from changes in the patent system. Therefore, a comparison of raw patents
and citations is only partially informative. To adjust for these variations, I follow
Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) and scale each patent citation count by the aver-
age citations of matched patents. Matched patents are defined as patents that are
granted in the same year and in the same technology class.14 Specifically, let Citesitk
12 I count citations in the year of patent approval and three subsequent calendar years. I discuss
the choice of citation horizon window in Section 2.B.
13 Specifically, they find that extra citation in firm’s average citations per patent increases market
value by 3%.
14 A technological class is a detailed classification defined by the U.S. Patenting and Trademark
Office (USPTO) that captures the essence of an invention. Technological classes are often much more
refined than industry classifications, consisting of about 400 main (3-digit) patent classes, and over
120,000 patent subclasses. For example, under the "Communications" category one can find numer-
ous sub-categories such as wave transmission lines and networks, electrical communications, direc-
tive radio wave systems and devices, radio wave antennas, multiplex communications, optical wave
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be the number of citations of patent i that was granted in year t and classified in
technology class k. The scaled citations of patent i, SCitesitk, is Citesitk divided by
Cites itk, the average number of citations of all patents granted in the same year
and in the same technology class excluding patent i , that is,
SCitesitk =
Citesitk
Cites itk
Similarly, to adjust for variations in patent-filing likelihood, each patent is scaled
by the average number of patents generated by firms in the same year and in the
same technology class. Hence, patents that were granted in technologies in which
firms issue more patents receive less weight. The scaled patent count per year is a
simple sum of the scaled patents.
The final measures, originality and generality, use the distribution of citations
to capture the fundamental nature of research (Trajtenberg, Jaffe, and Henderson,
1997). A patent that cites a broader array of technology classes is viewed as having
greater originality. A patent that is being cited by a more technologically varied
array of patents is viewed as having greater generality.15 Similarly to patents and
citations, scaled originality and scaled generality are scaled by the corresponding aver-
age originality or generality of all patents granted in the same year and technology
class.
guides, pulse or digital communications, etc.
15 The originality (generality) measure is the Herfindahl index of the cited (citing) patents, used to
capture dispersion across technology classes. I use the bias correction of the Herfindahl measures,
described in Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) to account for cases with a small number of patents within
technological categories.
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1.2.2 Empirical Design
Identifying the effects of going public on innovation or firm outcomes in gen-
eral is challenging due to inherent selection issues that arise from the decision of
firms to go public. A common approach in the literature16 uses “within-firm” es-
timator that compares the performance of the same firm before and after the IPO.
This method is attractive as it provides an estimate of the impact of IPOs on inno-
vation that is not affected by a firm’s time-invariant characteristics. At the same
time, however, this method fails to control for the selection of firms to go public
at a specific stage in its life cycle. If firms are more likely to go public following
a positive innovative shock,17 as argued by Pastor, Taylor, and Veronesi (2009), re-
gressions designed to capture the effect of going public may be biased by life cycle
effects and reversion to the mean.
To overcome the selection bias associated with firms’ decision to go public, I
construct a dataset that includes innovative firms that submitted the initial reg-
istration statement to the SEC in an attempt to go public. Following the IPO fil-
ing, firms engage in marketing the equity issuance to investors during the book-
building phase and have the option to withdraw the IPO filing. I compare the
long-run innovation of firms that went public (henceforth ‘IPO firms’) with firms
that filed to go public at the same year, but ultimately withdrew their filing and
remained private (henceforth ‘withdrawn firms’). This setup is attractive as it al-
lows the comparison of the post-IPO performance of firms that went public with
16 Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997),
Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998), Pastor, Taylor, and Veronesi (2009), and Chemmanur, He, and
Nandy (2009).
17 As illustrated in panel D of Table 1, I find that in the three years prior to the IPO, firms produce
substantially more novel patents than comparable patents within the same year and technology class.
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that of private firms at a similar stage in their life cycle. My baseline specification
of interest is
Yposti = α1 + β1 IPOi + γ1Y
pre
i + X
0
iδ1 + νk + µt + ε1i (1.1)
Yposti is the average innovative performance in the five years following the IPO
filing: average scaled citations, average scaled originality/generality and average
scaled number of patents per year. Yprei is the equivalent measure in the three years
prior to the IPO filing.18 IPOi is the dummy variable of interest, indicating whether
a filer went public or remained private. Under the null hypothesis that going public
has no effect on innovation, β1 should not be statistically different from zero. This
model includes industry (vk) and IPO filing year (µt) fixed effects.
If the decision to withdraw an IPO filing is related to unobserved firm innova-
tion policy or innovative opportunities (captured in the error term), the β1 estimate
may be biased. Therefore, I instrument for the IPO completion choice. Specifically,
I use the two-month NASDAQ returns as an instrument, calculated from the IPO
filing date (i.e., the first two months of the book-building phase). The figure below
illustrates the time line of the IPO filing and the NASDAQ fluctuations during the
book-building phase. Firms either choose to complete the IPO or to withdraw their
filing. On average, ownership choices are accepted within four months following
the IPO filing. The firm-level innovation is measured over the five-year horizon
after the IPO filing:19
18 Adding a constraint of γ1 = 1 in the model specified in equation (1) implies that the dependent
variable is equivalent to innovative performance difference before and after the IPO filing. However,
absent of this constraint, the above specification is more flexible and capable of capturing potential
reversion to the mean that may arise following the IPO filing.
19 The results of the analysis remain unchanged if innovation measures are calculated from the
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NASDAQ fluctuations provide a plausibly exogenous source of variation that
leads some firms to remain private in spite of their IPO filing. To implement the
instrumental variables approach, I estimate the following first-stage regression:
IPOi = α2 + β2NSDQi + γ2Y
pre
i + X
0
iδ2 + νk + µt + ε2i
where NSDQi is the instrumental variable. The second-stage equation estimates
the impact of IPO on firm innovative activity:
Yposti = α3 + β3 dIPOi + γ3Yprei + X0iδ3 + νk + µt + ε1i
where dIPOi are the predicted values from (2). If the conditions for a valid in-
strumental variable are met, β3 captures the causal effect of an IPO on innovation
outcomes. I implement the instrumental variable estimator using two-stage least
squares. I also use a quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) Poisson model to estimate
the IV specification (Blundell and Powell, 2004). This model, which I describe in
the Appendix, is the standard estimation method used in the innovation literature
and count data analysis more generally.
To illustrate the advantage of using this instrumental variables approach in this
setting consider a simple example. Assume that firm innovation following to the
IPO filing is the sum of future innovation opportunities (which are unobserved at
the time of the IPO filing) and the effect of ownership structure (being public or
private). Specifically, the post-IPO innovative performance can be written as Q+
c  IPO, where Q stands for the unobserved quality of the issuer’s future innovative
ownership choice date rather than IPO filing date, as patent filings during the book-building period
are not common.
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projects, and IPO is a dummy that indicates whether the issuer completed the IPO
filing (IPO = 1) or remained private (IPO = 0). The goal is to estimate c, the effect
of public ownership on firm innovation.
Suppose that the unobserved quality of future projects is heterogeneous and
affects the likelihood of completing the IPO filing. Specifically, there are three types
of firms: Sure Thing firms, with highest-quality future innovative projects (Q =
qH), will complete the IPO irrespective of market conditions; Sensitive firms, with
medium-quality innovative projects (Q = qM), will not complete the IPO filing
if NASDAQ drops, but will go public otherwise; and Long Shot firms, with the
poorest innovative prospects (Q = qL), will withdraw irrespective of the NASDAQ
change.20 For simplicity, assume that NASDAQ can be either high or low each with
probability of 1/2, and firm types are equally likely.
The OLS estimate simply compares firms that completed the IPO filing (the
upper triangle) and firms that withdrew the IPO filing (the bottom triangle) and
reflects the sum of the IPO effect as well as a selection bias:
γOLS = E [YjIPO = 1]  E [YjIPO = 0] = c+
2
3
(qH   qL) > c
Thus OLS will overestimate the effect of going public in this example because better
firms are more likely to complete the IPO filing.21
The instrumental variables approach uses the variation in the NASDAQ – which
affects the decision to complete or withdraw the IPO filing – to estimate the effects
20 The decision to withdraw or complete the IPO filing is complicated and driven by many observed
and unobserved factors. For simplicity in this example I assume that the decision depends only on
one factor.
21 Note that if one assumes that lower quality firms are more likely to complete the IPO filing then
the sign of the bias reverses.
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of an IPO on innovative outcomes. Intuitively, this is equivalent to calculating
the difference in performance across columns. Specifically, simply comparing out-
comes based on the NASDAQ returns generates the “reduced-form” regression:
E [YjNSDQ = High]  E [YjNSDQ = Low] = 1
3
c
The “first-stage” regression captures the likelihood to complete the IPO as a func-
tion of the NASDAQ variation:
E [IPOjNSDQ = High]  E [IPOjNSDQ = Low] = 1
3
Scaling the reduced-form result by the first-stage regression coefficient generates
the desired outcome:
γIV =
E [YjNSDQ = High]  E [YjNSDQ = Low]
E [IPOjNSDQ = High]  E [IPOjNSDQ = Low] = c
The example illustrates that the IV estimator uses only the Sensitive firms whose
IPO completion depends on NASDAQ conditions. In fact, any instrumental vari-
ables estimator use only the information of the group of firms that respond to the
instrument (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
In the example I assumed for the sake of simplicity that NASDAQ returns can
take two values. Clearly, NASDAQ returns vary considerably. When the instru-
ment is multi-valued the IV estimate is a weighted average of the sensitive sub-
population estimates along the support of the instrument (Angrist and Imbens,
1995).22
22 Different firms have different thresholds of NASDAQ changes for which they complete the IPO
filing. Roughly speaking, the IV estimate is an average of the estimates of sensitive firms along
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So far, I made two important assumptions. First, I assumed that NASDAQ
conditions are not correlated with firm characteristics, and second that NASDAQ
returns do not affect future innovative performance. These assumptions determine
the validity of the instrument. In the next section I discuss these assumptions.
1.2.3 NASDAQ Fluctuations and the Exclusion Restriction
For the instrument to be valid, it must strongly affect IPO completion choices.
Additionally, it must not affect the scaled innovation measures through any chan-
nel other than the decision to complete the IPO filing. Formally, this means that
the two-month NASDAQ returns must be uncorrelated with the residual in equa-
tion (1). This residual reflects unobservable characteristics that may influence firm
innovation. The latter requirement, the “exclusion restriction”, is the focus of the
discussion below.
I start by exploring whether firms that experience a NASDAQ drop are sig-
nificantly different from other firms that filed to go public within the same year.
A priori this seems unlikely since it would require high-frequency compositional
shifts in IPO filers, in contrast to the evidence of clustering of similar firms in IPO
markets that attempt to exploit information spillovers (Beneveniste et al. 2003).
I find no significant differences in observables between firms that experienced
a NASDAQ drop and other firms that filed in the same year. As illustrated in Sec-
tion 3.D, these observables include characteristics at the time of the IPO filing such
as firm financial information, age, venture capital backing, IPO filing character-
istics, and importantly, innovation performance in the three years before the IPO
different values of NASDAQ returns. The average is weighted by the impact of NASDAQ returns on
completing the IPO filing, and by the likelihood of observing the NASDAQ returns.
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filing. This suggests that the two-month NASDAQ fluctuations are not correlated
with firm observables and are plausibly exogenous within a year. To further ad-
dress concerns about within-year compositional shifts, I control also for the three-
month NASDAQ returns before the IPO filing, and for firms’ location within the
IPO wave.
The two-month NASDAQ fluctuations may reflect either a change in investor
sentiment or in future innovative opportunities. If NASDAQ fluctuations reflect
changes in future innovative opportunities, this would raise concerns regarding the
exclusion restriction. However, since R&D expenditure is a slow-moving process,
firms that file within the same year are likely to respond to similar changes in inno-
vation opportunities (Hall, Griliches, and Hausman 1986; Lach and Schankerman,
1989).
Additionally, since my innovation measures are scaled by average outcomes
and therefore expressed in relative terms within the same year and technology
class, changes in aggregate innovative opportunities reflected by the two-month
NASDAQ returns should affect all firms conducting research in the same technol-
ogy. Such changes are not likely to affect the relative innovative performance. For
example, consider a firm that submitted an IPO filing in 1995 and was awarded
a patent three years later in 1998 in the optical communications technology. The
novelty of the patent is scaled by the average novelty of all patents granted in 1998
in the optical communications technology. If the two-month NASDAQ returns fol-
lowing the IPO filing in 1995 reflected a change in innovative opportunities in opti-
cal communications in coming years, and thus affected patent novelty, this change
should affect the novelty of all patents within this technology class. Hence, the
relative patent novelty is unlikely to be affected.
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To further address concerns regarding the exclusion restriction I conduct two
additional tests reported in Section 3.E. First, I perform a placebo test. The exclu-
sion restriction requires that the two-month NASDAQ returns affect innovation
only through the ownership choice channel. If this is the case, we should expect
that two-month NASDAQ returns after the ownership choice was made should
have no effect on long-run innovation. Indeed, I find that in contrast to the two-
month NASDAQ returns immediately after the IPO filing, following the IPO com-
pletion choice, the two-month NASDAQ returns have no predictive power. This
evidence suggests that the effect of the instrument on the long-run innovation of
the firm goes through the IPO completion channel.
As a second test, I investigate directly whether the instrument can explain changes
in innovative trends. I use all patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office to calculate changes in innovative trends in the core technologies of firms
as of the time of their IPO filing. I find no evidence that the two-month NASDAQ
returns can predict changes in these innovative trends. While firms may switch to
different technologies subsequent to the IPO filing, this test suggests that, whether
or not such a switch occurred, it is not likely to be driven by the two-month change
in the NASDAQ.
1.3 Data
The dataset is constructed from several data sources combining IPO filings,
patent information, hand-collected financial information and other firm character-
istics. In this section I describe the steps in constructing the dataset, and provide
summary statistics comparing IPO firms and withdrawn firms at the time of the
filing.
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1.3.1 IPO Filings
To apply for an IPO, a firm is required to submit an initial registration statement
to the SEC (usually the S-1 form), which contains the IPO filer’s basic business and
financial information. Following the submission of S-1 form, issuers engage in
marketing the equity issuance to investors (the “book-building” phase) and have
the option to withdraw the IPO filing by submitting RW form. The most common
stated reason for withdrawing is “weak market conditions”.
Filing withdrawals are common in IPO markets, as approximately 20 percent of
all IPO filings are ultimately withdrawn. As noted by Busaba et al. (2001), the de-
cision to withdraw is driven by various observed and unobserved considerations
that affect the investors’ willingness to pay and the issuer’s reservation value.23 As
long as the investors’ valuation is higher than the issuer’s reservation price, the
firm will complete the IPO application.
I identify all IPO filings using Thomson Financial’s SDC New Issues database.
The sample starts in 1985, when SDC began covering withdrawn IPOs systemati-
cally, and ends in 2003 since the analysis explores the innovative outcomes of firms
in the five years after the IPO filing. Following the IPO literature, I exclude IPO
filings of financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), unit offers, closed-end
funds (including REITs), ADRs, limited partnerships, special acquisition vehicles,
and spin-offs. I identify 5,583 complete IPOs and 1,599 withdrawn IPO filings in
the period of 1985 - 2003.
23 The investors’ valuation may be affected by the issuer’s financials, innovative activity, sentiment,
and other unobserved factors. Similarily, the issuer’s reservation value is influenced by future invest-
ment opportunities, cash reserves, alternative funding options, and other unobserved elements such
as entrepreneur’s benefits from diversification and loss of private benefits of control.
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1.3.2 Patent Data
The patent data is obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) patent database, which includes detailed information on more than three
million patents submitted to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from
1976 to 2006 (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001).
I use the NBER bridge file to COMPUSTAT to match patents to firms that com-
pleted the IPO filing. Since withdrawn firms are not included in COMPUSTAT,
I match these firms based on company name, industry, and geographic location,
all of which are available in SDC and IPO registration forms. In ambiguous cases
where firm names are similar but not identical, or the location of the patentee dif-
fers from the SDC records or SEC registration statements, I conduct web and FAC-
TIVA searches to verify matches.
I restrict the sample to firms with at least one successful patent application in
the three years before and five years after the IPO filing; this yields 1,488 innovative
firms that went public and 323 that withdrew the IPO application.
The goal is to collect information on firms’ innovative activity in the five years
after the IPO filing. In some cases, firms are acquired, or withdrawn firms may go
public in a second attempt.24 I collect information on firms’ patenting activity even
after such firm exits, to avoid biases that may arise from truncating firm activity.
After all, firm exits are yet another consequence of the IPO effect that influence
firms’ innovative path. Collecting patent information subsequent to firms’ exits is
complicated since if a firm is acquired its patents may be assigned to the acquir-
ing firm. Nevertheless, I find that in most cases patents are still assigned to the
acquired company after its acquisition. This allows me to capture the patenting
24 See Panel F in Table 1 for a description of the acquisition statistics of IPO and withdrawn firms.
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activity in more than 90 percent of firm-year observations, irrespective of whether
a firm was acquired. In the remaining firm-years, no patent was assigned to the
acquired firm. This could be either because the acquired firm did not generate ad-
ditional patents, or because any patents generated were assigned to the acquiring
company. To identify missing patents, I use inventor identifiers and geographic
location to isolate patents that were produced by the acquired rather than the ac-
quiring company.25
I calculate the number of citations a patent receives in the calendar year of its
approval and in the subsequent three years. This time frame is selected to fit the
nature of the sample. Since many of the IPO filings in the sample occur toward the
end of the 1990s, increasing the time horizon of citation counts will reduce sample
size. Given that citations are concentrated in the first few years following patent’s
approval and the considerable serial correlation in citation rates (Akcigit and Kerr,
2011), three years is reasonably sufficient to capture the patent’s importance.26
Since the NBER patent database ends in 2006, I supplement it with the Harvard
Business School (HBS) patent database, which covers patents granted through De-
cember 2009. This enables calculating the citations of patents granted toward the
end of the sample. Overall, the sample consists of 39,306 granted patents of IPO
firms and 4,835 granted patents of withdrawn firms.
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the distribution of IPO filings by year. IPO fil-
ings are concentrated in the 1990s and drop after 2000, with 95 of the 323 with-
drawn filings occurring in 2000. The absence of transactions conducted before
25 Specifically, I start by collecting inventor identifiers of patents produced by the acquired firm
before the acquisition. These unique inventor identifiers are available through the Harvard Business
School patent database. Then, I go over the patents produced by the acquiring firm in the post-
acquisition years, to identify all patents produced by the same inventors.
26 I verify that the results are not sensitive to the selected citation horizon.
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1985 and after 2003 reflects the construction of the sample. Panel A also displays
the patent applications and awards of IPO firms and withdrawn firms separately.
Each patent is associated with an application date and grant date, reflecting the lag
in patent approvals. Since the sample includes only patents granted by December
2006, the number of approved patent applications declines in 2005 and 2006.
Panels B and C detail the composition of firms and patents across industries
and technology classes. The majority of the firms in the sample are concentrated in
technological industries such as electronic equipment, software, drugs, and med-
ical equipment. Similarly, most patents are concentrated in the industries that rely
on intellectual property, such as computer, drugs, and electronics industries.
Panel D compares the patenting activity of withdrawn and IPO firms in the
three years prior to the IPO filing. I find no significant differences across any of the
patenting measures. Since a value of one in the scaled citations measure implies
that a firm is producing patents of average quality, it is interesting to note that
both IPO firms and withdrawn firms produce patents that are substantially more
frequently cited than comparable average patents (80 percent higher for withdrawn
firms and 89 percent higher for IPO firms). This evidence suggests that firms that
select to go public are likely to do so following innovative breakthroughs, which
may raise concerns of post-IPO reversion to the mean.
1.3.3 Financial Information and Firm Characteristics
The analysis of private firms is complicated by data limitations. While patents
are useful in capturing the innovative activity of both public and private firms,
no financial information is readily available for withdrawn firms when using stan-
dard financial databases. To partially overcome this constraint, I collect withdrawn
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Table 1 - Summary Statistics
The table reports summary statistics of the key variables in the analysis, which are deﬁned in Section A
of the Appendix. Panel A describes the distribution of IPO ﬁlings and patents over time. Panels B and C
detail the distribution of ﬁrms across industries and the distribution of patents across technology classes.
The industry classiﬁcation is based on Fama-French 10, and the technology classiﬁcation is based on Hall,
Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg (2001). Panel D describes average innovative measures in the three years up to (and
through) the IPO ﬁling year. Panel E provides information on ﬁrm characteristics at the time of ﬁling. Panel
F describes ﬁrm exit characteristics in the ﬁve years after the IPO ﬁling, where ﬁrm exits are corporate events
such as acquisition, bankruptcy, or an IPO of withdrawn ﬁrms. *, **, and *** indicate that diﬀerences in
means are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel A - Distribution by year
IPO Filing Patent Applications Patent Grants
Year Complete Withdrawn Complete Withdrawn Complete Withdrawn
1983 N/A N/A 4 2 0 0
1984 N/A N/A 18 9 1 0
1985 4 2 16 8 9 8
1986 10 5 58 18 9 5
1987 11 6 111 17 39 11
1988 14 4 202 34 62 13
1989 42 6 356 74 147 27
1990 34 10 527 86 231 56
1991 120 2 715 62 321 59
1992 119 33 1169 125 525 68
1993 144 14 1457 106 797 89
1994 105 18 2152 162 1050 87
1995 140 8 3568 318 1309 94
1996 169 29 3220 262 1760 133
1997 114 25 3857 444 2298 199
1998 66 20 3672 509 3317 310
1999 169 15 4249 634 3658 388
2000 167 95 4225 586 3360 457
2001 17 13 4144 555 3448 531
2002 12 17 3082 431 3483 517
2003 21 1 1795 256 3678 533
2004 N/A N/A 616 117 3547 465
2005 N/A N/A 89 20 2943 376
2006 N/A N/A 4 0 3314 409
Total 1478 323 39306 4835 39306 4835
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firms’ financial information from initial registration statements. I download the
S-1 forms from the SEC’s EDGAR service, which is available from 1996. For IPO
firms, I rely on standard financial databases such as COMPUSTAT and CapitalIQ
to collect firm financial information. This allows me to compare withdrawn and
IPO firms’ characteristics at the time of filing.
I collect additional information on firm characteristics from various sources. I
obtain data on venture capital (VC) funding from SDC, VentureXpert, and registra-
tion statements. I supplement the data with information on firms’ age at the time
of the IPO filing and its underwriters’ ranking obtained from registration forms,
VentureXpert, Jay Ritter’s webpage, and the SDC database. Finally, I collect infor-
mation on firms’ exits, i.e., events in which firms were acquired, went public in a
second attempt (for withdrawn firms), or filed for bankruptcy. I use COMPUSTAT
and CapitalIQ to search for acquisitions and bankruptcies, and the SDC database
to identify second IPOs of withdrawn firms. I perform extensive checks to verify
the nature of private firms’ exits using the Deal Pipeline database, Lexis-Nexis and
web searches.
Panel E compares the characteristics of IPO firms and withdrawn firms at the
time of filing. I find no significant differences in firm size (measured by log firm
assets) and R&D spending (normalized by firm assets). However, withdrawn firms
have a higher Cash-to-Assets ratio and are lower net income to assets.
The literature often uses the reputation of the lead underwriter as a proxy for
firm quality, based on the rationale that higher-quality firms are more likely to
be matched with a higher quality underwriter.27 I find no significant differences
27 The underwriter ranking is based on a scale of 0 to 9, where 9 implies highest underwriter pres-
tige. The ranking is compiled by Carter and Manaster (1990), Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), and
Loughran and Ritter (2004). I use the rating that covers the particular time period when the firm
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between the two groups using this firm quality proxy. Moreover, there is no signif-
icant difference in firm age at the time of filing.28 However, I find that withdrawn
firms are slightly more likely to be backed by VC funds (51 percent relative to 46
percent of IPO firms). This difference is significant at the 10 percent threshold.
Finally, there are no significant differences in the location within the IPO wave.29
There are stark differences, however, in the NASDAQ fluctuations that firms
experience after the IPO filing. Specifically, firms that went public experienced on
average a 3 percent increase in the two-month NASDAQ returns following the IPO
filing, while firms that selected to withdraw experienced, on average, a sharp drop
of 6 percent over a similar period. However, the differences in NASDAQ returns
in the three months prior to the IPO filing are fairly small (5 percent increase for
firms that ultimately remained private versus 7 percent for those that went public).
Given the importance of NASDAQ fluctuations around the time of the IPO filing
in this analysis, I discuss these differences separately in the next section.
1.3.4 IPO Filings and NASDAQ Fluctuations
Issuers are highly sensitive to stock market fluctuations during the book-building
phase (Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo, 2001; Benveniste et al., 2003; Dunbar, 1998;
Dunbar and Foerster, 2008; Edelen and Kadlec, 2005). Stock market fluctuations
went public. If the rating for that period is not available, I employ the rating in the most proximate
period.
28 Firm age is calculated from founding date. The firm age of issuers that went public is kindly
available at Jay Ritter’s webpage. I collected firms’ age of issuers that remained private from IPO
prospectuses.
29 Beneveniste et al. (2003) demonstrate that differences in the location within the IPO wave may
be associated with the probability of IPO completion. I follow their methodology and define a firm
as a “pioneer” if its filing is not preceded by filings in the same Fama-French industry in the previous
180 days (using all IPO filings, irrespective of patenting activity). “Early followers” are those that file
within 180 days of a pioneer’s filing date.
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shift both investors’ willingness to pay and issuers’ reservation value. If a firm
only partially adjusts its reservation value, stock market declines may lead to an
issuer’s withdrawal.30
If NASDAQ fluctuations change investors’ willingness to pay, why wouldn’t
firms simply wait for more favorable market conditions rather than withdraw the
filing? There are several reasons. First, a filing registration automatically expires
270 days after the last amendment of the IPO filing, which limits the time to com-
plete the IPO filing (Lerner, 1994). Additionally, waiting is costly: as long as the
application is pending, firms cannot issue private placements, and are forbidden
to disclose new information to specific investors or banks. Any new information
disclosed must be incorporated into the public registration statement. In fact, firms
are required to update the registration statement periodically to reflect the current
affairs of the company irrespective of raising alternative means of capital. These
considerations lead firms to withdraw at an even earlier date prior to the automatic
expiration of the IPO filing.
Figure 1 illustrates the sensitivity of issuers to market movements over the time
period of the sample. I plot the fraction of monthly filings that ultimately with-
drew against the two months of NASDAQ returns calculated from the middle of
each month, which approximates the stock market fluctuations during the initial
part of the book-building phase. The figure demonstrates a strong and negative
correlation between NASDAQ movements and IPO withdrawals, even when fo-
cusing on the pre-2000 period.31
30 The summer of 2011 illustrates the sensitivity of issuers to market fluctuations. For example,
in the week of August 8th, U.S. stocks plummeted following the downgrade of U.S. treasuries and
the debate over the U.S. debt ceiling. During the same week, 12 IPOs were planned but only one
completed the process.
31 The correlation of the two plots equals -0.44, or -0.34 if considering only the pre-2000 period.
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In light of the costs associated with preparing for an IPO filing, this sensitivity
might be surprising. However, Ritter and Welch (2002) argue that “market con-
ditions are the most important factor in the decision to go public”; therefore it is
not surprising that firms are likely to withdraw following a deterioration in market
conditions. A survey by Brau and Fawcett (2006) indeed finds that CFOs that with-
drew an IPO registration recognized that market conditions “played a decisive role
in their decision.” Additionally, Welch (1992) argues that “information cascades”
can induce later investors to rely on earlier investors’ choices, which may lead to
rapid failure of the issue offerings in cases of market declines during the initial
period of the book-building phase.
Panel F describes firm exit events in the five years following the IPO filing.
These include acquisitions, bankruptcies, or IPOs of withdrawn firms. As dis-
cussed earlier, I am able to capture the patenting activity of firms in the five years
following their IPO filing, even after either acquisitions or second IPOs of with-
drawn firms. I find that 18 percent of the withdrawn firms ultimately go public in
a second attempt in the five years following the IPO filing. Additionally, 29 per-
cent of the withdrawn firms and 24 percent of the IPO firms are acquired over this
period.
The resulting low rate of return to public equity markets was highlighted in the
literature (Dunbar and Foerster, 2008; Busaba, Beneviste, and Guo, 2001). How-
ever, when incorporating alternative exit options of withdrawn firms, the fraction
of firms that exit in the five years following the event rises to 50 percent. There
are several explanations for the low rate of return to public equity markets. Re-
turning to the IPO markets in a second attempt may be difficult as the window of
Both correlations are significantly different from zero at the 0.01% level.
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opportunities may be closed due to the boom and bust nature of the IPO markets
(Ibbotson and Ritter 1995). Brau and Fawcett (2006) interview CFOs and found that
those that withdrew an IPO expressed greater concern about the uncertainty and
costs associated with the IPO process. These perceptions may deter firms from a
second attempt at going public. Brau and Fawcett (2006) find additionally that the
most important signal when going public is a firm’s past historical earnings. If go-
ing public requires several years of fast growth to attract investors’ attention, such
growth may be difficult to re-generate in a second attempt. Finally, Dunbar and Fo-
erster (2008) suggest that there are reputational costs associated with the decision
to withdraw which prevent firms from returning to equity markets.
1.3.5 Instrumental Variable Related Tests
Having introduced the data, this section presents the results briefly discussed
in section 2.D to explore the validity of the instrumental variables approach. The
first set of results is presented in Table 2. I explore whether firms experiencing
NASDAQ drops are significantly different from other filing firms in the same year.
A firm is said to have experienced a NASDAQ drop if the two-month NASDAQ
returns after the IPO filing are within the bottom 10 percent of filers in a given year.
I repeat the same exercise with the bottom 25 percent, and median as alternative
cutoff thresholds. I explore whether firms that experienced NASDAQ drops are
significantly different across various observables such as firm financial informa-
tion at the time of filing, age, VC backing, IPO filing characteristics, and pre-filing
innovation measures. I find no differences between the two groups when thresh-
olds reflect a substantial drop in NASDAQ conditions, i.e., at the bottom 10 percent
or 25 percent threshold. When using medians as a cutoff, I find a weak difference
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in the VC backing variable.
In the second set of results, I conduct a placebo test. The exclusion restriction
requires that the two-month NASDAQ returns affect innovation only through the
ownership choice channel. If this is the case, we should expect that two-month
NASDAQ returns after the IPO completion choice would have no effect on long-
run innovation. In Table 1 of the Appendix, I explore whether the two-month
NASDAQ returns can predict future innovation once the ownership structure is
fixed, i.e., immediately after the decision to either issue equity or withdraw filing. I
find that once ownership is determined, NASDAQ fluctuations do not significantly
predict long-run innovative performance, in contrast to the two-month returns im-
mediately after the IPO filing.
Finally, I investigate directly whether the instrument can explain changes in
innovative trends in the core technologies of firms at the time of IPO filing.32 I
use all patents granted by the USPTO to calculate changes in innovative trends in
these technologies.33 In Table 2 of the Appendix, I find that the instrument does
not predict changes in any of these innovative trends. Clearly, firms may switch to
different technologies following the IPO. However, this test suggests that whether
or not such a switch occurred, it is not likely to be driven by the two-month change
in the NASDAQ.
32 I define a technology class as a core technology if the share of patents in that class, in the three
years before the IPO filing, is above the median share of patents across all the technology classes of
the firm.
33 Specifically, the change in average patent quality of each core technology is the average scaled
citations of all patents in the specific technology class in the five years after the IPO filing, divided by
the average scaled citations in the three years prior to the IPO filing in the corresponding technology
class. Similarly, I construct the change in the total number of patents in the core technology, and
also the change in the weighted number of patents, when patents are weighted by the number of
citations. Since firms may have multiple core technologies, I weight the measures outlined above by
the number of patents a firm produced in each core technology class.
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1.4 Results
1.4.1 Within-Firm relationship between IPOs and Innovation
Before turning to the instrumental variables analysis, in this section I explore
the within-firm changes in innovation of firms that successfully completed the IPO
filing. The specification presented in Table 3 uses the various innovation measures
as dependent variables and has the following form:
Yit = β0 +
k=5
∑
k= 3
k 6=0
γkEventYeari,k + τi + µt + εi,t
EventYeari,k is a dummy variable indicating the relative year around the IPO
in which a patent was applied for approval (year zero is the year of the IPO and
the omitted category). All specifications are estimated using OLS and include firm
fixed effects (τi) and year fixed effects (µt). Standard errors are clustered at the
firm level.34
The unit of observation in columns (1) to (6) of Table 3 is at the patent level.
The dependent variable in column (1) is the raw count of patent citations. I find a
monotonic decline in patents’ novelty that starts two years before the IPO event,
and continues in the five years thereafter. Since citations vary over time and be-
tween technology classes, in column (2) I use the scaled citations measure. The
coefficients represent the change in relative innovation quality, and demonstrate
a similar pattern to the one found in column (1). The post-IPO decline in scaled
citations is displayed in Figure 2. The magnitude of the effect is substantial. For
34 In an unreported analysis I verify that these results remain unchanged when the estimated model
is quasi maximum likelihood Poisson, the standard model used in count data analysis. The model is
discussed in the Appendix.
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example, the coefficient of the year dummy three years after the IPO equals -0.597,
implying a decline of 31.64 percent in innovation quality relative to the pre-IPO
filing period (average scaled citations is 1.89).
In column (3) I repeat the same specification, but use patent originality as a
dependent variable. Patent originality deteriorates significantly, starting two years
after the IPO event. In column (4) the effect becomes even more significant when
I estimate it using scaled originality. In columns (5) and (6), similar patterns arise
when I estimate the effects on generality and scaled generality. Lastly, in columns
(7) and (8) I consider changes in innovation measured by number of patents per
year in the years around the IPO event. I find no change in the number of patents
produced after the IPO, measured by either simple patent counts or scaled number
of patents.
Taken together, the results indicate a change in the composition of patents around
the IPO. The quality of innovation declines, as do the generality and originality
measures, indicating that research becomes less fundamental. Additionally, I find
no evidence for an increase in innovative scale following the IPO. However, these
results could be driven by reversion to the mean and life cycle effects, irrespective
of the IPO filing. To better understand whether this decline is driven by the IPO,
next sections present the results using the instrumental variables approach.
1.4.2 Internal Innovation
In this section I use the instrumental variables approach, described in Section 2
to study the effects of going public on internally generated firm innovation.
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Figure 2 - Quality of Innovation around the IPO Event
The ﬁgure presents the changes in patent quality, measured by scaled citations in the years around the IPO
(year zero is the year of the IPO event). The chart estimates and conﬁdence intervals are taken from the
year dummy variables in the second column of Table 3.
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First Stage
The first-stage results, presented in Table 4, demonstrate the effect of the two-
month NASDAQ returns on IPO completion. The dependent variable is equal to
one if a firm completed the IPO filing, and zero otherwise. All specifications in-
clude filing year and industry fixed effects using OLS.35 In column (1), I find that
the coefficient of the two-month NASDAQ returns equals 0.704 and is significant
at 1 percent. A change of one standard deviation in NASDAQ returns translates
into a decline of 8.72 percent in the likelihood of completing the IPO. Moreover,
the F-statistic equals 47.79 and exceeds the threshold of F = 10 which suggests
that the instrument is strong and unlikely to be biased toward the OLS estimates
(Bound, Jaueger, and Baker, 1995; Staiger and Stock 1997).
A concern with the post-IPO filing returns is that its variation may be either
capturing the pre-IPO filing fluctuations that motivate firms to submit the initial
registration statement, or reflecting the state of the IPO market. Therefore, I add
additional control variables such as the three-month NASDAQ returns prior to the
IPO filing and the location of the filer within the IPO wave. I also control for the
number of pre-filing patents, and a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is
backed by a VC fund and re-estimate the model in column (2). The coefficient of
the post-IPO filing NASDAQ returns is still significant at 1 percent with a higher
F-statistic of 52.03 reflecting the greater accuracy of the first stage. The sensitivity
to market fluctuations slightly increases, and equals 0.763. This result suggests
that the two-month NASDAQ returns play an important role in determining IPO
completion, and is almost orthogonal to the added control variables, confirming
the findings in Table 2.
35 Probit model generates similar estimates.
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In columns (3) and (4) I verify that the variation of the instrument is not driven
only by the year 2000. I repeat the specification above, but limit the sample to
pre-2000 years. The sensitivity of IPO completion to market fluctuations remains
strongly significant at 1 percent, with only a slight change in magnitude (0.690
relative to 0.704 estimated in column (1)), illustrating that sensitivity of filers to
market conditions is not a unique phenomena to the burst of the internet bubble,
as additionally demonstrated in Figure 1.
In the remainder of the table I explore alternative specifications of the instru-
ment. In columns (5) and (6) I calculate the NASDAQ returns over the entire book-
building period, from the first day of the IPO filing until the IPO completion or
withdrawal dates.36 Although the coefficient is still significant at 1 percent, and the
F-statistic is sufficiently high, the magnitude of the coefficient declines, and one
standard deviation change reflects a 6.17 percent change in the likelihood that the
firm will complete the IPO filing. The weaker effect reflects the importance of the
first months in the book-building period, where most of the marketing efforts are
concentrated. This is consistent with Welch’s (1992) argument of “information cas-
cades”: later investors are more likely to rely on earlier investors’ choices, leading
to the rapid success or failure of the equity offering.
In columns (7) and (8), I construct a dummy variable that equals one if the two-
month NASDAQ returns experienced by a filer are among the lowest 25 percent
of all filers within the same year. The dummy variable is highly significant, re-
flecting a 10.6 percent decline in the likelihood that a firm will complete the IPO
filing. Finally, Figure 3 illustrates the non-parametric relation between the two-
month NASDAQ fluctuations and the likelihood to complete the IPO filing. The
36 When the IPO withdrwal date is not available, I calculate it as the 270 days after the last IPO
filing amendment (Lerner 1994)
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figure shows that as long as the NASDAQ fluctuations are negative, there is a pos-
itive and monotonic association between NASDAQ returns and the likelihood to
complete the IPO filing. When NASDAQ returns are positive, filers become less
sensitive to market conditions and the likelihood to complete an IPO filing becomes
more or less stable around 85%.
Overall, the first-stage results indicate that NASDAQ fluctuations have a strong
effect on IPO completion, particularly when NASDAQ declines. Moreover, the
two-month NASDAQ effect seem to be orthogonal to the added control variables.
Simple Illustration of Reduced Form Results
Before proceeding to the multivariate analysis, I illustrate the results by a sim-
ple comparison of the post-IPO innovative performance of firms that experienced
a NASDAQ drop relative to other filers within the same year. This comparison is
equivalent to the reduced-form estimation illustrated in the example in Section 2.B
when the instrument is binary and equals one if a firm experienced a NASDAQ
drop. This approach is attractive because of its simplicity and the absence of any
distributional or functional form assumptions. If experiencing a NASDAQ decline
affects the decision to complete the IPO but does not affect the long-run scaled mea-
sures of innovation, differences in averages illustrate the effects of going public on
innovative activity.
For this analysis, a firm is said to have experienced a NASDAQ drop if the two-
month NASDAQ returns after the IPO filing are within the bottom 25 percent of
filers in a given year. Column (2) of Table 2 illustrates that there are no significant
differences between the two groups in any of the firm characteristics and innova-
tion measures at the time of the IPO filing. However, a comparison of post-IPO
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Table 5 - Reduced Form
The table reports differences in the ﬁve-year innovative performance following the IPO
ﬁling between ﬁlers that experienced aNASDAQdrop and other ﬁlers in the same year that
did not experience a NASDAQ drop. A ﬁrm is said to have experienced a NASDAQ drop
if the two-month NASDAQ returns after the IPO ﬁling are within the bottom 25 percent
of all ﬁlers in the same year. This comparison is equivalent to a reduced form estimation
when the instrument is binary and equals one if a ﬁrm experienced a NASDAQ drop.
IPO is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a ﬁrm completed its IPO ﬁling, and zero
otherwise. Variables are described in section A of the Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate that
the difference in means is statistically signicant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
NASDAQ Drop No NASDAQ Drop
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Difference
IPO 0.74 1.00 0.44 0.85 1.00 0.36 −0.111***
Scaled Citations 1.59 1.19 2.05 1.34 1.09 1.15 0.247***
Scaled Number of Patents 5.56 1.91 12.42 5.91 1.49 16.64 −0.351
Scaled Generality 1.10 1.10 0.67 1.10 1.09 0.67 −0.005
Scaled Originality 1.09 1.09 0.39 1.04 1.06 0.43 0.047*
Scaled Best Patent 5.36 3.14 7.92 4.14 2.69 4.99 1.215***
filing performances reveals significant differences.
Table 5 illustrates a strong correlation between two-month NASDAQ declines
and subsequent five-year innovative performance. The likelihood that the IPO will
be completed declines by 11.1 percent for firms experiencing low NASDAQ re-
turns. These firms produce patents with higher average scaled citations in the sub-
sequent five years (the difference is significant at a 1 percent level) and generate
patents with higher average scaled originality. The difference in patent quality is
also apparent when one considers the most-cited patent produced after the IPO fil-
ing (rather than the average citation rates). I find no differences in the number of
patents produced following the IPO filing.
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These reduced-form results demonstrate that going public affects firms’ innov-
ative activity, and it leads to more incremental type of innovation. The rest of the
section makes use of the continuous value instrument, using the entire variation
in the two-month NASDAQ returns, and studies separately each of the innovative
performance measures.
Innovation Novelty
The first set of results explores the effect of IPO on innovation novelty. The de-
pendent variable is the average scaled citations of patents in the five years follow-
ing the IPO filing. I control for the equivalent measure in the three years prior to the
IPO filing. All specifications follow the model described in Section 2.B, controlling
for filing year and industry fixed effects. Additionally, I control for the three-month
pre-IPO filing NASDAQ returns, a dummy variable indicating whether the issuer
is backed by a VC, and Pioneer and Early Follower indicators that capture the lo-
cation within the IPO wave. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.37
In column (1) of Table 6, I report the endogenous OLS model and find no differ-
ences between IPO firms and withdrawn firms as the IPO coefficient is insignificant
and close to zero. Column (2) presents the reduced-form estimation, obtained by
substituting the endogenous IPO variable with the instrument. I find a strong and
negative correlation between two-month NASDAQ returns and average scaled ci-
tations in the subsequent five years. This strong correlation is plausibly generated
37 It may be natural to cluster standard errors at the level of the quarter since the selection to com-
plete the IPO filing may be correlated across issuers filing in proximity to one another. In an unre-
ported analysis I run this specification and find that in fact clustered standard errors decline relative
to the robust estimates. This may indicate that there is no need to cluster firms at that level. As
illustrated by Kezdi (2004), clustering may generate a bias toward over-rejection and overestimated
t-statistics when there is no need for clustering. Using a robust standard errors in my setting may be
a more conservative approach with lower t-statistics.
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Table 6 - Innovation Novelty
The table reports the effect of an IPO on innovation novelty. The dependent variable is the
average scaled citations per patent in the ﬁve years after the IPO ﬁling. IPO is a dummy
variable equals to one if a ﬁrm completed the IPO ﬁling, and zero otherwise. NASDAQ
returns variable is the two-month NASDAQ returns calculated from the IPO ﬁling date.
Control variables included in the regressions are: pre-ﬁling average scaled citations per
patent, pre-ﬁling average scaled number of patents per year, Pioneer, Early follower, VC-
backed dummy, and the three-month NASDAQ returns before the IPO ﬁling. Variables are
described in section A of the Appendix. In columns (1) and (2) the estimated model is Or-
dinary Least Squares (OLS), and Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) in column (3). Column (4)
estimates the instrumental variables approach using a quasi maximum likelihood Poisson
model, which is discussed in Section B of the Appendix. In all speciﬁcations, marginal ef-
fects are reported. The standard errors in column (4) are corrected using the delta method.
Magnitude is the ratio of the IPO coefﬁcient to the pre-ﬁling average of scaled citations per
patent. Robust Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate that the
coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Scaled Scaled Scaled Scaled
Citations Citations Citations Citations
Model OLS OLS 2SLS-IV Poisson-IV
IPO −0.019 −0.831** −0.980**
(0.069) (0.409) (0.427)
NASDAQ returns −0.498**
(0.239)
Magnitude -1.02% - -43.51% -52.41%
Observations 1,079 1,079 1,079 1,079
R-squared 0.239 0.242 0.128 0.148
Filing year FE yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Control variables yes yes yes yes
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through the effect of the two-month NASDAQ fluctuations on the decision of firms
whether to complete the IPO filing or not. This result corresponds to the findings
in Table 5. In column (3), I report the estimates of the two-stage least squares.
The coefficient of the IPO variable is significant and equals -0.831, implying that
average scaled citations per patent of IPO firms drops after the event by 43.51 per-
cent (=0.83/1.91, when 1.91 is the average number of scaled citations in pre-event
years). In column (4) I use the quasi maximum likelihood (QML) Poisson model to
estimate the IV specification. The estimates are similar to column (3): the coefficient
of interest is significant, negative, and of a similar magnitude.
It is interesting to note that the OLS coefficient overestimates the effect of going
public on the quality of innovation, compared to the IV estimate. As illustrated in
the example in Section 2.B, this suggests that the selection bias associated with the
decision to complete the IPO filing is positive, and on average, more innovative
firms are more likely to complete the IPO filing.
The Fundamental Nature of Research
In this part I explore whether the decline in patent citations is associated with
a change in the nature of projects. Specifically, firms that pursue less basic or fun-
damental research may produce less influential innovations. In Table 7, I use the
originality and generality measures to capture the fundamental nature of patents.
The estimation follows the same specification used in the previous section, substi-
tuting average scaled citations with average scaled originality or generality.
Columns (1)-(3) provide the results with respect to average scaled originality
of patents in the five years following the IPO filing. In column (1), I estimate the
endogenous variable specification. I find no significant difference between with-
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drawn firms and IPO firms. The reduced-form estimation in column (2), which
substitutes the IPO variable for the instrument, shows that the instrument is signif-
icant at -0.081. The two-stage least squares estimates in column (3) demonstrate
that the post-filing average originality of firms that completed the IPO signifi-
cantly declines as the IPO coefficient equals -0.137 reflecting a decline of 13 percent
(=  0.131.06 , the average scaled originality in pre-event years is 1.06). These findings
suggest that issuers who remained private produce patents that rely on a broader
set of technologies. In columns (5)-(8) I repeat the analysis this time with respect to
average scaled generality measure, and results demonstrate no significant effects.
Scale of Innovation
The decline in innovation novelty may be driven by an increase in the scale of
innovation, measured by number of patents. In that case, addition of low-quality
innovative projects may generate the results rather than a repositioning of research
to lower impact topics. The analysis in Table 8 addresses this conjecture by ex-
ploring changes in innovative scale. The dependent variable is the average scaled
number of patents per year after the IPO filing. I control for the pre-IPO filing corre-
sponding measure. The specification is identical to the estimation in the previous
sections. One complication in this analysis is coming from the attrition problem
that may arise due to patent approval lags, particularly toward the end of the sam-
ple. Patents applied toward the end of the sample period may have not yet been
approved and therefore are not considered in the analysis. In that regard, scaling
patent counts is important not only to account for variations in patent filings but
also because it alleviates the attrition problem. The attrition problem is further mit-
igated by the fact that patent approval lags are likely to affect similarly both IPO
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firms and withdrawn firms.
The endogenous model in column (1) indicates that IPO firms produce signifi-
cantly more patents per year following the IPO filing with a 37.75 percent increase
relative to the pre-IPO average. Column (2), however, indicates that the above ef-
fect is insignificant when the reduced form specification is estimated. The 2SLS
estimate in column (3) indicates that the coefficient of the IPO variable is insignifi-
cant and the magnitude declines to 28.17 percent. In fact, when using the IV Pois-
son specification in column (4), the coefficient of the IPO variable is close to zero
and insignificant.
Given the length of research projects, the magnitude of increase in scale may
appear only several years after the IPO. In column (5), I use the innovative scale
measure over years two to five after the IPO filing, and control for the scaled num-
ber of patents per year in prior years (in the three years before the IPO filing and
one year thereafter). Similar to the results in column (4), I find no evidence of an in-
crease in the number of patents produced by IPO firms. Overall, the results suggest
that there is no causal evidence of an increase in the scale of innovation.
Patent Portfolio
Since the change in patent quality is not driven by changes in the number of
patent filings, it is natural to further investigate the nature of the change in firms’
research following the IPO. In this part, I study the structure of the patent portfolio.
In the first analysis I investigate the dispersion of patents across different tech-
nology classes, using the Herfindahl index. The lower the Herfindahl measure,
the higher the concentration of patents in a specific set of technologies. To allow
a meaningful calculation of the Herfindahl measure, I restrict the analysis to firms
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Table 8 - Innovation Scale
The table reports the effect of an IPO on innovation scale. The dependent variable is the
average scaled number of patents per year in the ﬁve years after the IPO ﬁling. IPO is
a dummy variable equal to one if a ﬁrm completed the IPO ﬁling, and zero otherwise.
NASDAQ returns variable is the two-month NASDAQ returns calculated from the IPO ﬁl-
ing date. Control variables included in regressions are: pre-ﬁling average scaled citations,
pre-ﬁling average scaled number of patents per year, Pioneer, Early follower, VC-backed
variable, and the three-month NASDAQ returns before the IPO ﬁling. Variables are de-
scribed in section A of the Appendix. In columns (1) to (4), the pre-ﬁling period is within
the range of [-3,0] years around the IPO ﬁling, while the post-IPO corresponds to the years
[1,5]. In column (5), the pre-ﬁling period covers the years [-3,1] while the years [2,5] used to
calculate the post-IPO ﬁling measure. The estimated model is OLS in columns (1) and (2),
and two-stage least squares in column (3). Columns (4) and (5) estimate the speciﬁcation
using a quasi maximum likelihood Poisson model discussed in Section B of the Appendix.
In all speciﬁcations, marginal effects are reported. In columns (5)-(6) standard errors are
corrected using the delta method. Magnitude is equal to the ratio of the IPO coefﬁcient,
divided by the pre-ﬁling scaled number of patents per year. Robust Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample post post post post post plus
Dependent Variable Scaled Scaled Scaled Scaled Scaled
Patents Patents Patents Patents Patents
Model OLS OLS 2SLS - IV Poisson IV Poisson IV
IPO 0.268*** 0.200 0.002 −0.003
(0.066) (0.474) (0.662) (1.067)
NASDAQ returns 0.127
(0.305)
Magnitude 37.75% 28.17% 0.28% -0.12%
Observations 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,801 1,458
R-squared 0.184 0.178 0.184 0.168 0.174
Filing year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes
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that have at least two patents before and two patents after the IPO filing.38 The de-
pendent variable is the Herfindahl measure of all patents applied in the five years
subsequent the IPO filing. I control for the pre-IPO filing corresponding measure,
and the other standard control variables described in previous sections. In column
(1) of Table 9 I estimate the 2SLS-IV specification. The coefficient of the IPO variable
is significant and equals to -0.287, which is equivalent to a 58 percent decline in the
dispersion of patents across technology classes relative to the pre-IPO filing period.
This finding suggests that following the IPO, firms’ patent portfolio becomes more
focused on a narrower set of technologies.
I obtain further insights into firm patenting activity by exploring changes in the
quality of patents in core technologies and in expanded technology classes. I divide
patents in two ways. First, I divide patents into those in core technologies versus
those in non-core technologies. I define a technology as a (non-) core technology if
the share of patents in a certain technology before the IPO filing is above (below)
the median share of patents across classes in the firm. Second, I divide patents that
belong to expanded technology classes versus non-expanded classes. I consider
a technology class as an expanded class if the share of patents in a class increases
following the IPO relative to its share before the IPO.
The results of this analysis are presented in the remaining columns of Table
9. The dependent variable in column (2) is the average scaled citations of patents
within core technologies in the five years following the IPO filing. I control for the
pre-IPO filing patent quality within the same technologies. Estimating the 2SLS
model, I find that the IPO coefficient equals -0.910 and is significant at a 5 percent
38 Similar results are obtained even when the sample is restricted to firms with at least four patents
before and four after the IPO filing in order to get a more precise Herfindahl measure, although the
results are noisier due to the smaller sample size.
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Table 9 - Patent Portfolio
The table reports the effect of an IPO on patent portfolio composition in the ﬁve years fol-
lowing the IPO ﬁling. In column (1), the dependent variable is the Herﬁndahl measure to
capture patents dispersion across ﬁrm technology classes. In columns (2) to (5) the depen-
dent variable is the average scaled citations of patents within the (non-) core technologies
or (non) expanded classes. I deﬁne a technology class as a (non-) core technology if the
share of patents in a certain technology class before the IPO ﬁling is above (below) the me-
dian share of patents across technology classes in a ﬁrm. Additionally, a technology class
is considered (non-) expanded if the share of patents in a class (did not) increase following
the IPO relative to the share of patents before the IPO ﬁling. In all speciﬁcations I control
for the average scaled citations before the IPO ﬁling in the correponding partition. In col-
umn (1) I control also for the pre-IPO ﬁling Herﬁndahl of patents generated in the three
years before the IPO ﬁling. IPO is a dummy variable equals to one if a ﬁrm completed
the IPO ﬁling, and zero otherwise. The instrumental variable is the two-month NASDAQ
returns calculated from the IPO ﬁling date. Additional control variables included in all
regressions are: pre-ﬁling average scaled number of patents, Pioneer, Early follower, VC-
backed variable, and the three-month NASDAQ returns before the IPO ﬁling. Variables are
described in section A of the Appendix. The models are estimated using two-stage least
squares. Magnitude is equal to the IPO coefﬁcient, divided by the pre-ﬁling average scaled
citations in the respective partition. Robust Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable Herﬁndahl Scaled Scaled Scaled Scaled
Citations Citations Citations Citations
Sample Large Core Non-Core Expanded Non-Expanded
Portfolio Tech Tech Classes Classes
Model 2SLS - IV 2SLS - IV 2SLS - IV 2SLS - IV 2SLS - IV
IPO −0.287** −0.910** −0.383 −0.846* −0.095
(0.142) (0.458) (0.450) (0.464) (0.377)
Magnitude -58.37% -48.66% -22.31% -50.66% -6.51%
Observations 792 1,079 898 1,079 670
R-squared 0.158 0.171 0.141 0.078 0.248
Filing year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes
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level. This estimation reveals large differences in the post-IPO quality of patents
within the core technologies, as the quality of patents of IPO firms is lower by 48.6
percent relative to the pre-IPO filing average quality of patents at core technologies.
I re-estimate this model in column (3), but focus on innovation novelty in non-core
technologies. While the IPO coefficient is negative, I don’t find significant differ-
ences between IPO firms and withdrawn firms. Similarly, I repeat the analysis for
expanded and non-expanded classes in columns (6) and (7). I find that the decline
in the quality of the patents of IPO firms is concentrated in expanded technology
classes.
The results suggest that IPO firms focus on a narrower set of technologies, while
those that remained private are more likely to experiment in a broader set of tech-
nologies. Moreover, IPO firms produce lower quality patents particularly in core
technology classes and technology classes that were expanded following the IPO.
Robustness Checks
In the following section I summarize the results of several unreported supple-
mental analyses that test the robustness of the findings and explore alternative ex-
planations. I start by considering more carefully the hypothesis that IPO firms
have a lower threshold of filing patent applications, which leads to the addition of
low-quality patents and hence the decline in average quality. However, the best
(most-cited) patent is unlikely to be affected by such addition of low-quality patent
filings. Studying changes in the best patent, I find that the quality of the best patent
declines following the IPO, with comparable magnitude to the decline in the aver-
age innovation quality reported in Table 6. This evidence, which adds up to the
finding of the overall number of patents, suggests that going public affects the en-
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tire patent distribution rather than simply driving average performance down by
the addition of low-quality projects.
Second, I examine when differences between IPO firms and withdrawn firms
first emerge. Since research is a long-term process, the effect should not take place
immediately after the IPO. I repeat the instrumental variable estimation separately
for each year in the years following the IPO filing. I find that, as expected, the
differences in quality between IPO firms and withdrawn firms become significant
only from the second year onward after the IPO filing.
Third, I explore whether the results are mostly driven by the year 2000. As il-
lustrated in Table 4, the instrument strongly predicts IPO completion even when
all firms that filed in 2000 onward are excluded. I re-estimate the innovation nov-
elty regressions after excluding all firms that filed to go public during the internet
bubble in the years of 1999 – 2000. Naturally, standard errors increase due to the
decline in sample size, but the results remain significant and qualitatively the same.
Fourth, I verify that the results are robust to different citations horizons. As
noted earlier, Akcigit and Kerr (2011) find that citations are concentrated in the
first few years following a patent’s approval; therefore, results should not vary
substantially when using different citation horizons. I repeat the analysis, using
citation horizons of two and four years after the patent’s approval. I find that the
results are qualitatively similar.
Finally, a common caveat in interpreting instrumental variables results is that
the estimates apply only to a subset of firms who respond to variations in the in-
strument. Since capital-dependent firms are likely to complete the IPO irrespective
of NASDAQ fluctuations, the IV estimate may underestimate the average treat-
ment effects of IPO on innovation.
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To explore this caveat in detail, it is useful first to recognize that the fraction of
sensitive firms varies with NASDAQ fluctuations. The larger the NASDAQ drops
are, the larger the fraction of firms that are likely to withdraw (i.e., the larger the
sensitive group). In fact, at the limit, all firms are likely to be sensitive. Therefore,
I repeat the IV analysis, using only firms that experienced extreme fluctuations in
the NASDAQ (using both tails of the NASDAQ returns distribution). While this
decreases the size of the sample, it increases the external validity of the results,
since the fraction of sensitive firms is larger. As expected, I find that the fraction
of firms that respond to such variations increases. Importantly, when using the ex-
treme values of NASDAQ as an instrument, the effect of IPO on innovation novelty
remain similar to previous findings. This evidence suggests that the results are not
driven by a unique unrepresentative set of firms, but rather relevant to a broader
set of firms in the population.
1.4.3 Inventor Mobility and Productivity Changes
A substantial portion of the R&D investment is in the form of wages for highly
educated scientists and engineers. Their efforts generate intangible assets, which
encompass the firm’s knowledge. To the extent that this knowledge is “tacit,” it
is embedded in the firm’s human capital, and departure of inventors may lead to
knowledge loss. Therefore, firms tend to smooth their R&D spending over time in
an effort to reduce the risk of human capital loss (Hall, Griliches, and Hausman,
1986; Lach and Schankerman, 1989). Changes associated with the transition to pub-
lic equity markets may have substantial ramifications for the firm’s human capital.
Retaining key employees may become difficult following the IPO as options are
vested, and disparities in wealth between employees may affect their incentives.
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Additionally, dilution in ownership and changes in firm governance may affect
employees as well. Given the decline in innovation novelty and the importance of
inventors, it is natural to explore the human capital channel. In this section, I study
mobility choices and productivity changes of inventors following the IPO.
Inventor Level Data
The patent database provides an interesting opportunity to track inventors’ mo-
bility across firms, as each patent application includes both the name of the inven-
tor and its assignee (most often the inventor’s employer). The analysis of inventor-
level data is, however, complicated for several reasons. First, patents are associated
with inventors based on their name and geographic location. Inventors’ names are
unreliable, as first names can be abbreviated and different inventors may have sim-
ilar or even identical names. Second, attempting to detect inventor mobility using
patents is necessarily inexact. While it is possible to infer that an inventor changed
firms (e.g., patented for company A in 1987 and for company B in 1989), the precise
date of the relocation is unavailable. Additionally, in transitions in which inventors
did not produce patents in the new location are not observable. Nevertheless, this
method identifies relocations of the more creative inventors who patent frequently
and presumably matter the most.
To overcome the hurdle of name matching, I use the Harvard Business School
patenting database, which includes unique inventor identifiers. The unique iden-
tifiers are based on refined disambiguation algorithms that separate similar inven-
tors based on various characteristics (Lai, D’Amour, and Fleming, 2009). I attribute
a patent equally to each inventor of a patent. Overall, I have information on ap-
proximately 36,000 inventors in my sample. I restrict the analysis to inventors that
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produced at least a single patent before and after the IPO filing and explore the
patenting behavior of inventors in the three years before and five years after the
IPO filing. I identify three inventor types:
1. Stayer – an inventor with at least a single patent before and after the IPO
filing at the same sample firm.
2. Leaver – an inventor with at least a single patent at a sample firm before the
IPO filing, and at least a single patent in a different company after the IPO
filing.39
3. Newcomer – an inventor that has at least a single patent after the IPO filing
at a sample firm, but no patents before, and has at least a single patent at a
different firm before the IPO filing.
Out of the 36,000 inventors in my sample, I classify 13,300 inventors by the
above categories. These inventors account for approximately 65 percent of the
patents in the sample.
In Panel A of Table 10, I compare the patenting activity of stayers and leavers
in the three years before the IPO filing.40 I first consider only IPO firms, and find
that leavers produced more novel patents, measured by either raw or scaled cita-
tions. These differences are significant at a 1 percent level. Additionally, leavers
generate slightly more patents, when accounting for variations in propensity to
patent across technologies and over time. Interestingly, these patterns are reversed
for withdrawn firms. Those who remained at the firm produced higher-quality
39 I verify that all inventor relocations are not mistakenly associated with acquisitions and name
changes.
40 If an inventor’s status corresponds to the definitions of both a stayer and a leaver, I classify her
as a leaver. The results do not change in a meaningful way if I classify her as a stayer instead.
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patents measured by scaled citations, while no significant differences arise in terms
of number of patents.
Next, I compare the post-IPO filing patents generated by stayers and newcom-
ers. Newcomers in IPO firms produce more cited patents than stayers, and dif-
ferences are significant at 1 percent when I compare either raw or scaled citations.
Additionally, newcomers produce fewer patents than stayers, although this may
result mechanically from the shorter time period they stayed at the firm following
the IPO. Again, I find opposite results when considering withdrawn firms. The
quality of patents produced by newcomers is lower than those who remained at
the firm, when considering either raw or scaled citations. These differences are
strong and significant at a 1 percent level. Interestingly, the quality of patents gen-
erated by leavers is significantly higher than the quality of patents generated by
newcomers for both IPO firms and withdrawn firms.
Inventor Level Analysis
I explore the changes in inventor level activity using the instrumental variable
approach introduced in Section 2.B. I start by investigating changes in innovation
quality of stayers. Then, I examine inventor mobility by studying inventors’ likeli-
hood to leave or join the firm following the IPO filing.
The results are reported Table 11, when the unit of observation is at the level of
the inventor. In columns (1) and (2) I focus on the set of inventors that remained
at the firm, and the dependent variable is the average scaled citations per patent
produced by inventors in the five years after the IPO filing. I control for the inven-
tor’s pre-IPO filing citations per patent, as well as filing year and industry fixed
effects, VC-backed dummy, pre-IPO filing NASDAQ returns, and location within
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the IPO wave. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the firm, to allow for
correlations between inventors in the same firm. I estimate the 2SLS-IV in column
(1), and find that the IPO coefficient equals -1.094 and is significant at a 1 percent
level. The magnitude of this coefficient is large, corresponding to a 48 percent
decline in inventor’s innovation novelty in IPO firms relative to the pre-IPO filing
period. I repeat the analysis in column (2) using the Poisson specification, and find
a similar result. These findings suggest that the decline in IPO firms’ innovative
activity could be at least partially attributed to the change in quality of innovation
produced by inventors who remained at the firm.
To estimate whether inventors are more or less likely to leave the firm after
the IPO filing I focus only on the subset of stayers and leavers in column (3). The
dependent variable equals one if the inventor is classified as a leaver. I control for
the average quality of patents produced by an inventor in the pre-filing period, the
number of patents produced, as well as the other control variables used in previous
specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the firm. The 2SLS-IV
estimates of column (3) illustrate that inventors in IPO firms are 18 percent more
likely to leave the firm after the IPO, and coefficient is significant at 1 percent.
A natural concern regarding the validity of the instrument in this setup is that
NASDAQ returns may affect labor market conditions and thus correlate with the
likelihood that an inventor will leave the firm. However, since the empirical exer-
cise compares firms that filed in the same year and given the lengthy process of the
job search, it may be reasonable to assume that employees of firms that filed to go
public at the same year will face similar labor market conditions in the five years
following the IPO filing. To verify the robustness of the results, I restrict the sam-
ple further by focusing only on late leavers, i.e., inventors who produced patents
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in a different firm for the first time at least three years after the IPO filing. This
lag between the IPO filing event and relocations may reduce the likelihood that the
two-month NASDAQ change is correlated with future labor market conditions. I
estimate this specification in column (4) and find that, in fact, the magnitude of
the coefficient becomes larger, and employees at firms that went public are 27.5
percent more likely to leave the firm relative to withdrawn firms. These results
demonstrate that the decline in the quality of innovation of IPO firms is potentially
driven also by the departure of inventors.
Finally, I explore whether IPO firms are more likely to attract new inventors. In
order to address this question, I restrict the analysis to stayers and newcomers. The
dependent variable in column (5) is a dummy variable indicating that an inventor
is a newcomer. Using the 2SLS-IV specification I find that IPO firms are substan-
tially more likely to hire new inventors. The magnitude of the coefficient is large,
corresponding to a 38.8 percent increase. In column (6), I repeat the same exercise
as in column (4) and restrict attention to late newcomers who produce their first
patent at least three years after the IPO filing. I find that the coefficient slightly
decreases, but is still highly significant, corresponding to a 35 percent increase in
the likelihood to hire newcomers.
The results reveal that the transition to public equity markets has important
implications for the human capital accumulation process as it shapes firms’ ability
to retain and attract inventors. Following the IPO, there is an exodus of inventors
leaving the firm, and importantly, these inventors are those who are responsible
for the more novel innovations before the IPO. Additionally, going public affects
the productivity of the inventors who remained at the firm. The average quality of
patents produced by stayers decline substantially at IPO firms. These two effects
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can explain the decline in the innovative quality of IPO firms. However, the effect is
partially mitigated by the ability of IPO firms to attract new inventors who produce
patents of higher quality than the inventors who remained at the firm.
1.4.4 Acquisition of External Technology
The transition to public equity markets allows firms to acquire companies more
easily by exploiting the improved access to capital and the potentially overvalued
stock (Shleifer and Vishny 2003). Acquisition of ready-made technologies is also
attractive since it is easier to communicate to shareholders, quicker to implement,
and less prone to failures relative to a long process of internal innovation. This
section shows that following the IPO, firms are more likely to rely on external tech-
nologies.
Figure 4 illustrates the annual acquisition likelihood of at least a single target in
the years around the IPO filing. IPO firms exhibit a sharp increase in likelihood fol-
lowing the IPO, while there is no meaningful effect for withdrawn firms. In Panel
A of Table 12, I find that the acquisition likelihood of IPO firms increases from 9
percent in the three years prior to the IPO, to 66 percent in the five years follow-
ing the event. The comparable change for withdrawn firms is from 10 percent to
24 percent following the IPO filing, and this change is not significant. These find-
ings confirm the results of Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2010) who find that
IPO firms are more prolific acquirers even than mature public firms within their in-
dustry, and their average expenditure on acquisitions is substantially greater than
either capital expenditures or R&D.
Acquisitions, however, are used for a variety of reasons. The question remains
whether acquisitions are used to buy external technologies. I collect information
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Table 12 - Acquisition of External Technologies
The table reports summary statistics of ﬁrm acquisitions in the three years before and ﬁve
years after the IPO ﬁling. Panel A compares IPO ﬁrms and withdrawn ﬁrms and their
respective likelihood to engage in at least a single acquisition. Panel B details the own-
ership status of target ﬁrms. Panel C describes the summary statistics of acquisitions of
targets with patents. Panel D is a simpliﬁed reduced form table, illustrating differences
in likelihood to acquire external patents between ﬁlers that experienced a NASDAQ drop
and other ﬁlers in the same year. A ﬁrm is said to have experienced a NASDAQ drop if
the two-month NASDAQ returns after the IPO ﬁling is within the bottom 25 percent of all
ﬁlers in a given year. Panel E compares internal patents generated by IPO ﬁrms after they
went public with the external patents they acquired through mergers and acquisitions. *,
**, and *** indicate that the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Panel A - Acquisitions before and after IPO ﬁling
Complete Withdrawn Difference
Three years pre-IPO ﬁling
Total number of acquisitions 178 46 -
Avg. number of acquisitions per ﬁrm 0.12 0.14 -0.022
Acquisition likelihood 0.09 0.10 -0.009
Amount spent on acquisitions 3.94 7.05 -3.113
Five years post-IPO ﬁling
Total number of acquisitions 4043 428 -
Avg. number of acquisitions per ﬁrm 2.27 0.59 1.688***
Acquisition likelihood 0.66 0.24 0.419***
Amount spent on acquisitions 173.47 41.64 131.8***
Panel B - Target ownership status
Ownership Status
Public 324 7.98%
Public Sub. 604 14.88%
Private Sub. 585 14.41%
Private 2,547 62.73%
Total Public 928 22.86%
Total Private 3,132 77.14%
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on patents generated by target firms in the years prior to the acquisition. A com-
plication arises since, as demonstrated in Panel B, approximately 30 percent of the
acquisition targets are firm subsidiaries. In these cases, it is difficult to identify
whether assigned patents are generated by the parent firm or by the subsidiary.
Therefore, I collect patent information on independent firms only (approximately
90 percent of these are privately owned). Given that almost all of the subsidiaries
are acquired by IPO firms, the results underestimate the true contribution of acqui-
sitions to the IPO firms’ innovation and provide only a lower bound.
The number of external patents acquired by public firms in the five years fol-
lowing the IPO is substantial. As illustrated in panel C, approximately 7,500 patents
were acquired through mergers and acquisitions, relative to approximately 30,000
patents produced. Before the IPO filing, both withdrawn and IPO firms rarely ac-
quire external patents through M&A (the fraction of external patents are 3 percent
and 1 percent for withdrawn and IPO firms respectively). However, in the five
years following the IPO filing there is a drastic change. The fraction of external
patents in IPO firms’ portfolio increases to 31 percent while it remains small for
withdrawn firms (8 percent). This pattern is illustrated in Figure 5, demonstrating
the annual likelihood to acquire at least a single external patent per year.
The patterns described so far demonstrate a sharp increase in dependence on
external technologies following the IPO. Similar patterns arise when using the in-
strumental variable approach. For example, panel D shows that firms that experi-
enced two-month NASDAQ returns within the bottom 25 percent of all filers in the
same year acquire significantly fewer external patents relative to the rest of filers in
the same year (1.27 versus 4.70 patents in the subsequent five years). Similar results
arise when using the multivariate IV analysis, even when controlling for industry
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acquisition propensities.
Given the substantial reliance on external patents, it is interesting to compare
the external and internal patents of IPO firms. Panel E details these differences. On
average, external patents exhibit higher quality than patents generated internally
and are more likely to be in new technologies for which the firm has no patents
before the IPO filing (and less likely to be in core technology classes) relative to the
patents generated within the firm.
1.5 Discussion
The empirical findings illustrate that going public has substantial effects on the
manner in which firms pursue innovation. The financing view suggests that the
improved access to capital may allow firms to enhance their innovative activities.
While I find that the transition to public equity markets enables firms to acquire
external technologies, the financing view by itself cannot explain the decline in the
quality of internal innovation following the IPO, nor the departure of key inventors
from the firm.
The incentives view, however, is consistent with the main empirical findings.
This view suggests that in addition to the improved access to capital, the transition
to public equity market affects managers’ and inventors’ incentives. This translates
into a selection of less novel projects and departure of key inventors. In this section,
I explore two incentives-related explanations that are consistent with the empirical
findings.
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1.5.1 Managerial Incentives
Going public may affect managers’ incentives which may consequently lead
to a change in the type of innovative projects selected and to a greater reliance
on acquisitions of external technologies. Evidence shows that stock markets seem
to misvalue innovation, even when outcomes are persistent and predictable (Co-
hen, Diether, and Malloy, 2011). As argued by Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales
(2009), this may be driven by the weaker incentives of dispersed shareholders to
fully understand complex projects pursued by the firm relative to more concen-
trated ownership structures. Career concerns and takeover threats may pressure
managers to select more conventional projects which can be more easily communi-
cated to the stock market (Stein, 1989; Ferreira, Manso, and Silva, 2010). Concerns
regarding such adverse effects of market pressures are often raised by CEOs and
entrepreneurs. For example, when explaining the delay in Facebook’s IPO, Mark
Zuckerberg, CEO and founder, claimed that “being private is better for us right
now because of some of the big risks we want to take in developing new products.
... Managing the company through launching controversial services is tricky, but
I can only imagine it would be even more difficult if we had a public stock price
bouncing around.”41
The difficulty in conveying complex projects to the stock market may lead man-
agers to exploit the improved access to capital and potentially overvalued stock in
order to acquire technologies externally, rather than developing them within the
firm. The former strategy is attractive since acquisitions are easily observed, po-
tentially less prone to failures, and quicker to implement. The shift in the focus
toward more incremental projects internally and the greater reliance on external
41 Facebook Blog, September 2010.
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technologies may explain the departure of skilled entrepreneurial inventors.
Overall, a change in managerial incentives can explain the three main findings
in the paper: decline in internal innovation novelty, departure of inventors and the
increased reliance on external technologies.
1.5.2 Inventor Incentives
Going public may affect inventors’ incentives as well. For example, the dilution
in ownership claims of future innovations may lead inventors to pursue less am-
bitious projects, or alternatively may lead inventors to leave the firm to implement
their ideas in a private firm setting in which they can capture a larger fraction of
the returns for their innovation.
Another difficulty in retaining inventors is due to the improved ability of in-
ventors to cash out through their stock options, which may lead to their departure.
Google’s prospectus provides some anecdotal evidence. As claimed in the risk fac-
tors section in its IPO filing: “the initial option grants to many of our senior man-
agement and key employees are fully vested. Therefore, these employees may not
have sufficient financial incentives to stay with us.”42 This naturally raises the ques-
tion why couldn’t Google provide even stronger financial incentives to prevent the
departure of key employees. While Google provides some additional grants, these
are relatively mild and not sufficiently strong to retain employees. The reason for
the relatively mild additional compensation is due to Google’s attempt to avoid
generating even greater gaps in pay between employees. Specifically, the filing
states that “this offering may create disparities in wealth among Google employ-
ees, which may adversely impact relations among employees and our corporate
42 Google’s prospectus, p. 13
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culture in general.”43 This anecdotal evidence is consistent with broader evidence
suggesting that firms’ wage setting is constrained by workers’ views about what
constitutes a fair wage (Blinder and Choi, 1990; Agell and Lundborg, 1995; Camp-
bell and Kamlani, 1997).
Inventors’ incentives may also be affected by the improved ability of firms to
acquire external technologies following the IPO. Rotemberg and Saloner (1994)
discuss the incentives benefits from having a narrow business, which increases
the likelihood of implementation ideas generated by employees and therefore in-
creases their ex-ante incentives. Acquisitions may adversely affect the likelihood of
implementing inventors’ innovative projects and weaken their incentives to pursue
ambitious and novel projects.
This discussion suggests that following the IPO it may be more difficult to pro-
vide appropriate incentives for inventors and therefore less feasible to induce them
to pursue high-quality innovation. This, in turn, may force managers, regardless
of the change in their incentives, to rely more heavily on the acquisition of external
technologies. Hence, changes in inventors’ incentives, associated with the tran-
sition to public equity markets, can be similarly consistent with the findings of a
decline in novelty of innovation, departure of skilled inventors, and the greater
reliance on acquisitions.
1.5.3 Suggestive Evidence
While both theories can explain the empirical findings, they have different im-
plications. The managerial incentives explanation suggests that firms can pursue
high-quality innovation, but corporate governance considerations translate into
43 Google’s prospectus, p. 9
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managerial career concerns and prevent managers from doing so. The inventor’s
incentives theory suggests that providing appropriate incentives to inventors is dif-
ficult in a public firm setup and therefore, irrespective of managerial preferences,
this setting is less productive for innovation. In this section I provide some sugges-
tive evidence supporting the managerial incentives theory. However, this evidence
does not rule out the inventors incentives theory.
To explore whether managerial incentives affect innovation, I start by consider-
ing the case of managerial entrenchment. A more entrenched CEO may be harder
to replace, and thus less likely to be sensitive to market pressures. I capture man-
agerial entrenchment by investigating whether the CEO is also the chairman of the
board (Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989). The CEO’s dual role as chief executive and chair-
man of the board implies that the CEO can direct board initiatives affecting the
CEO’s job security and compensation, as well as responding to takeover threats.
Inventors’ incentives, however, are plausibly not affected directly by whether the
CEO is also the chairman of the board. Thus, if CEO entrenchment is correlated
with a higher quality of innovation, this may provide evidence for the importance
of managerial incentives and stock market pressures.
I collect information on board characteristics from S-1 filings, to determine whether
the CEO is also the chairman at the time of the IPO.44 Since S-1 filings are avail-
able through the SEC Edgar system from 1996, the number of observations in this
analysis is smaller. In Table 13, I repeat the IV analysis to explore the effect of
going public on innovation novelty separately for IPO firms with and without an
entrenched CEO. In column (1), I find that when the CEO is the chairman of the
board, the decline in innovation novelty following the IPO is not significant with
44 Execucomp database collects information about executives from S&P 1000 firms only.
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a magnitude of a 20.1 percent decline relative to the pre-IPO period. In column
(2) I contrast this result with the case where the CEO is not the chairman of the
board: here, going public is associated with a decline of 64 percent in the novelty
of patents produced in the five years following the IPO, significant at 5 percent.45
In columns (3) and (4) I repeat the analysis with respect to the likelihood of inven-
tors to leave the firm. In column (3), I find that when the CEO is the chairman,
the likelihood of inventors to leave the firm is in fact negative, yet insignificant,
relative to firms that remained private. When the CEO is not the chairman, how-
ever, column (4) demonstrates that inventors are 10.8 percent more likely to leave,
consistent with the decline in innovation quality. These results provide some evi-
dence of the importance of managerial incentives in generating innovation, and its
subsequent effect on inventors turnover.
In order to test whether dilution of ownership claims on innovation and cashing
out affect inventors incentives and departure choices, it is necessary to have infor-
mation on their compensation within the firm. In absence of this type of data, I
consider whether acquisitions adversely affect inventors. If acquisitions reduce the
likelihood of implementation of internal projects, and adversely affect inventors,
I expect to find a substitution effect between acquisitions and internal innovation
where greater reliance on acquisitions may be correlated with lower quality of in-
ternal innovation. Also, we may expect to find a greater departure of inventors
when firms rely more heavily on acquisitions.
I distinguish between firms that acquired external technologies in the five years
45 I estimate columns (1) and (2) separately, instead of using an interaction term of IPO variable
and CEO entrenchment dummy. An interaction term will require using an additional instrumental
variable. While it is possible to use the interaction of NASDAQ returns and entrenched CEO dummy
as an instrument, this has limited power, and is particularly problematic given the small number of
observations.
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following the IPO and firms that did not engage in such acquisitions, and run the
IV estimation separately for each group, using innovation novelty as a dependent
variable. In column (5) I find no significant decline in innovation quality for firms
that acquired external technologies (although the coefficient is negative), while in
column (6) I find a significant decline in the innovation quality of firms that did
not engage in such acquisitions. Additionally, in columns (7) and (8) I study the
likelihood of inventors leaving the firm, and find that inventors are more likely to
leave firms that did not acquire external technologies. These findings are consistent
with Sevilir and Tian (2011) who find that acquisitions complement innovation and
improve the acquiring company’s innovation. Hence, I find no direct evidence of
an adverse effect of acquisitions on internal innovation and inventors’ departure.
However, these findings should be interpreted lightly as they merely reflect corre-
lations and do not test for alternative channels through which inventors’ incentives
might be affected following the IPO.
Overall, this section provides suggestive evidence regarding the underlying
mechanisms that generate the decline in firm-level innovation. More precisely, I
find that managerial incentives play an important role in leading to a decline in
quality of innovation and departure of skilled inventors.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate an important but understudied aspect of initial pub-
lic offerings, namely, the effect on firm innovation. I find that the transition to
public equity markets has a substantial effect on firms’ innovative activities along
three dimensions. First, the projects selected within the firm are less novel, and rely
on a narrower set of technologies. Second, key inventors are more likely to leave
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the firm, and the productivity of remaining inventors declines, while at the same
time firms attract new human capital to the firm. Finally, firms rely more heavily
on acquisition of external technologies.
I consider two views in which going public may matter for innovation. On the
one hand, the financing view suggests that improved access to capital may enhance
innovation. On the other hand, the incentives view suggests that, in addition to ac-
cess to capital, going public affects managers’ and inventors’ incentives. This may
lead to a selection of more conventional projects. I find that although the financ-
ing view is consistent with some aspects of the empirical findings (the increased
reliance on external technologies), it cannot explain the decline in the novelty of in-
ternal innovation and the departure of key inventors following the IPO. In contrast,
the incentives view explains the effects of going public along all three dimensions
of the empirical findings.
Estimating the effects of going public on innovation is challenging due to its
inherent selection bias. My empirical strategy compares firms that went public
with firms that intended to go public, but ultimately withdrew their IPO filing and
remained private. I use NASDAQ fluctuations during the book-building phase as
an instrument for the decision to complete the IPO filing.
The findings in this paper reveal a complex trade-off between public and pri-
vate ownership forms. While private firms are able to generate more novel inno-
vation and retain skilled inventors, public firms can rely on acquisitions of external
technologies and attract human capital. These results have implications for deter-
mining the optimal point at which a firm should go public in its life cycle.
The results draw attention to the effects of IPO on both the ability of firms to
retain and attract human capital and on the productivity of the remaining inven-
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tors. Seru’s (2010) study of the impact of mergers on innovation has found that
mergers affect mostly the productivity of inventors remaining at the firm, rather
than affecting their likelihood to leave. The difference in results suggests that pro-
ductivity changes that coincide with various corporate events such as mergers and
IPOs are nuanced, heterogeneous, and require better understanding.
This paper does not address the general equilibrium effects of the IPO market
on innovation and its corresponding welfare consequences. Yet, the results suggest
that there may be important complementarities between public and private own-
ership structures. While private ownership may allow firms to pursue more am-
bitious innovations, improved access to capital may allow public firms to acquire
technologies, mostly from private firms. This suggests that ownership structure
plays an important role in shaping the market for technologies.
Finally, corporate managers, bankers, and policy makers alike have expressed
concerns that the recent dearth of IPOs marks a breakdown in the engine of inno-
vation and growth (Weild and Kim, 2009). Some blame the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX) for raising the costs of compliance for publicly traded firms.46 Regardless
of the role of SOX in explaining the recent IPO cycle, policy prescriptions of this
sort raise the question of whether the transition to public equity markets affects
innovation and if so how. This paper contributes to the debate by demonstrating
that IPOs affect innovation, but that their effects may be indirect. While innovation
novelty declines following the IPO, it allows public firms to acquire entrepreneur-
ial firms, and thus, potentially facilitates innovation through increased demand for
new technologies.
46 In the hope that IPO market stimulation will “jumpstart innovation and job creation,” President
Obama’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness has urged Congress to amend the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act to allow small companies to tap public equity markets.
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2. PRIVATE EQUITY AND INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE
This chapter is coauthored with Josh Lerner, Morten Sorensen, and Per Stromberg
2.1 Introduction
In response to the global financial crisis that began in 2007, governments are re-
thinking their approach to regulating financial institutions, with private equity (PE)
funds in particular being targeted by regulators. Most dramatically, in 2010 the Eu-
ropean Commission adopted the Alternative Investment Fund Managers directive
(European Commission 2010), which contains a sweeping set of rules regulating
the PE industry.
Regulators, politicians, and labor organizers have long expressed concern about
the impact of PE funds, pointing to their need to rapidly return capital to investors
and the potentially deleterious effects of such practices as the extensive leveraging
of firms. Critics have pointed to case studies that illustrate the negative conse-
quences of the transactions. For instance, Rasmussen (2008) points to the buyout of
Britain’s Automobile Association, which led to large-scale layoffs and service dis-
ruptions while generating substantial profits for the transaction’s sponsor, Permira.
The Service Employees International Union (2007, 2008) presents studies that show
the deleterious effect that excessive leverage, cost-cutting, and poor managerial de-
cisions by PE groups can have on firms and industries in cases such as Hawaiian
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Telecom, Intelsat, KB Toys, and TDC.
A central hypothesis in the finance literature since Jensen (1989), however, has
been that PE has the ability to improve the operations of firms. By closely moni-
toring managers, restricting free cash flow through the use of leverage, and incen-
tivizing managers with equity, it is argued, PE-backed firms are able to improve
operations in the firms they finance.
Several case and clinical studies illustrate Jensen’s (1989) hypothesis. For in-
stance, in the Hertz buyout, the PE investor Clayton, Dubilier & Rice (CD&R) ad-
dressed inefficiencies in pre-existing operations procedures to help increase the
profitability of Hertz. Specifically, CD&R created value by lowering overhead
costs, reducing inefficient labor expenses, cutting non-capital investments down to
industry standard levels, and aligning managerial incentives with return on capi-
tal (Luehrman 2007). Similarly, the buyout of O.M. Scott & Sons led to substantial
operating improvements in the firm’s existing operations, in part due to power-
ful management incentives, as well as the active involvement by the PE investors
(Baker and Wruck 1989).
This paper investigates the impact of PE investments on aggregate growth and
cyclicality. Specifically, we examine the relationship between the presence of PE
investments and the growth rates of total production, employment, and capital
formation across 20 industries in 26 major nations between 1991 and 2007. The
magnitude of PE investments is substantial: in a given year and country, we esti-
mate that approximately 4% of the average industry is acquired by PE investors,
measured in terms of sales, which is significant given the extended holding periods
of these investments.
For our production and employment measures, we find that PE investments are
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associated with faster growth. Industries where PE funds have been active in the
past five years grow more rapidly than other industries, whether measured using
total production, value added, total wages, or employment. One concern is that
this growth may come at the expense of greater cyclicality, which could translate
into greater risks for investors and stakeholders. Thus, we also examine whether
economic fluctuations are exacerbated by the presence of PE investments, but we
find little evidence that this is the case. Activity in industries with PE backing
appears to be no more volatile in the face of industry cycles than in other indus-
tries, and sometimes less so. The reduced volatility is particularly apparent in total
wages and employment. These patterns continue to hold when we focus on the
impact of PE in Continental Europe, where concerns about these investments have
been most often expressed.
In our baseline empirical specification, we include country-industry, industry-
year, and country-year fixed effects (FEs), so the impact of PE activity is measured
relative to the average performance in a given country, industry, and year. For
instance, if the Swedish steel industry has more PE investment than the Finnish
one, we examine whether the steel industry in these two countries performs better
or worse over time relative to the average performance of the steel industry across
all the countries in our sample, and whether the variations in performance over the
industry cycles are more or less dramatic.
We believe it is unlikely that these results are driven by reverse causality, i.e.,
PE funds selecting to invest in industries that are growing faster and/or are less
volatile. The results are essentially unchanged if we only consider the impact of
PE investments made two to five years earlier on industry performance. Granger
causality tests suggest that past PE investment precedes subsequent improvements
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in industry performance, while past industry performance has no impact on future
PE investment. The results continue to hold when we use an instrumental variables
technique employing the size of the private pension and insurance company asset
pool in the nation and year as a percentage of GDP.
This paper is related to the modest and mixed literature on the competitive ef-
fects of PE. Chevalier (1995a, 1995b) shows that buyouts of supermarket chains lead
to positive outcomes for local rivals. These rivals are more likely to enter or expand
in an urban region, if there are a number of firms that have undergone buyouts and
charge higher prices in these markets. She suggests that these results are consistent
with “softer” product market competition. Similarly, Oxman and Yildrim (2008)
suggest that PE corporate governance practices spill over on competitors after a
buyout. In contrast, Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl (2010) find that rivals experience a de-
crease in both their stock prices and their operating performance around the time
of PE investments in their industry. This different result may be due to the au-
thors focusing on a subset of isolated transactions and including so-called private
investments in public equity (PIPEs) in their analysis.
Our analysis has some limitations. First, the question of economic growth and
volatility is only one of many questions that regulators encounter when assessing
the impact of PE investment. Among the unaddressed topics are the impact on pro-
ductivity, the distribution of wealth across society, and the competitive dynamics
across industries. Second, it is too early to assess the consequences of the eco-
nomic downturn in 2008 and 2009, a period where the decrease of investment and
absolute volume of distressed PE-backed assets was greater than in earlier cycles.
Third, our results suggest that spillovers from PE-backed companies are important,
but data limitations prevent us from exploring them in more detail here.
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This paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2.2, we develop the hypotheses. Sec-
tion 2.3 describes the construction of the dataset, and the results are presented in
the Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents concluding remarks.
2.2 Industry Performance and Private Equity
Several alternative perspectives have been offered as to how PE investments
affect the prospects of an industry. In this section, we begin by reviewing the sug-
gestions about changes regarding overall performance; we then discuss hypotheses
regarding the interaction between economic cycles and PE investments.
2.2.1 The impact of PE investments on industry performance
Our initial examination compares the performance of industries where PE funds
have been more or less active.
The Jensen (1989) hypothesis that PE-backed firms have improved operations
has been supported by a number of empirical studies that focus on the effects on
the individual PE-backed companies. Kaplan (1989) examines changes in account-
ing performance for 76 large management buyouts of public companies between
1980 and 1986. He shows that in the three years after the transaction, operating
income, cash flow, and market value all increase. He argues that these increases
reflect the impact of improved incentives rather than layoffs. Looking at more re-
cent public-to-private transactions in the United States, however, Guo, Hotchkiss,
and Song (2009) find only weak evidence that gains in operating performance of
bought-out firms exceed those of their peers. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990)
examine 72 “reverse LBOs” (RLBOs), that is, companies taken private that went
public once again. These firms experienced a dramatic increase in profitability,
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which they argue is a reflection of cost reductions. John, Lang, and Netter (1992)
present supporting empirical evidence that the threat of takeover spurs firms to
voluntarily undertake restructurings.
More recent studies have used large samples and a variety of performance mea-
sures to more directly assess whether PE makes a difference in the management
of the firms in which they invest. Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2009) survey
over 4,000 firms in Asia, Europe, and the U.S. to assess their management prac-
tices. They show that PE-backed firms are on average the best-managed ownership
group in the sample, though they cannot rule out the possibility that these firms
were better managed before the PE transaction. Davis et al. (2008) compare all
U.S.-based manufacturing establishments that received PE investments between
1980 and 2005 with similar establishments that did not receive PE investments.
They show that PE-backed firms experience a substantial productivity growth ad-
vantage (about two percentage points) in the two years following the transaction;
about two-thirds of this differential is due to improved productivity. Cao and
Lerner (2009) examine the three- and five-year stock performance of 496 RLBOs
between 1980 and 2002. RLBOs appear to consistently outperform other IPOs and
the stock market as a whole. Large RLBOs that are backed by PE firms with more
capital under management perform better, while quick flips — when PE firms sell
off an investment soon after acquisition — underperform.
These findings might suggest that we would see superior performance for PE
firms, regardless of the economic conditions. Moreover, if PE firms represent a sig-
nificant fraction of the activity in certain industries (as shown below), there may
also be a positive effect at the industry level. Potentially, ‘contagion’ effects might
arise if improvements in bought-out firms spur their competitors to improve. This
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effect is difficult to document empirically, and our analysis provides no direct evi-
dence on the channels through which PE transactions affect the industries.
2.2.2 The impact of economic cycles
Numerous practitioner accounts have suggested that the PE industry is highly
cyclical, with periods of easy financing (often in response to the successes of earlier
transactions) leading to an acceleration of deal volume, greater use of leverage,
higher valuations, and ultimately more troubled investments (akin to the well-
known ‘corn-hog cycle’ in agricultural economics). This pattern is corroborated in
several academic studies. Axelson et al. (2010) document the cyclical use of lever-
age in buyouts. Using a sample of 1,157 transactions completed by major groups
worldwide between 1985 and 2008, they show that the level of leverage is driven
by the cost of debt, rather than the industry- and firm-specific factors that affect
leverage in publicly traded firms. The use of leverage is also strongly associated
with higher valuation levels and lower PE fund returns. Kaplan and Stein (1993)
document that the 1980s buyout boom saw an increase in valuations, reliance on
public debt, and incentive problems (e.g., parties cashing out at the time of trans-
action). Moreover, in the transactions done at the market peak, the outcomes were
disappointing: of the 66 largest buyouts completed between 1986 and 1988, 38% ex-
perienced financial distress, which they define as default or an actual or attempted
restructuring of debt obligations due to difficulties in making payments; 27% did
default on debt repayments, often in conjunction with a Chapter 11 filing. Kaplan
and Schoar (2005) show that fund performance is negatively correlated with in-
flows into these funds. Private equity funds raised during periods of high capital
inflows, which are typically associated with market peaks, perform far worse than
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their peers.
These findings corroborate the suggestions that the availability of financing im-
pacts booms and busts in the PE market. If firms completing buyouts at market
peaks employ excessive leverage, we may expect industries where a significant
fraction of firms have undergone buyouts to experience more intense subsequent
downturns. Moreover, the effects of this overinvestment would be exacerbated if
PE investments drive rivals not backed by PE to aggressively invest and leverage
themselves. Chevalier (1995b) shows that in regions with supermarkets receiving
PE investments, the rivals responded by adding and expanding stores.
An alternative perspective, suggested by some recent events in the PE industry,
is that PE-backed firms may do better during economic downturns because their
investors constitute a concentrated shareholder base, which can continue to pro-
vide equity financing in a way that might be difficult to arrange for other compa-
nies during downturns, as frequently happened during the recent recession. This
perspective implies that PE-backed companies may outperform their peers during
downturns, as they have access to equity financing that other firms do not have.
The presence of PE investors as shareholders may lead to fewer failures in difficult
economic conditions.
A related argument, originally proposed by Jensen (1989), is that the high levels
of debt in PE transactions force firms to respond earlier and more forcefully to neg-
ative shocks to their business. As a result, PE-backed firms may be forced to adjust
their operations more rapidly at the beginning of an industry downturn, enabling
them to better weather a recession. Even if some PE-backed firms eventually end
up in financial distress, their underlying operations may thus be in better shape
than their peers. This facilitates an efficient restructuring of their capital structure
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and lowers the deadweight costs on the economy. Consistent with this argument,
Andrade and Kaplan (1998) study 31 distressed leveraged buyouts from the 1980s
that subsequently became financially distressed, and found that the value of the
firms post-distress was slightly higher than the value before the buyout, suggest-
ing that even the leveraged buyouts that were hit most severely by adverse shocks
added some economic value.
Finally, institutional differences between PE funds and other financial institu-
tions may make PE funds less susceptible to industry shocks. A major source of
concern for financial institutions is the so-called ‘run on the bank’ phenomenon.
Runs occur when holders of short-term liabilities, such as depositors or repo coun-
terparties, simultaneously refuse to provide additional financing and demand their
money back. Other versions of this phenomenon arise when companies simulta-
neously draw down lines of credit, hedge fund investors simultaneously ask for
redemptions, or a freeze in the market for commercial paper prevents structured
investment vehicles (SIVs) from rolling over short-term commercial paper. How-
ever, it is unlikely that PE investments create dangers through this mechanism.
Private equity funds are typically prevented from borrowing themselves, and the
funds’ only claimants are their limited partners (LPs), which are typically bound by
ten-year lock-up agreements. Hence, the funds have no short-term creditors that
can run. Still, extensive loans may be provided to the individual portfolio compa-
nies. However, these loans are typically made by a concentrated set of lenders and
are without recourse to other portfolio companies or the fund generally. Hence,
an individual creditor’s ability to be repaid is largely unaffected by the actions of
other creditors, mitigating the incentive to run.
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2.3 Data Sources and Sample Construction
We combine two datasets in order to analyze how PE investments affect indus-
tries. One dataset contains information about PE investments compiled by Capital
IQ, and another contains industry activity and performance across the Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries that
are included in the OECD’s Structural Analysis Database (STAN).
2.3.1 PE investment sample
We use the Capital IQ (CIQ) database to construct a base sample of PE transac-
tions. This database is recognized as the most comprehensive database of world-
wide PE transactions. Strömberg (2008) compares CIQ LBO data during the 1980s
with older LBO studies using 1980s data and estimates that during this early pe-
riod, well before Capital IQ’s formation, the database’s coverage was somewhere
between 70% and 85%. The base sample contains all private placements and M&A
transactions in CIQ where (a) the list of acquirers includes (at least) one investment
firm, (b) where the transaction is classified as ‘leveraged buyout,’ ‘management
buyout,’ or ‘going private,’ (c) that were announced between January 1986 and De-
cember 2007, and (d) where the target company is located in an OECD country
included in the STAN database. Thus, we only look at later-stage buyout trans-
actions, and do not include venture capital investments. We exclude transactions
that were announced but not completed as of December 2007, as well as trans-
actions that did not involve a financial investor (e.g., a buyout executed by the
management team itself was excluded). This results in a sample with about 14,300
transactions, involving 13,100 distinct firms.
We use various measures of PE activity relative to the size of the industry. For
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most of our analyses we use an indicator variable that equals one if there are any
PE investments during the previous five years. This has the advantage of being
well-defined even absent information about deal sizes and the total size of the in-
dustry. For some analyses we use more refined measures of PE activity. We only
have information about the deal size for 50% of our transactions (though more
of the larger transactions), so for those analyses we impute missing deal sizes by
constructing fitted values from a regression of deal size on fixed effects for coun-
try, investment year, and target industry. Using the imputed transaction sizes, we
generate aggregate country-year-industry measures of PE volume in the form of
summed deal sizes. We then scale the total deal size calculated in this way by the
total industry production as reported by STAN (see below) to construct a relative
measure of PE investments in the industry. Since the imputations are noisy, we do
not use this measure directly. Rather, to reduce the noise, we construct indicators
for whether PE activity is above or below the median amount, or in the different
quartiles, based on this measure.
2.3.2 Industry Data
The STAN database provides industry data across OECD countries compiled
from national statistics offices. It contains economic information at the country,
year, and industry level. Thus, a typical observation would be the German trans-
port equipment industry in 1999. STAN includes measures of total production,
employment, and capital formation, as described in Table 1.
Throughout this paper, we focus on the following measures of industry activity:
 Production (gross output), the value of goods and/or services produced in a
year, whether sold or stocked, in current prices.
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Table 14: Descriptions of OECD STAN industry variables 
Industry Variable Description 
Production (gross output) Value of goods and/or services produced in a year, whether sold or stocked, measured at current prices. 
Value added 
Industry contribution to national GDP. Value added 
comprises labor costs, consumption of fixed capital, 
taxes less subsidies, measured at current prices. 
Labor costs (compensation of employees) 
Wages and salaries of employees paid by producers as 
well as supplements such as contributions to social 
security, private pensions, health insurance, life 
insurance and similar schemes. 
Number of employees Persons engaged in domestic production excluding self-employed and unpaid family workers. 
Gross fixed capital formation  
Acquisitions, less disposals, of new tangible assets 
(such as machinery and equipment, transport 
equipment, livestock, constructions) and new 
intangible assets (such as mineral exploration and 
computer software) to be used for more than one year, 
measured at current prices. 
Consumption of fixed capital  
Reduction in the value of fixed assets used in 
production resulting from physical deterioration, 
normal obsolescence or normal accidental damage. 
Source: OECD, STAN database, 2003. 
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 Value added represents the industry’s contribution to national GDP, i.e., out-
put net of materials purchased. While the methodology for constructing this
measure differs across nations, our focus here is on differences across time,
which should reduce the effect of national differences in the measure.
 Labor costs, which comprise wages and salaries of employees paid by pro-
ducers, as well as supplements such as contributions to social security, pri-
vate pensions, health insurance, life insurance, and similar schemes.
 Number of employees, which is the traditional measure of employment, ex-
cluding self-employed and unpaid family members working in the business.
 Gross capital formation is acquisitions, less disposals, of new tangible assets,
as well as such intangible assets as mineral exploration and computer soft-
ware. This variable is the closest aggregate to capital expenditures.
 Consumption of fixed capital measures: the reduction in the value of fixed
assets used in production resulting from physical deterioration or normal ob-
solescence.
2.3.3 Mapping Capital IQ to STAN industries
We have to rely on the OECD/STAN industry classification, since the endoge-
nous variables are only defined at this level. The STAN database and Capital IQ,
however, rely on different industry classifications. Industries in the STAN database
are classified by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Code,
which does not map directly to the Capital IQ classification. To overcome this is-
sue, we first use the mapping from the CIQ industry classification into SIC Codes,
and then use another existing mapping from SIC to ISIC industries.
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The mapping of CIQ industry classifications to SIC Codes includes only matches
for the most detailed levels of the CIQ classifications to four-digit SIC Codes. When-
ever possible we use this matching to get equivalent SIC Codes. However, PE trans-
actions are often defined by CIQ at a more aggregated industry level classification
(hence includes multiple refined categories), for which no direct mapping to SIC,
and ultimately to ISIC, exists. In these cases, we used all SIC Codes that belong to
the sub-categories of the industry classification of CIQ and therefore had multiple
four-digit SIC Codes for a single CIQ (upper level) industry classification.
In some cases, the mapping of a single aggregated level CIQ industry to mul-
tiple four-digit SIC Codes generated no conflict as all of the four-digit SICs corre-
sponded to the same ISIC industry classification, creating a one-to-one mapping.
In cases where the four-digit SIC Codes corresponded to different industries in
the ISIC scheme, we considered the particular deals and selected the most suitable
industry. In 390 transactions, we were not able to determine with certainty the
appropriate match in ISIC, and those transactions were dropped, leaving us with
13,910 PE transactions with ISIC classifications.
Finally, we group ISIC sub-industries to balance PE activity across industries.
For example, there are 520 PE transactions within the “Food products and bever-
ages” sub-industry classification, and only two transactions in the “Tobacco” in-
dustry. The ISIC parent category of these two classifications is “Food products,
beverages, and Tobacco.” Therefore, we use this aggregate category rather than the
two more refined ones. As a result, the industry classification we use is a refined
ISIC classification, but in cases of small PE activity we are using a more aggregate
industry level. In unreported analyses we verify that the results hold using the
refined (non-grouped) industry classifications.
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This results in a sample of 11,135 country-industry-year observations during
the years 1986 to 2007. For each country-industry-year, we measure PE activity
as the volume of PE deals occurring during the previous five years in this coun-
try and industry. In particular, an observation is a PE industry if it had at least
one PE investment during those five years. This definition was motivated by the
holding periods reported by Strömberg (2008). With this definition, we can only
compare activity from 1991 to 2007, leaving us with 8,596 country-industry-year
observations.
Tables 15, 16, and 17 present the distribution of deals across industries, years,
and countries. Several patterns are visible: (1) the heavy representation of buy-
outs as a share of economic activity in traditional industries, such as ‘textiles, tex-
tile products, leather,’ ‘machinery and equipment,’ ‘pulp, paper, paper products,
printing,’ ‘electrical and optical equipment,’ and ‘chemical, rubber, plastics and
fuel products’; (2) the acceleration in buyout activity, first modestly during the late
1980s and then especially in the mid-2000s; and (3) the greater level of activity in
a handful of traditional hubs for PE funds, including the U,S., the Netherlands,
Sweden, and the U.K.
Although the concentration of PE activity across certain industries, years, and
countries may have been a potential concern, our analysis includes year, industry,
and country fixed effects. This, together with the fact that country-industry-year is
the unit of observation, ensures that our results are not driven by a few industry,
year, or country outliers.
Table 18 is a comparison of the growth the industry measures for PE and non-
PE industries. PE industries grow more quickly in terms of output, value added,
and employment; however, the PE industries have a slower growth rate for gross
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Table 16: Distribution of deals by year 
Observations is the number of country-industry-year observations per year. PE Industries contains the 
number of observations classified as PE industries. An industry is a PE industry if it had at least one PE 
investment during the previous five years. Deals is the number of deals, and Deal Volume is the 
combined size of the deals (normalized to 2008 US$ billions). Imputed Deal Volume imputes the deal 
size for deals with missing size information. 
Year Observations 
PE 
Industries Deals Deal Volume 
Imputed Deal 
Volume 
1986  n/a n/a 95 19.56 27.15 
1987 n/a n/a 109 18.51 27.43 
1988 n/a n/a 157 42.83 60.77 
1989 n/a n/a 137 59.75 68.07 
1990 n/a n/a 120 21.41 32.47 
1991 456 116 158 13.29 21.88 
1992 469 139 178 15.73 26.80 
1993 509 177 197 16.44 29.61 
1994 516 191 262 15.57 25.68 
1995 520 202 347 35.05 49.86 
1996 520 204 431 43.53 57.30 
1997 520 206 655 55.41 86.12 
1998 520 202 871 94.46 144.40 
1999 520 217 824 86.41 131.17 
2000 520 228 780 105.44 138.76 
2001 520 251 687 80.83 102.62 
2002 520 269 722 93.28 122.11 
2003 520 276 945 145.73 178.78 
2004 520 293 1,217 203.73 278.14 
2005 520 293 1,428 258.58 368.21 
2006 520 316 1,788 404.54 552.20 
2007 406 273 1,776 748.42 963.42 
Total 8,596 3,853 13,884 2,578.48 3,492.93 
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Table 17: Distribution of deals by country 
The sample consists of 8,596 country-industry-year observations of OECD countries between 1991 and 
2007. Observations is the number of observations in each country. PE Industries contains the number of 
observations classified as PE industries. An industry is a PE industry if it had at least one PE investment 
during the previous five years. Deals is the number of deals, and Deal Volume is the combined size of the
deals (normalized to 2008 US$ billions). Imputed Deal Volume imputes the size for deals with missing 
size information. 
Country Observations PE Industries Deals Deal Volume Imputed Deal Volume 
Australia 320 125 122 14.64 18.55 
Austria 340 77 53 1.78 3.93 
Belgium 340 129 117 13.00 22.56 
Canada 340 218 292 98.98 117.12 
Czech Republic 300 158 37 5.06 5.89 
Denmark 340 94 142 9.79 17.30 
Finland 340 161 192 7.66 16.06 
France  339 274 1,273 121.04 176.37 
Germany 340 220 598 109.79 187.06 
Greece 324 30 7 4.45 6.14 
Hungary 320 142 18 1.15 3.39 
Ireland 340 104 4 0.00 0.01 
Iceland 339 6 46 19.09 20.69 
Italy 340 210 335 42.21 57.69 
Japan 328 70 73 20.79 26.71 
Netherlands 340 204 320 84.87 125.66 
Norway 340 73 71 5.00 9.53 
Poland  286 171 41 2.33 2.61 
Portugal  320 63 27 0.25 0.33 
Slovakia 300 111 13 0.18 0.93 
South Korea 340 47 20 4.81 4.81 
Spain 320 171 217 38.93 42.58 
Sweden 340 186 267 43.07 57.60 
Switzerland 340 158 111 17.66 31.46 
United Kingdom 340 318 2,194 377.13 423.60 
United States 340 333 6,676 1,372.78 1,898.46 
Total 8,596 3,853 13,266 2,416.42 3,277.05 
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fixed capital formation.
One natural question is whether the volume of buyouts during our sample pe-
riod is sufficiently large to have a material impact on the industries in which the
funds invest. The most direct approach is to look at the implied share of PE invest-
ments in the industries in our sample. We wish to compute the mean share of total
industry value represented by PE transactions annually.
Because enterprise value is not available for privately-held firms, we must ap-
proximate this measure. In particular, we compute a “revenue multiple” from the
publicly traded firms in Global Compustat for each industry and year as the ratio
between the aggregate enterprise value (the sum of the market value of equity, plus
the book value of debt and preferred stock) of all publicly traded firms across all
sample nations and the revenues for the same set of firms. We then assume that
this ratio also characterizes the privately-held firms in each industry in the same
year. Thus, we estimate the ratio of the aggregate volume of PE investments in each
industry and year (not using imputed deals, in order to be conservative), as well
as the product of the estimated revenue multiple and the aggregate production by
public and private firms, as estimated by the OECD.
These ratios vary by year, reflecting the ebb and flow of PE activity. If we ex-
amine the average annual share of PE activity across the entire sample period by
industry, it varies from 0.9% (for transport equipment) to 13.5% (for machinery and
equipment). The weighted average across all industries is 4.35%, with an inter-
quartile range from 2.5% to 7.1%. This suggests that for the typical industry, the
impact of PE over this period is quite substantial, especially in light of the five-to-
seven year holding period, which characterizes the typical PE investment (Ström-
berg 2008). This measure may understate the volume of PE activity. Not only are
93
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transactions with missing data excluded, but as discussed above, CIQ’s coverage
is incomplete.
Moreover, it is likely that having a significant fraction of firms in an industry
under buyout ownership has a substantial effect on competitors as well. As dis-
cussed in the introduction, earlier work suggests that the impact of PE extends
beyond the bought-out firms.
2.4 Analysis
2.4.1 Industry performance
We begin by examining the relationship between various industry characteris-
tics and the role of PE in the industry. In each case, an observation is an industry-
country-year triple, and the dependent variable is the growth rate of a given eco-
nomic variable (e.g., employment).
We employ several specifications. First, we include an indicator that denotes
whether the industry is a PE industry or not (defined, as noted above, as an indus-
try with at least one PE investment during the previous five years). Note that this
definition does not use the imputed deal values, since it only depends on the pres-
ence of PE deals. Second, we use two indicators to capture whether an industry is
a low or high PE industry. A low PE industry (PE5 Low) is a PE industry where
the fraction of total imputed PE investments divided by total production (both nor-
malized to 2008 U.S. dollars) is smaller than the median (conditional on having a
non-zero level of PE investment), while a high PE industry has PE investments
to production ratio above the median. We also perform the analysis dividing PE
activity into quartiles to better measure the differential effects of different activity
levels. For both the median and the quartile dummy specifications, industries with
95
no PE activity is the omitted group, i.e., coefficients should be interpreted as rela-
tive to observations with zero PE investment in a given country-industry-year. All
specifications include country-industry fixed effects.
To control for common shocks across industries and countries, we include industry-
year, country-industry, and country-year fixed effects in our specifications. Hence,
we estimate the fixed-effect panel regression:
yciy = PEciyβ+ ηci + ξ iy + µcy + εciy
where yciy is the endogeneous variable of interest, e.g., the growth rate of em-
ployment; PEciy is an indicator for whether the industry is a PE industry; ηci is
a country-industry fixed effect; ξ iy is an industry-year fixed effect; µcy is a country-
year fixed effect; and εciy is the residual error term.
The results in Table 19 indicate that industries with PE deals have significantly
higher growth rates of production and value added. For instance, in the first re-
gression, the coefficient of 1.368 implies that the total production of an average PE
industry grows at an annual rate that is 1.368% higher than a non-PE industry. The
average growth rate is 5.9%. When we include country-year fixed effects, the coef-
ficient is still statistically significant but declines to 0.541; i.e., the excess growth in
PE industries is 0.541% per year. This drop in the magnitude of the effect may indi-
cate that PE investors invest in countries during periods of above-average growth.
In Table 9, we report the significance of a statistical test for differences between
high- and low-PE industries, as well as differences between the four quartiles of PE
activity (reported as PEL = PEH). Without country-year FEs, we find some evidence
that the effect is stronger for industries with more PE activity. With country-year
FEs, the effect, although not statistically significant, appears slightly stronger for
96
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industries with less PE activity. The large number of country-year FEs reduces the
statistical power and statistical significance. Similarly, the data do not appear to
contain sufficient information to separate the effects when the level of PE activity
is broken down by quartile. All coefficients are positive, but not statistically signif-
icantly different.
In Table 19, for value added, we also find that the PE investments are associated
with faster growth. Without country-year FEs, the relation is particularly striking,
with industries with lower levels of PE activity growing 1.008% faster per year
than industries without PE activity, and industries with more PE activity growing
1.764% faster on average. These coefficients remain positive, but muted, when
including country-year FEs. Statistical significance also declines, although the loss
in statistical power is a potential reason for this decline, as mentioned above.
A natural concern is the direction of causality. It is possible that PE investors
pick industries that have the potential to grow, and our results may reflect this
industry choice rather than the causal effect of the investments on the industry.
To mitigate this concern, we change our definition of the PE industry measure to
only include investments during the period from two-to-five years prior to the ob-
servation, called the twice-lagged measure (the original PE measure included all
five years prior to the observation). The results are reported in Table 20. We find
that the results are very similar, indicating that the effect that we find is unlikely
to be driven by PE investors entering countries and industries where they expect
stronger immediate growth.
Table 21 considers measures of employment. PE industries appear to grow sig-
nificantly faster in terms of labor costs and the number of employees. In the specifi-
cations without country-year fixed effects, the annual growth rate of total labor cost
98
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is 0.779 percentage points greater for PE industries, while the number of employees
grows at an annual rate that is 0.845 percentage points greater. With country-year
fixed effects, these estimates decline to 0.16 percentage points for total labor cost
and to 0.4 percentage points for the number of employees, neither of which is sta-
tistically significant.
These findings may be surprising, since a common concern is that PE investors
act aggressively to reduce costs with little concern for employees. This concern is
not necessarily inconsistent with our results, since we are looking at the industry
rather than the firm level. Even if buyouts may lead to initial employment reduc-
tions at PE-backed firms (as found in Davis et al. (2009) for the U.S.), the greater
subsequent growth in total production, observed in Table 6, may lead to subse-
quent employment growth in the industry overall. Considering the specifications
with PE activity quartiles, the growth rate of labor costs and number of employees
is fastest in industries with moderate levels of PE activity. This suggests that the
increase in employment is not primarily driven by increases at the PE-backed firms
themselves but driven by the spillover effects at other firms.
As above, we are concerned about the direction of causality. Table 22 repeats the
analysis using the twice-lagged PE measure. The magnitudes in Tables 21 and 22
are largely similar, suggesting that the effect we identify is not mainly driven by PE
investors picking industries with expectations of immediate employment growth.
If anything, the results of the twice-lagged measure suggest that the growth in the
number of employees is more robust than the growth in labor costs.
Finally, in Table 23 we examine measures of fixed capital formation and con-
sumption of fixed capital. These measures appear much more volatile than the
production and employment measures, with substantially larger standard errors,
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making it difficult to discern any relationship between PE investments and capi-
tal formation. If anything, the results suggest that PE investments reduce the gross
fixed capital formation and consumption of fixed capital, but these results are more
tentative.
2.4.2 Cyclical Patterns
We next analyze how PE relates to industry cycles. For each industry and year,
we average the growth rate of the production and employment measures across
countries to attain the average growth rate. This rate measures the annual aggre-
gate shock in these variables (e.g., production output in the steel industry fell by 2%
on average in 2002 across the nations in our sample). We then investigate whether
PE industries are more or less exposed to this shock by including the PE measure
interacted with this average growth measure in the regressions. In particular, we
estimate the specification:
yciy   yiy = PEciyβ+ (PEciy  yiy)γ+ ηci + εciy
where yciy is the endogeneous variable of interest (e.g., the growth rate of employ-
ment); yiy is the mean of the endogenous variable across countries (e.g., the average
growth rate of employment in industry i during year y); PEciy is an indicator for
whether the industry is a PE industry; ηci is a country-industry fixed effect; and εciy
is the residual error term. Note that this specification does not permit us to include
individual year controls, since demeaning by subtracting industry-year averages
also removes any aggregate year variation. To capture any remaining serial corre-
lation and cyclicality, we also estimate specifications that allow the error terms to
follow AR(1) processes, as indicated.
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If PE and non-PE industries were equally sensitive to economic conditions, we
would expect the coefficient on the interaction term, γ, to be zero. For example,
if the average growth rate of employment first increases by 2% and this increase
is equally large for PE and non-PE industries and then decreases by 2% and this
decrease is also equally large, then γ is zero. In contrast, imagine that the growth
rate of employment increases by 2% on average, but this increase is distributed
such that PE industries grow by 3% and non-PE industries grow by only 1%, and
this is followed by a 2% decline in growth rate, but this decline is distributed such
that PE industries decline by 3% and non-PE industries decline by 1%, then the
coefficient γ is positive and we interpret this as PE investments amplifying the
exposure to the aggregate shocks.
In Tables 24 and 25, we examine the impact on production and employment.
Across all the regressions, the interaction terms are negative, which suggests that
PE industries are less exposed to industry shocks than non-PE industries.
To interpret the coefficients, using the estimates in the first regression in Ta-
ble 25, if an industry on average experiences a 5% increase in total labor costs in
a given year (the aggregate shock), a PE industry will experience, on average, a
5.576% increase (5% + 1.992% + 5% x -0.214 = 5.922%). Conversely, following a 5%
decrease in labor costs, a PE industry will only experience, on average, a 2.394%
decline ( 5% + 1.591% + (–5%) x –0.203 = –1.938%). Hence, an aggregate swing
from +5% to –5% (a 10% difference) in aggregate growth rates translates into a
swing from 5.9% to –1.9% (a 7.8% difference) in the growth rates for PE industries.
For the production and employment analyses (not value added), the coefficients
are significantly negative in the simple specification and many of the coefficients
in the employment analysis remain statistically significant when high and low PE
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industries are included separately. Overall, it appears that PE activity translates
into smaller employment fluctuations than average, but industries with a higher
amount of PE activity may follow a growth pattern that is closer to that of the in-
dustry as a whole.
2.4.3 Geographic Patterns
It is interesting to explore whether the impact of PE is different in Continental
Europe than in the U.S. and U.K. Not only is the level of PE activity higher in
the U.S. and U.K. than in most other nations, but the industry is more established.
Thus, we repeat the analysis, separating Continental Europe from the U.S. and U.K.
In unreported results, we repeat the base specifications reported in Tables 19
and 21 with the sample restricted to Continental European countries. All the main
effects remain largely unchanged for the Continental Europe sample, suggesting
that the effects are not primarily driven by the U.S. and U.K. Moreover, we find
that that the effects are not statistically different for Continental Europe and the
U.S./U.K., although the U.S./U.K. subsample is naturally a smaller sample, with
reduced statistical power to distinguish the effect of PE investments.
2.4.4 Addressing causality concerns
One natural concern relates to the interpretation of these results. While it ap-
pears that PE is associated with more rapid growth at an industry level in our
sample, it is natural to wonder which way the causation runs. Does the presence
of PE lead to higher production, or do PE investors invest where they anticipate
industries will grow? We respond to this question in several ways.
First, our baseline analysis considers PE investments during the five years prior
108
to the observed growth in total production and employment. As discussed above,
we also narrowed our measure to only include investments in the years two through
five prior to the investment. If our effects are due to PE investors anticipating
growth in particular sectors, they would have to be quite prescient to anticipate
growth two years in advance.
Second, we address this concern using an instrumental variables technique. To
identify exogenous variation, we use the size of the private pension and insur-
ance company asset pool in the nation and year, expressed as a percentage of GDP.
This kind of identification strategy has been employed in other papers in the ven-
ture capital literature, such as Kortum and Lerner (2000) and Mollica and Zingales
(2007). The basic idea is that in nations with larger pension and insurance pools
(institutional assets), domestic PE funds are more likely to raise capital and invest
it locally. Moreover, pension policy and insurance regulation are driven by broader
socio-economic considerations, rather than a desire to impact the local PE industry
or current investment opportunities in this industry. The intuition is that when a
country’s institutional assets increase, this increase leads to an increase in PE activ-
ity across all industries in this country, and the IV estimates the marginal change
in industry growth resulting from this increase.
Although the instrument only varies at the country-year level and PE investors
invest at the country-year-industry level, the identification follows from standard
arguments for identification using instrument variables. Specifically, identification
of the local average treatment effect (LATE) follows from an exclusion restriction
and a monotonicity condition (conditions 1 and 2 in Imbens and Angrist (1994)).
The exclusion restriction requires that changes in pension assets are indepen-
dent of the error term in the regression. While this is difficult to establish em-
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pirically, pension funds primarily change as a result of pension reforms, and we
have reviewed changes in pension policies in Germany and the U.K. These reviews
suggest that a wide array of considerations drive reforms in the rules governing
long-term savings, including demographic pressures and the consequent dangers
of running out of funding, the presence of perceived disparities (e.g., between
white- and blue-collar workers, in the treatment of stay-at-home mothers), and
the desire to increase the labor supply. We found no evidence that these changes
are motivated by a perception that PE investments offered particularly attractive
investment opportunities. One concern with respect to the exclusion restriction,
however, is that the motivation to increase the labor supply could potentially gen-
erate some of the results that we see. It is unlikely, however, that such reforms
should be concentrated in industries where PE firms are active.
The monotonicity condition states that an increase in institutional assets in a
given country must be associated with a weakly increasing amount of PE activity
in each of the industries in this country. In other words, an increase in institutional
assets cannot lead to a decline in PE activity for any industry, which seems reason-
able.
To estimate this model, we supplement the dataset with data on financial assets
held by domestic pension funds and insurance corporations from the OECD. We
only include funded pension obligations, excluding for instance, public pension
plans that hold very few investable assets but are funded on a “pay as you go”
basis. Table 13 presents the distribution of financial assets across countries.
The instruments for the PE variable we employ are financial assets normalized
with the country’s GDP, along with country and industry fixed effects. The results
of this analysis are shown in Table 27, which also includes regular OLS estimates
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Table 26: Distribution of financial assets by country 
Observations is the number of country-year pairs for which financial assets data is available (since 1990). 
Financial Assets is the value of assets held by domestic autonomous pension funds and insurance 
corporations (in 2008 US$ billions). Financial Assets to GDP Ratio is the fraction of financial assets 
normalized by country’s GDP.  
    
Financial Assets      
(2008 US$ billions) 
Financial Assets to  
GDP Ratio 
Country Observations Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev. 
Australia 18 480.14 269.90 0.72 0.18 
Austria 18 86.32 37.07 0.28 0.09 
Belgium 18 152.77 93.40 0.40 0.19 
Canada 18 809.71 296.95 0.77 0.11 
Switzerland 9 725.27 136.57 1.84 0.12 
Czech Republic 13 12.45 7.87 0.10 0.03 
Germany 17 1,493.70 465.62 0.49 0.13 
Denmark 14 260.46 76.98 1.00 0.15 
Spain 18 233.03 143.10 0.23 0.09 
Finland 13 45.13 15.38 0.23 0.05 
France  14 1,456.34 600.87 0.66 0.18 
United Kingdom 18 3,062.95 1,075.63 1.49 0.28 
Greece 13 10.49 4.62 0.05 0.01 
Hungary 17 8.65 9.12 0.08 0.06 
Ireland 7 253.39 102.63 1.15 0.21 
Iceland 7 19.25 7.95 1.14 0.20 
Italy 13 473.46 246.79 0.26 0.10 
Japan 18 3,327.69 374.91 0.59 0.08 
South Korea 6 368.09 87.98 0.42 0.04 
Netherlands 18 899.32 319.63 1.48 0.28 
Norway 13 105.06 38.10 0.39 0.03 
Poland  16 26.21 32.77 0.08 0.07 
Portugal  13 62.29 27.26 0.33 0.09 
Slovakia 12 3.02 2.37 0.06 0.02 
Sweden 13 302.44 95.06 0.80 0.15 
United States 18 12,900.00 3,246.92 1.08 0.14 
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for comparison. With the exception of number of employees, the previous results
of a positive impact of PE investment on industry performance are robust. The
coefficients on the PE investment variable actually increase substantially in magni-
tude. Interpreting this estimate as a LATE suggests that local PE investors, who are
more affected by the instrument, have a particularly large effect on growth rates.
In unreported analyses, we also repeat this exercise using lagged and twice lagged
assets-to-GDP as the instrument, and the results remain consistent.
Third, we address the endogeneity issue using Granger (1969) causality. This
empirical approach investigates the relative timing of related time series, in our
case PE investments, relative to production and employment growth. PE invest-
ments will Granger-cause production growth (or employment growth) if a previ-
ous increase in PE investments is associated with a subsequent increase in produc-
tion, but a previous increase in production growth is unrelated with subsequent
changes in PE investments. Granger causality has been widely studied and applied
in macroeconomics, and there has been substantial debate over the interpretation
of the causality concept. The concerns and caveats are well understood. Since we
have separate time series for each country-industry pair, we adopt a panel Granger
analysis. This is a more recent extension of the traditional approach and is less
established (see Hartwig, 2009). We adopt a natural parsimonious empirical speci-
fication.
We estimate a three-equation system of linear equations. The endogenous vari-
ables are the total production and employment growth rates and an indicator of
PE activity (we use an indicator for PE activity in each year, not the past five years
as used above). The exogenous variables are lags of the endogenous variables, in
addition to country and industry fixed effects. We first estimate the system using
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GLS (SUR), taking into account cross-equation correlations in the error terms.
Estimated coefficients using two different specifications of the lags are reported
in Table 28. Note that the coefficients from the system regressions are identical to
the coefficients one would obtain from estimating single-equation OLS regressions.
The standard errors, however, adjust for cross-equation correlations in the error
terms. In the first equation, we see evidence that PE investments Granger-cause
production and employment growth. In the third equation, however, we find no
evidence that increases in production or employment growth are associated with
subsequent PE investments. Indeed, the individual coefficients are all insignificant
and Wald tests for the joint significance of either the production or labor coefficients
do not reject the hypothesis that they are zero. Combined, this evidence indicates
that the direction of causality likely flows from PE investments to total production
and employment growth.
It is well known that including fixed effects in dynamic panel models can lead
to biased and inconsistent estimators. Given our long panel — from 1991 to 2007
— we suspect that this problem is small. Nevertheless, Table 16 reports estimates
of the system-GMM procedures proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blun-
dell and Bond (1998) to overcome this problem. These procedures involve first-
differencing of the endogenous variables, which is similar to including country-
industry fixed effects. The table reports joint significance tests of the lagged PE
indicators, lagged labor growth, and lagged production growth. In addition, we
report tests for first- and second-order serial correlation in the error terms. First dif-
ferencing, by construction, generates first-order autocorrelation, as reported, which
is fully consistent with the specification. We find some evidence of higher-order au-
tocorrelation for labor growth, however, but not for production growth and the PE
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Table 28: Granger causality (SUR) 
The table contains coefficients from two specifications of a linear SUR/VAR model, each with three 
equations. Columns 1-3 contain estimates of the first specification; columns 4-6 contain the second o
Endogenous variables are productivity growth (deviation from annual industry average), labor growt
(deviation from annual industry average), and a PE indicator (equals one for each country-industry-y
with any PE activity). Exogenous variables are lagged endogenous variables with the lag in parenthe
and industry- and country-fixed effects. Note that the coefficients, but not the standard errors, are 
identical to those obtained from six single-equation OLS regressions. Reported standard errors allow
cross-equation correlations. Significance levels of Wald tests of the joint significance of the PE, 
productivity, and labor coefficients are reported. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% leve
are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Prod.(%) Labr.(%) PE(0/1) Prod.(%) Labr.(%) PE(0/1) 
PE1 (1) 0.918*** 0.562*** 0.096*** 0.894*** 0.607*** 0.098*** 
 (0.297) (0.218) (0.015) (0.312) (0.217) (0.015) 
PE1 (2) 0.000 -0.051 0.115*** 0.126 0.012 0.115*** 
 (0.307) (0.225) (0.015) (0.321) (0.224) (0.015) 
PE1 (3) -0.433 -0.007 0.144*** -0.342 0.015 0.151*** 
 (0.312) (0.228) (0.016) (0.327) (0.228) (0.015) 
PE1 (4) 0.213 -0.287 0.136*** 0.210 -0.281 0.133*** 
 (0.323) (0.237) (0.016) (0.339) (0.236) (0.016) 
PE1 (5) -0.221 0.039 0.101*** -0.151 -0.000 0.102*** 
 (0.333) (0.244) (0.017) (0.349) (0.244) (0.016) 
Prod. Growth (1) 0.137*** 0.161*** 0.000 0.154*** 0.166*** 0.000 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.001) (0.015) (0.011) (0.001) 
Prod. Growth (2) -0.110*** 0.041*** -0.000 -0.051*** 0.055*** -0.000 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.001) (0.016) (0.011) (0.001) 
Prod. Growth (3) 0.093*** 0.076*** -0.000 0.086*** 0.065*** -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.001) (0.015) (0.011) (0.001) 
Prod. Growth (4) 0.005 0.006 -0.000    
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.001)    
Prod. Growth (5) 0.145*** 0.065*** 0.001    
(0.015) (0.011) (0.001)    
Labor Growth (1) 0.071*** 0.089*** -0.000 0.068*** 0.088*** -0.001 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.001) (0.022) (0.016) (0.001) 
Labor Growth (2) -0.008 -0.032** -0.000 -0.014 -0.026* -0.000 
(0.022) (0.016) (0.001) (0.022) (0.015) (0.001) 
Labor Growth (3) -0.007 -0.054*** -0.001 0.009 -0.032** -0.001 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.001) (0.020) (0.014) (0.001) 
Labor Growth (4) -0.065*** -0.025* -0.002*    
(0.020) (0.014) (0.001)    
Labor Growth (5) -0.036** -0.026** 0.000    
(0.016) (0.012) (0.001)    
       
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob[PE = 0] 0.040* 0.181 0.000*** 0.028** 0.043* 0.000*** 
Prob[Prod. = 0] 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.813 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.892 
Prob[Labor = 0] 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.413 0.024** 0.000*** 0.537 
Observations 4,730 4,730 4,730 4,939 4,939 4,939 
R-squared 0.228 0.366 0.500 0.227 0.387 0.497 
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Table 29: System GMM 
The table contains coefficients from six single-equation GMM specifications, using first differences to 
eliminate country-industry fixed effects. Specifications 1-3 use moments and instruments suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991); specifications 4-6 follow Blundell and Bond (1998). Endogenous variables are 
productivity growth (deviation from annual industry average), labor growth (deviation from annual 
industry average), and a PE indicator (equals one for each country-industry-year with any PE activity). 
Exogenous variables are these variables lagged with the lag in parentheses. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Significance levels of Wald tests of the joint significance of the PE, productivity, and labor 
coefficients are reported. Significance levels for Arellano-Bond tests for first- and second-order 
autocorrelation in the error terms are reported. The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation (by construction, 
first-differencing creates first-order autocorrelation as reported and fully consistent with the 
specification). Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Prod.(%) Labr.(%) PE(0/1) Prod.(%) Labr.(%) PE(0/1) 
PE1 (1) 5.680*** 1.954* 0.104*** 4.369*** 1.748* 0.174*** 
 (1.441) (1.007) (0.038) (1.441) (0.920) (0.021) 
PE1 (2) -1.210 -0.536 0.127*** -3.481*** -1.557* 0.186*** 
 (1.363) (1.042) (0.031) (1.279) (0.920) (0.021) 
PE1 (3) 1.277 2.000** 0.157*** -0.317 0.789 0.201*** 
 (1.368) (1.014) (0.027) (1.309) (0.911) (0.022) 
PE1 (4) -1.497 -3.217*** 0.153*** -2.731** -3.664*** 0.185*** 
 (1.456) (1.105) (0.026) (1.333) (1.040) (0.023) 
PE1 (5) 0.350 -0.310 0.113*** -0.112 -0.082 0.140*** 
 (0.498) (0.298) (0.021) (0.396) (0.256) (0.020) 
Prod. Growth (1) 0.120** 0.267*** 0.001 0.154*** 0.239*** -0.001 
 (0.049) (0.046) (0.002) (0.043) (0.043) (0.002) 
Prod. Growth (2) -0.086 -0.002 0.002 -0.067 -0.020 0.001 
 (0.060) (0.034) (0.002) (0.054) (0.031) (0.002) 
Prod. Growth (3) 0.144*** 0.141*** 0.006*** 0.147*** 0.128*** 0.003* 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.002) (0.034) (0.034) (0.002) 
Prod. Growth (4) 0.075** 0.076** 0.002 0.054* 0.047 -0.000 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.002) (0.031) (0.030) (0.002) 
Prod. Growth (5) 0.171*** 0.075*** 0.003*** 0.175*** 0.076*** 0.002 
 (0.029) (0.019) (0.001) (0.028) (0.017) (0.001) 
Labor Growth (1) -0.019 -0.085 -0.005 -0.010 0.025 -0.002 
 (0.093) (0.052) (0.003) (0.087) (0.042) (0.003) 
Labor Growth (2) -0.120 -0.089** -0.006** -0.115 -0.044 -0.003 
 (0.088) (0.036) (0.003) (0.084) (0.033) (0.003) 
Labor Growth (3) -0.158* -0.131*** -0.010*** -0.127* -0.098*** -0.006** 
 (0.082) (0.033) (0.003) (0.077) (0.029) (0.003) 
Labor Growth (4) -0.189** -0.097*** -0.005** -0.114* -0.061** -0.002 
 (0.075) (0.031) (0.002) (0.066) (0.030) (0.002) 
Labor Growth (5) -0.018 -0.032 0.002* -0.022 -0.026 0.001 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.001) (0.023) (0.023) (0.001) 
Prob[PE = 0] 0.001*** 0.014** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Prob[Prod. = 0] 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.039** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.316 
Prob[Labor = 0] 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.010** 0.001*** 0.234 
Prob[AR(1)] 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
Prob[AR(2)] 0.302 0.005*** 0.774 0.317 0.001*** 0.933 
Observations 4,309 4,301 4,432 4,766 4,758 4,889 
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indicator.
The Blundell and Bond specification (Table 29, columns (4) to (6)) provides par-
ticularly consistent evidence of Granger causality. In this specification, the lagged
PE indicator is significant for predicting future labor and production growth. How-
ever, the joint tests suggest that lagged labor- and production-growth are not sta-
tistically significant predictors of future PE investments. One remaining concern
is that the labor growth process may include higher-order autocorrelation, which
may exaggerate the statistical significance and introduce biases in the coefficients.
Finally, our PE indicator is discrete, and estimating dynamic models with lagged
endogenous discrete variables may introduce additional complications for shorter
panels (see Honoré and Kyriazidou 2000). Addressing these technical econometric
issues is beyond the scope of this analysis.
2.5 Conclusion
The growth of the PE industry world-wide has spurred concerns about its po-
tential impact on the global economy. This study looks across nations and indus-
tries to assess the impact of PE on industry performance.
The key results are, first, that industries where PE funds have invested in the
past five years have grown more quickly. There are few significant differences be-
tween industries with low and high PE activity, suggesting that the results are at
least partly driven by spillover effects from PE-backed firms to other firms in the
industry. Second, it is hard to find support for claims that economic activity in in-
dustries with PE backing is more exposed to aggregate shocks. Various approaches
suggest that the results are not driven by reverse causality. Finally, these patterns
are not driven solely by common law nations such as the U.K. and U.S., but also
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hold in Continental Europe.
Our findings suggest a number of avenues for future research. First, it would be
interesting to look at finer data on certain critical aspects of industry performance,
such as the rates of layoffs, plant closings and openings, and product and process
innovations. Second, it is important to understand the mechanisms by which the
presence of PE-backed firms affects their peers. While Chevalier’s (1995b) study of
the supermarket industry during the 1980s was an important first step, much more
remains to be explored. Finally, we are limited by the available data. The buyout
boom of the mid 2000s was so massive, and the subsequent crash so dramatic,
that the consequences may have been substantially different from other economic
cycles (see Kosman 2009). The impact of the recent financial crisis is an important
issue to explore in the future.
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3. CONTRACTINGWITH HETEROGENEOUS EXTERNALITIES
This chapter is coauthored with Eyal Winter
3.1 Introduction
What is the optimal structure of contracts to induce a group of agents to partic-
ipate in a joint activity? How should these contracts take into account the complex
externalities that prevail among the agents? These questions arise in various set-
tings. Governments around the world seek to foster growth and innovation by
emulating the success of Silicon Valley and creating planned science parks.1 To
attract companies, policy makers devote substantial resources.2 Can governments
lower the costs of establishing science parks by exploiting the heterogeneous ex-
ternalities that arise between companies? Mall owners use such a strategy when
leasing stores. Gould et al. (2005) show that national brand stores (which attract
the most consumer traffic to malls) are being used to attract leases of smaller stores.
These smaller stores generate most of the mall owners’ leasing revenue.
In many situations a group member decision to participate depends on the
choices of others. These relations are hardly symmetrical; in particular, partici-
1 The International Association of Science Parks (IASP) currently has members in 49 countries
outside the United States. According to the IASP, the number of science parks in the U.S. alone has
increased from 16 in 1980 to 170 in 2010.
2 For example, Hong Kong spent more than $2 billion to develop a planned research and develop-
ment park (Cheng 1999).
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pation choices may depend not only on how many members decide to participate,
but also on the identity of the other participating agents. In a mall, a small store
substantially gains from the presence of national brand stores, which attract a high
volume of buyer traffic. The opposite externality, induced by the small store, has
hardly any effect. The recruitment of a senior star to an academic department can
easily attract a junior researcher to apply to that department. Invited party guests
base their participation decisions on the participation of their close friends. In all
of these examples the relations between the agents should be taken into account
when structuring incentives.
In this paper we analyze a principal’s problem of coordinating participation
given heterogeneous externalities between group members. We explore a project
initiated by a principal, when its success depends on the participation of a group.
The principal structures a set of incentive contracts to coordinate the group mem-
bers’ participation. Such incentives can be tax credits, discounts, gifts, celebrities’
participation, or any other benefits that are conditional on an agent’s participation.
We characterize the optimal, i.e., the least expensive, contracts that induce the par-
ticipation of the group members.
In our model, the heterogeneous externalities are additive and described by a
matrix whose entry wi(j) represents the extent to which agent i benefits from joint
participation with agent j.3 Following Segal (2003) we focus on situations in which
the principal cannot coordinate agents to his preferred equilibrium in a multiple-
equilibria setting. That is, we mainly focus on contracts that sustain agents’ par-
ticipation in a unique Nash equilibrium.4 This set of contracts is of the form of
3 We consider non-additive externalities in Section 3 of the paper
4 Recent experimental papers (see Brandt and Cooper 2005) indicate that in an environment of
positive externalities agents typically are trapped in the bad equilibrium of no-participation.
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divide and conquer.5 For any given ranking of the agents, divide-and-conquer con-
tracts are structured in the following way: offer each agent a reward that would
convince him to participate in the belief that the agents who precede him in the
ranking participate, and all subsequent agents abstain. Thus, the optimal contract
is achieved by the ranking (henceforth, optimal ranking) that produces the least
expensive divide-and-conquer incentive scheme.
Given the complex relations between the agents due to heterogeneity we ask:
(1) Who should be getting a higher-powered incentive for participation? In other
words, how should we determine the optimal ranking of the agents? (2) How do
changes in the structure of externalities affect the principal’s cost of sustaining the
group’s participation?
We show that the optimal ranking can be constructed using a virtual popular-
ity tournament between the agents. In this tournament, we say that agent i beats
agent j if agent j’s benefit from i’s participation is greater than i’s benefit from j’s
participation. This binary relation is described by a directed graph. We use basic
graph theory arguments to characterize the optimal ranking which depends on the
number of winnings in the virtual tournament.6 Hence, the agents’ payoffs are de-
termined with respect to their success in the tournament. This idea that agents who
induce higher externalities receive higher-powered incentive rewards is supported
by an empirical paper by Gould et al. (2005) who demonstrate that while national
brand stores occupy over 58% of the total leasable space in shopping malls they
5 Segal (2003) uses a similar structure to characterize a setting of homogeneous externalities. Che
and Yoo (2001) show that a similar structure arises as an optimal mechanism in a moral hazard in
team setups.
6 The ranking is directly determined by the number of winnings if the directed graph is acyclic. If
the graph is cyclic, ranking depends on the number of winnings as well as on the differences between
agents’ externalities.
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pay only 10% of the total rent collected by the mall owners.
A key characteristic of group externalities is the level of asymmetry7 between
the pairs of agents, which we show to reduce the principal’s cost. Greater asymme-
try offers the principal more leverage in exploiting the externalities to lower costs.
This result has a significant implication on the principal’s choice of group for the
initiative in the selection stage.
Our problem surprisingly connects to two quite distinct topics: (1) ranking
sport teams based on tournament results, which has been discussed in the Op-
erations Research literature, and (2) ranking candidates in a voting problem based
on the outcomes of pairwise elections, which was suggested by Condorcet (1785).
Condorcet’s solution uses a similar approach to ours, where candidates are the
nodes in the graph, and the arcs’ directions are the election results of pair-wise
voting.
This work is part of an extensive body of literature on multi-agent contracting
in which externalities arise between the agents.8 Our general approach is closely
related to the seminal papers by Segal (1999, 2003) on contracting with externalities.
Segal (2003) introduced a general model of trade contracts that admit externalities
among agents. He shows that increasing externalities implies that the principal
gains from using a divide-and-conquer mechanism, when he cannot coordinate
7 By asymmetry we refer to the sum of differences in bilateral externalities.
8 To give a few examples, these applications include vertical contracting models (Katz and Shapiro
1986a; Kamien, Oren, and Tauman 1992) in which the principal supplies an intermediate good to N
identical downstream firms (agents), which then produce substitute consumer goods; employment
models (Levin 2002) in which a principal provides wages to induce effort in a joint production of
a group of workers; exclusive dealing models (Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley 1991; Segal and
Whinston 2000) in which the principal is an incumbent monopolist who offers exclusive dealing
contracts to N identical buyers (agents) in order to deter the entry of a rival; acquisition for monopoly
models (Lewis 1983; Kamien and Zang 1990; Krishna 1993) in which the principal makes acquisition
offers to N capacity owners (agents); and network externalities models (Katz and Shapiro 1986b).
122
players to play his most-preferred equilibrium. Segal’s model is sufficiently gen-
eral to fit nicely into a variety of IO applications (like takeovers, vertical contract-
ing, exclusive dealing, and network externalities). While Segal (2003) defines the
divide-and-conquer mechanism in a general contracting setup that allows for het-
erogeneity, he doesn’t solve for the optimal mechanism except for special cases
such as the symmetric case (although he is able to obtain some comparative static
results without deriving the optimal mechanism explicitly). Our objective here is
to solve for the optimal mechanism for any matrix of externalities. While our envi-
ronment is more restrictive than Segal’s in the sense that agents’ choices are binary
(participate or not), we develop a sharper characterization by allowing externali-
ties to be heterogeneous and thus capture the contracting implications of complex
relations between the agents.
In fact, most of the literature assumes that externalities are homogeneous (in
our setting, such an assumption implies that the benefit from joint participation de-
pends on the number of participants, and not on the identity of the agents). Excep-
tions to this assumption are Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) and Jehiel, Moldovanu,
and Stachetti (1996), who consider an auction in which a single indivisible object
is sold to multiple heterogeneous agents. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1999) introduce
resale markets and consider the implications of the identity of the initial owner of
the good to the initial consumer. Our paper is also related to Milgrom and Roberts
(1990) who pointed out that a principal can gain from collusion or coordination
among his agents in an interaction that gives rise to strategic complementarity.
We consider several extensions to verify the robustness of our assumptions.
First, we study situations in which agents’ choices are sequential and we show that
our solution applies when the principal is interested in implementing effort via a
123
stronger solution concept that admits a dominant strategy for each player at his
relevant subgame. We show that the analysis remains valid when we allow the
externalities to affect agents’ outside options, as well as for more complicated con-
tingent contracts. We consider more general externalities structures. In particular,
we allow externalities to be both negative and positive, and provide the condi-
tions under which the solution for the mixed externalities participation problem
can be derived by decomposing the mixed problem to two problems one of which
is positive and the other negative. Finally, we consider the case of a non-additive
externalities structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we introduce the
general model. Section 3.3 provides the solution to a participation problem with
positive externalities between the agents. In Section 3.4 we consider several ex-
tensions of the model, by which we demonstrate that our results apply in more
general settings. Section 3.5 demonstrates how the model can be used to solve se-
lection problems and Section 3.6 concludes. Proofs are presented in the Appendix.
3.2 The Model
A participation problem is given by a triple (N,w,c)where N is a set of n agents.
The agents’ decision is binary: participate in the initiative or not. The structure
of externalities w is an n n matrix specifying the bilateral externalities between
the agents. An entry wi(j) represents agent i’s added value from participation in
the initiative jointly with agent j. Agents gain no additional benefit from their
own participation, i.e., wi(i) = 0. Agents’ preferences are additively separable; i.e.,
agent i’s utility from participating jointly with a group of agents M is∑j2M wi(j) for
every M  N. In the extensions section we consider a model in which agents’
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preferences are non-additive; i.e., externalities are defined over all subsets of agents
in group N.
We assume that the externalities structure w is fixed and exogenous. Also, c
is the vector of the outside options of the agents. For simplicity, and with a slight
abuse of notation, we assume that every outside option is constant and equals c
for all agents. In the extensions section we demonstrate that our results hold also
when the outside options are affected by the participation choices of the agents.
We assume that contracts offered by the principal are simple and descriptive in
the sense that the principal cannot provide payoffs that are contingent on the par-
ticipation behavior of other agents. Many of the examples discussed above seem
to share this feature. Based on the data used by Gould et al. (2005) which includes
contractual provisions of over 2,500 stores in 35 large shopping malls in the U.S.,
there is no evidence that contracts make use of such contingencies. The theoretical
foundation for the absence of such contracts is beyond the scope of this paper. One
possible explanation is the complexity of such contracts. In Section 3.4 we demon-
strate that our analysis remains valid even if we allow contingencies to be added
to the contracts.
The set of contracts offered by the principal can be described as an incentives
vector v= (v1, v2, ..., vn) in which agent i receives a payoff of vi if he decides to
participate and zero otherwise. vi is not constrained in sign and the principal can
either pay or charge the agents but he cannot punish them for not participating
(limited liability). Given a contracting scheme v, agents face a normal-form game
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G(v).9,10 Each agent has two strategies in the game: participation or abstention.
For a given set M of participating agents, each agent i 2 M earns ∑j2M wi(j) + vi
and each agent j /2 M earns c, his outside option. We define full implementation
contracts to be contracts that induce group participation as a unique Nash equilib-
rium. Alternatively, partial implementation contracts induce the group to participate
in a Nash equilibrium, which is not necessarily unique.
3.3 Contracting with Positive Externalities
Positive externalities are likely to arise in many contracting situations. Network
goods, opening stores in a mall and attracting customers, and contributing to pub-
lic goods are a few such examples. In this section we consider situations in which
agents benefit from the participation of the other agents in the group. Suppose that
wi(j) > 0 for all i, j 2 N, such that i 6= j. In this case, agents are more attracted to
the initiative as the set of participants grows.
As a first step toward characterizing optimal full implementation contracts, we
show in Proposition 1 that an optimal contracting scheme is part of a general set of
contracts characterized by the divide-and-conquer11 property. This set of contracts is
constructed by ranking agents in an arbitrary fashion, and by offering each agent
9 We view the participation problem as a reduced form of the global optimization problem faced by
the principal, which involves both the selection of the optimal group for the initiative and the design
of incentives. Specifically, let U be a (finite) universe of potential participants. For each N  U let
v(N) be the total payment made in an optimal mechanism that sustains the participation of the set
of agents N. The principal will maximize the level of net benefit he can guarantee himself, which is
given by the following optimization problem: maxNU [u(N)  v(N)], where u(N) is the principal’s
gross benefit from the participation of the set N of agents and is assumed to be strictly monotonic
with respect to inclusion; i.e., if T  S, then u(T) < u(S).
10 In the extensions section we also consider the case of a sequential offers game.
11 See Segal (2003) and Winter (2004) for a similarly structured optimal incentive mechanism in a
setting of homogeneous externalities.
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a reward that would induce him to participate in the belief that all the agents who
precede him in the ranking participate and all subsequent agents abstain. Due to
positive externalities, “later” agents are induced to participate (implicitly) by the
participation of others and thus can be offered smaller (explicit) incentives. More
formally, the divide-and-conquer (DAC ) contracts have the following structure:
v = (c, c  wi2(i1), c  wi3(i1)  wi3(i2), ..., c ∑
k
win(ik))
whereϕ= (i1, i2, ..., in) is an arbitrary order of agents. We say that v is a DAC con-
tracting scheme with respect to the rankingϕ. The following proposition, which is
similar to the analysis in Segal (2003, subsection 4.1.1) provides a necessary condi-
tion for optimal contracts.
Proposition 1 If v is an optimal full implementation contracting scheme then it is a
divide-and-conquer contracting scheme.
Note that given contracting scheme v, agent i1 has a dominant strategy in the
game G(v) to participate.12 Given the strategy of agent i1, agent i2 has a dominant
strategy to participate as well. Agent ik has a dominant strategy to participate
provided that agents i1 to ik 1 participate as well. Therefore, contracting scheme v
sustains full participation through an iterative elimination of dominated strategies.
12 Since rewards take continuous values we assume that if an agent is indifferent then he chooses
to participate. Alternatively, we can define an optimal contract to be a vector of payments v such that
any arbitrary increase of the payoffs of all players will result in a unique equilibrium in which all
agents participate. Note also that while the indifferences may generate multiple Nash equilibria, full
participation is a unique Nash equilibrium with iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies
(without assuming that agents participate whenever they are indifferent).
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3.3.1 Optimal Ranking
The optimal contracting scheme satisfies the divide-and-conquer property with
the ranking that minimizes the principal’s payment. The optimal ranking is deter-
mined by a virtual popularity tournament among the agents, in which each agent is
“challenged” by all the other agents. The results of the matches between all pairs of
agents are described by a simple and complete13 directed graph G(N, A), where N
is the set of nodes and A is the set of arcs. N represents the agents, and A  N N
represents the results of the matches, which is a binary relation on N. We refer to
such graphs as tournaments.14 More precisely, the set of arcs in tournament G(N, A)
is as follows:
(1) wi(j) < wj(i) () (i, j ) 2 A
(2) wi(j) = wj(i) () (i, j) 2 A and (j, i) 2 A
The interpretation of a directed arc (i, j) in the tournament G is that agent j val-
ues mutual participation with agent i more than agent i values mutual participation
with agent j. We simply say that agent i beats agent j whenever wi(j) < wj(i). In
the case of a two-sided arc, i.e., wi(j) = wj(i), we say that agent i is even with agent
j and the match ends in a tie.
In characterizing the optimal contracts we distinguish between cyclic and acyclic
tournaments. We say that a tournament is cyclic if there exists at least one node v
for which there is a directed path starting and ending at v, and acyclic if no such
path exists for all nodes.15 The solution for cyclic tournaments relies on the acyclic
solution, and therefore the acyclic tournament is a natural first step.
13 A directed graph G(N, A) is simple if (i, i) /2 A for every i 2 N and complete if for every i, j 2 N
at least (i, j) 2 A or (j, i) 2 A.
14 We allow that (i, j) and (j, i) are both in A.
15 By definition, if (i, j) 2 A and (j, i) 2 A, then the tournament is cyclic.
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3.3.2 Optimal Ranking for Acyclic Tournaments
A ranking ϕ is said to be consistent with tournament G(N, A) if for every pair
i, j 2 N, if i is ranked before j inϕ, then i beats j. In other words, if agent i is ranked
higher than agent j in a consistent ranking, then agent j values agent i more than
agent i values j. We start with the following graph theory lemma:
Lemma 1 If tournament G(N, A) is acyclic, then there exists a unique ranking that is
consistent with G(N, A).
We refer to the unique consistent ranking proposed in Lemma 1 as the tourna-
ment ranking.16 In the tournament ranking, each agent’s location in the tournament
ranking is determined by the number of his wins. Hence, the agent ranked first is
the agent who won all matches and the agent ranked last lost all matches. As we
demonstrate later, there may be multiple solutions when tournament G(N, A) is
cyclic. Proposition 2 provides the solution for participation problems with acyclic
tournaments, and shows that the solution is unique.
Proposition 2 Let (N,w, c) be a participation problem for which the corresponding
tournament G(N, A) is acyclic. Letϕ be the tournament ranking of G(N, A). The optimal
full implementation contracting scheme is given by the DAC with respect toϕ.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is based on the notion that if agents i, j 2 N
satisfy wi(j) < wj(i) then the principal is able to reduce the cost of incentives by
wj(i), rather than by only wi(j), by giving preferential treatment to i and placing
him higher in the ranking. Applying this notion to all pairs of agents minimizes the
16 The tournament ranking is actually the ordering of the nodes in the unique Hamiltonian path of
tournament G(N, A).
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principal’s total payment to the agents, since it maximizes the inherent value of the
participants from the participation of the other agents.
The optimal contracting scheme can be viewed as follows. First the principal
pays the outside option c for each one of his agents. The winner of each match in
the virtual tournament is the agent who imposes a higher externality on his com-
petitor. The loser of each match pays the principal an amount equal to the benefit
that he gets from mutually participating with his competitor. The total amount
paid depends on the size of bilateral externalities and not merely on the number
of winning matches. However, the higher agent i is located in the tournament, the
lower is the total amount paid to the principal.
An intuitive solution for the participation problem is to reward agents accord-
ing to their level of popularity in the group, such that the most popular agents
would be the most rewarded. A possible interpretation of popularity in our con-
text would be the sum of externalities imposed on others by participation, i.e.,
∑nj=1 wj(i). However, as we have seen, agents’ ranking in the optimal contract-
ing scheme is determined by something more refined than this standard definition
of popularity. Agent i’s position in the ranking depends on the set of peers that
value agent i’s participation more than i values theirs. This two-way comparison
may result in a different ranking than the one imposed by a standard definition
of popularity. This can be illustrated in the following example in which agent 3 is
ranked first in the optimal contracting scheme despite being less “popular” than
agent 1.
Example Consider a group of four agents with an identical outside option c =
20. The externalities structure of the agents is given by matrix w, as shown
in Figure 6. The tournament G is acyclic and the tournament ranking is ϕ =
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(3, 1, 2, 4). Consequently, the set of optimal contracts is v = (20, 17, 14, 10),
which is the divide-and-conquer contracting scheme with respect to the tourna-
ment ranking. Note that agent 3 who is ranked first is not the agent who has
the maximal ∑nj=1 wj(i).
Figure 6
The derivation of the optimal contracting scheme requires the rather elaborate
step of constructing the virtual tournament. However, it turns out that a substan-
tially simpler formula can derive the cost of the optimal contracts. Two terms play
a role in this formula: the first measures the aggregate level of externalities, i.e.,
Kagg = ∑i j wi(j); the second measures the bilateral asymmetry between the agents,
i.e., Kasym = ∑i<j
wi(j)  wj(i). Hence, Kasym stands for the extent to which agents
induce mutual externalities on each other. The smaller the value of Kasym the higher
the degree of mutuality of the agents. Proposition 3 shows that the cost of the op-
timal contracting scheme is additive and declining in these two measures.
Proposition 3 Let (N,w, c) be a participation problem and Vf ull be the principal’s cost
of the optimal full implementation contracts. If the corresponding tournament G(N, A) is
acyclic then Vf ull = n  c  12
 
Kagg + Kasym

.
An interesting consequence of Proposition 3 is that for a given level of aggregate
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externalities, the principal’s payment is decreasing with a greater level of asymme-
try among the agents, as stated in Corollary 3.1.
Corollary 3.1 Let (N,w, c) be a participation problem with an acyclic tournament.
Let Vf ull be the principal’s cost of the optimal full implementation contracts. For a given
level of aggregate externalities, Vf ull is strictly decreasing with the asymmetry level of the
externalities within the group of agents.
The intuition behind this result is related to the virtual tournament discussed
above. In each match the principal extracts “fines” from the losing agents. It is clear
that these fines are increasing with the level of asymmetry (assuming wi(j) +wj(i)
is kept constant). Hence, a higher level of asymmetry allows the principal more
leverage in exploiting the externalities. This observation has important implica-
tions for the principal’s selection stage.
Consider the comparison between the optimal full and partial implementation
contracts, where in the latter the principal suffices with the existence of a full partic-
ipation equilibrium, not necessarily unique. With partial implementation, the cost
for the principal in the optimal contracting scheme is substantially lower. More
specifically, in the least costly contracting scheme that induces full participation,
each agent i receives vi = c   ∑j wi(j). However, these contracts entail a no-
participation equilibrium as well; hence coordination is required. The total cost
of the partial implementation contracts is Vpartial = n  c ∑i j wi(j) and the princi-
pal can extract the full revenue generated by the externalities.17
17 Our emphasis on full implementation is motivated by the fact that under most circumstances the
principal cannot coordinate the agent to play his most-preferred equilibrium. Brandts and Cooper
(2005) report experimental results that speak to this effect. Agents’ skepticism about the prospects
of the participation of others trap the group in the worst possible equilibrium even when the group
is small. Nevertheless, one might be interested in evaluating the cost of moving from partial to full
implementation.
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It is worth mentioning that for a fixed level of aggregate externalities, the dif-
ference between full and partial implementation contracts, Vf ull  Vpartial , is stricty
decreasing with the level of asymmetry of the externalities within the group. In
the extreme case where Kasym = 0 ( wi(j) = wj(i) for all pairs), the cost of mov-
ing from partial to full implementation is the most expensive. On the other hand,
when externalities are always one-sided, i.e., for each pair of agents i, j 2 N sat-
isfies that either18 wi(j) = 0 or wj(i) = 0,then the additional cost is zero and full
implementation is as expensive as partial implementation.
Note that increasing the aggregate level of externalities will not necessarily in-
crease the principal extraction of revenue in the optimal contracting scheme. For
example, in an asymmetric two-person problem raising slightly the externality that
the less attractive agent induces on the other one will not change the principal’s
revenue.19 From the perspective of the agents, their reward is not a continuous
increasing function of the externalities they impose on the others. However, it is
possible that a slight change in these externalities may increase rewards signifi-
cantly, since a minor change in externalities may change the optimal ranking and
thus affect agents’ payoffs.
The extreme asymmetric case nicely contrasts with the completely symmetric
case, where the principal’s surplus increases with any slight increase of the exter-
nalities. With partial implementation, which allows the principal full extraction of
surplus, the principal’s revenue is sensitive to the values of externalities whether
the problem is symmetric or asymmetric.
18 Since this section deals with positive externalities, assume that wi(j) = ε or wj(i) = ε when ε is
very small.
19 It can be shown that in an n-person asymmetric problem one can raise the externalities in half of
the matrix’s entries (excluding the diagonal) without affecting the principal’s surplus extraction.
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3.3.3 Optimal Ranking of Cyclic Tournaments
In the previous section we demonstrated that optimal full implementation con-
tracts are derived from a virtual tournament among the agents in which agent i
beats agent j if wi(j) < wj(i). However, the discussion was based on the tour-
nament being acyclic. If the tournament is cyclic, the choice of the optimal DAC
contracting scheme (i.e., the optimal ranking) is more delicate since Lemma 1 does
not hold. Any ranking is prone to inconsistencies in the sense that there must be a
pair i, j such that i is ranked above j although j beats i in the tournament. To illus-
trate this point, consider a three-agent example where agent i beats j, agent j beats
k, and agent k beats i. The tournament is cyclic and any ranking of these agents
necessarily yields inconsistencies. For example, take the ranking fi, j, kg , which
yields an inconsistency involving the pair (k, i) since k beats i and i is ranked above
agent k. This applies to all possible rankings of the three agents.
The inconsistent ranking problem is similar to problems in sports tournaments,
which involve bilateral matches that may turn out to yield cyclic outcomes. Var-
ious sports organizations (such as the National Collegiate Athletic Association -
NCAA) nevertheless provide rankings of teams/players based on the cyclic tour-
nament outcome. Extensive literature in Operations Research suggests solution
procedures for determining the “minimum violation ranking” (e.g., Kendall 1955,
Ali et al. 1986, Cook and Kress 1990, and Coleman 2005) that selects the ranking
for which the number of inconsistencies is minimized. It can be shown that this
ranking is obtained as follows. Take the cyclic (directed) graph obtained by the
tournament and find the smallest set of arcs such that reversing the direction of
these arcs results in an acyclic graph. The desired ranking is taken to be the consis-
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tent ranking (per Lemma 1) with respect to the resulting acyclic graph.20
One may argue that this procedure can be improved by assigning weights to
arcs in the tournament depending on the score by which team i beats team j and
then look for the acyclic graph that minimizes the total weighted inconsistencies. In
fact this approach goes back to Condorcet’s (1785) classical voting paper in which
he proposed a method for ranking multiple candidates. In the voting game, the set
of nodes is the group of candidates, the arcs’ directions are the results of pairwise
voting, and the weights are the plurality in the voting. The solution to our problem
follows the same path. In our framework arcs are not homogeneous and so they
will be assigned weights determined by the difference in the bilateral externalities.
As in Condorcet’s voting paper, we will look for the set of arcs such that their
reversal turns the graph into an acyclic one. While Young (1988) characterized
Condorcet’s method axiomatically, our solution results from a completely different
approach, i.e., the design of optimal incentives to maximize revenues.
Formally, we define the weight of each arc (i, j) 2 A by t(i, j) = wj(i)  wi(j).
Note that weights are always non-negative as an arc (i, j) refers to a situation in
which j favors i more than i favors j. Hence t(i, j) refers to the extent of the one-
sidedness of the externalities between the pairs of agents. If an inconsistency in
the ranking arises due to an arc (i, j), then this implies that agent j precedes agent
i despite the fact that i beats j. Relative to consistent rankings, inconsistencies gen-
erate additional costs for the principal. More precisely, the principal has to pay an
additional t(i, j) when inconsistency is due to arc (i, j) 2 A.
For each subset of arcs S = f(i1, j1), (i2, j2), ..., (ik, jk)gwe define t(S) = ∑(i,j)2S t(i, j),
which is the total weight of the arcs in S. For each graph G and subset of arcs S we
20 Multiple rankings may result from this method.
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denote by G S the graph obtained from G by reversing the arcs in the subset S.
Consider a cyclic graph G and let S be a subset of arcs that satisfies the following:
(1) G S is acyclic.
(2) t(S)  t(S) for all S such that G S is acyclic.
Then, G S is the acyclic graph obtained from G by reversing the set of arcs
with the minimal total weight, and S is the set of pairs of agents that satisfies
inconsistencies in the tournament ranking of G S . Proposition 4 shows that the
optimal ranking of G is the tournament ranking of G S since the additional cost
from inconsistencies, t(S), is the lowest.
Proposition 4 Let (N,w, c) be a participation problem with a cyclic tournament G.
Letϕ be the tournament ranking of G S . Then, the optimal full implementation contracts
are the DAC with respect toϕ.
In the symmetric case, the principal cannot exploit the externalities among the
agents, as Kasym = 0, and the total payment made by the principal is identical for
all rankings. This can be seen to follow from Proposition 4 as well by noting that
the tournament has two-way arcs connecting all pairs of agents, and t(i, j) = 0 for
all i, j and t(S) is uniformly zero. An intriguing feature of the symmetric case is
that all optimal contracting schemes are discriminative in spite of the fact that all
agents are identical.
Corollary 4.1 When the externalities structure w is symmetric then all DAC contracts
are optimal.
We can now provide the analogue version of Proposition 3 for the cyclic case.
In this case, the optimal ranking has an additional term Kcyclic = t(S) representing
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the cost of making the tournament acyclic, i.e., the cost borne by the principal due
to inconsistencies.
Proposition 5 Let (N,w, c) be a participation problem. Let Vf ull be the principal’s
optimal cost of a full implementation contract. Then Vf ull = n  c  12 (Kagg + Kasym) +
Kcyclic.
Corollary 3.1 still holds for pairs of agents that are not in S. More specifically,
if we increase the level of asymmetry between pairs of agents that are outside S,
we reduce the total expenses that the principal incurs in the optimal contracting
scheme.
3.4 Extensions
In this section we discuss the implications of the assumptions we made so far.
We demonstrate that the optimal contracts remain optimal if we assume sequential
participation choices when the principal desires to implement participation in a
subgame perfect equilibrium with the property that each player has a dominant
strategy on the subgame that he plays. In addition, we show that even when the
outside option is affected by the agents’ participation choices, the construction of
the optimal contracts remains unchanged. We demonstrate that when contracts
can be contingent on the participation of a subset of the agents, then the optimal
contracts are closely related to the analysis above. Our analysis is valid in more
general setups in which externalities can be either negative or positive. Moreover,
the solution is also relevant to non-additive externalities structures.
137
3.4.1 Sequential Participation Decisions
We first point out that our analysis applies to any sequential game except for
one of perfect information, i.e., when each player is fully informed about all the
participation decisions of his predecessors. Indeed, this extreme case of perfect
information is a strong assumption as agents rarely possess the participation deci-
sions of all their predecessors. Any partial information environment implies that
some actions are taken simultaneously, and therefore the divide-and-conquer con-
tracting scheme and the virtual tournament apply.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to point out that our analysis is also relevant to
the extreme case of perfect information. Consider a game in which players have
to decide sequentially about their participation based on a given order. Suppose
that the principal wishes to implement the full participation in a subgame perfect
equilibrium with the additional requirement that each player has a dominant strat-
egy on the subgame in which he has to play.21 It is easily verified that the optimal
contracting scheme in this framework is the DAC applied to the order of moves;
i.e., the first moving player is paid c and the last player is paid c   ∑j2N wi(j).
Under this contracting scheme each player has a dominant strategy on each sub-
game. Assume now that the principal can control the order of moves (which he can
do by making the offers sequentially and setting a deadline on agents’ decisions).
Then the optimal sequential contracting scheme is exactly identical to the one dis-
cussed in previous sections for the simultaneous case. If the principal suffices with
a standard subgame perfect equilibrium (without the strategy dominance condi-
tion), then the optimal contracting scheme will allow him to extract more and he
21 Such a requirement may reflect the principal’s concern that a player will fail to apply complex
backward induction reasoning.
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will pay c ∑j2N wi(j) to all agents.
3.4.2 Participation-dependent Outside Options
In many situations non-participating agents are affected by the participation
choices of other agents. Consider the case of a corporate raider who needs to ac-
quire the shares of N identical shareholders to gain control (similar to Grossman
and Hart 1980). If the raider is enhancing the value of the firm when he holds a
larger stake in the firm, then selling shareholders impose positive externalities on
non-participating agents. If the raider gains private benefits from the firm which
will decrease its value, then selling shareholders induce negative externalities on
the non-participating agents.
In this section we consider the case in which the agents’ outside option is partly
determined by the agents who choose to participate. For a given group of agents
P  N who participate, we define the outside option of non-participants as c +
η∑j2P wi(j). In the former analysis we assumed η = 0.22 Segal (2003) defines ex-
ternalities as increasing (decreasing) when an agent is more (less) eager to par-
ticipate when more agents participate. In our setup, eagerness to participate is
identity-dependent. When η  1, we say that agents are more eager to participate
when highly valued agents choose to participate. If η > 1, the benefits of non-
participation outweigh the benefits of participation when highly valued agents
choose to participate; hence agents are less eager to participate. In Segal’s termi-
nology, the former case is equivalent to increasing externalities, while the latter is
22 The following analysis can be generalized by specifying an externalities matrix q that distin-
guishes between the benefits of participating and non-participating agents. It can be shown that
in such a case our analysis remains unchanged. However, we choose to use the simpler and more
intuitive outside option form of c+ η∑j2C wi(j).
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equivalent to decreasing externalities.
Following the analysis of Proposition 1, if v is an optimal full implementation
contracting scheme then it is easy to verify that under the current setup, v is a DAC
of the form:
v = (c, c  (1  η)wi2(i1), ..., c  (1  η)∑
k
win(ik))
where ϕ = (i1, i2, ..., in) is an arbitrary ranking. Instead if η > 1, the participation
problem is identical to a standard participation problem (with fixed outside option)
where externalities are (1  η)wi(j) < 0. In these negative externalities problems
the DAC mechanism does not apply and the optimal scheme requires that the prin-
cipal reimburse the agents for their total burden, i.e., c  (1  η)∑j wi(j)),which is
a positive number whenever the outside option and wi(j) are positive. Finally, the
case of η = 1 corresponds to an environment of no externalities at all and the op-
timal scheme requires simply to reimburse agents for their outside option. We can
summarize with the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Let (N,w, c) be a participation problem where ci = c+ η∑j2P wi(j)
and P  N is a group of participating agents. Let G(N, A) be the equivalent tournament.
The optimal full implementation contracts are given as follows:
(1) for η < 1, DAC contracts with respect to the optimal ranking;23
(2) for η  1, the optimal mechanism pays agent i the payoff c  (1  η)∑j wi(j)),
which is exactly c, whenever η = 1.
Note that one could consider a different case in which the outside option of
agents is a linear function of the externalities agents induce. Also in this case,
23 As described in Section 3.5.
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asymmetry improves the principal’s rent extraction.
3.4.3 Contingent Contracts
Our model assumes that the principal cannot write contracts that make a payoff
to an agent contingent on the participation of other agents. Under such contracts
the principal could extract the total surplus from positive externalities among the
agents.24 We find such contracts not very descriptive. Based on the data used by
Gould et al. (2005) which consists of contractual provisions of over 2,500 stores in
35 large shopping malls in the U.S., there is no evidence that contracts make use
of such contingencies. Shopping malls are a natural environment for contingent
contracting; the fact that these contracts are still not used makes it likely that in
other, more complicated settings such contracts are exceptional as well. The the-
oretical foundation for the absence of such contracts is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, one possible reason for their absence is the complexity of such
contracts, especially in environments where participation involves long-term en-
gagement and may be carried out by different agents at different points in time. We
point out that if partial contingencies are used, i.e., participation is contingent on a
subset of the group, our model and its analysis remain valid. Specifically, for each
player i, let Ti  N be the contingency set, i.e., the set of agents whose participation
choice can appear in the contract with agent i. Let T = (T1, T2, ..., Tn) summarize
the contingency sets in the contracts. The optimal contracts under the contingency
sets are closely related to the original optimal contract (when contingencies are not
24 One possible contracting scheme is to offer agent i a participation reward of vi = c ∑j2N wi(j)
if each of the other agents participates, and a reward of vi = c if any of the contingencies is violated.
Such contracts will sustain full participation as a unique Nash equilibrium, and the principal extracts
the entire surplus.
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allowed). More precisely, let w be the original matrix of externalities. Denote by wT
the matrix of externalities obtained from w by replacing wi(j) with zero whenever
j 2 Ti. Lemma 6.1 in the Appendix shows that the optimal full implementation
contracting scheme is as follows: agent i gets c if one of the agents j 2 Ti does not
participate, i.e., the contingency requirement is violated.25 If all agents in Ti partici-
pate, then agent i gets the payoff vi(N,wT, c) ∑j2Ti wi(j), where vi(N,wT, c) is the
payoff for agent i for the participation problem (N,wT, c) under no-contingencies.
3.4.4 Mixed Externalities Structure
So far we have limited our discussion to environments in which agents’ partic-
ipation positively affects the willingness of other agents to participate. However,
in many situations this is not the case, such as in environments of congestion. Traf-
fic, market entry, and competition among applicants all share the property that the
larger the number of agents who participate, the lower the utility of each partic-
ipant. The heterogeneous property in our framework seems quite descriptive in
some of these examples. In the context of competition it is clear that a more qual-
ified candidate/firm induces a larger negative externality. It is also reasonable to
assume, at least for some of these environments, that the principal desires a large
number of participants in spite of the negative externalities that they induce on
each other.
In Proposition 7 we demonstrate that in order to sustain full participation as
a unique Nash equilibrium under negative externalities the principal has to fully
compensate all agents for the participation of the others.
25 In fact, the principal can offer lower payments to the agents in case of contingencies’ violations,
by exploiting the participation of other agents. However, these off-equilibrium payments do not
affect the principal’s payment in the full participation equilibrium.
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Proposition 7 Let (N,w, c) be a participation problem with negative externalities.
Then optimal full implementation contracts v are given by vi = c+∑i 6=j jwi(j)j , and v is
unique.
Naturally, real-world multi-agent contracting problems may capture both pos-
itive and negative types of externalities. In social events, individuals may greatly
benefit from some of the invited guests, while preferring to avoid others. In a mall,
the entry of a new store may benefit some stores by attracting more customers, but
impose negative externalities on its competitors.
Our analysis of the mixed externalities case is based on the following binary
relation. We say that an agent i is non-averse to agent j if wi(j)  0, and we write
it as i  j. We will assume that  is symmetric and transitive, i.e., i  j =)
j  i and if i  j and j  k then i  k. Note that this assumption does not
imply any constraint on the magnitude of the externalities, but just on their sign.
While the symmetry and transitivity of the non-averse relation seem rather intuitive
assumptions, not all strategic environments satisfy them. These assumptions are
particularly relevant to environments where the selected population is partitioned
into social, ethnic, or political groups with animosity potentially occurring only
between groups but not within groups. We analyze a specific example of this sort
of environment in Section 3.5.
It turns out that the optimal solution of participation problems with symme-
try and transitivity of the non-averse relation is derived by a decomposition of the
participation problem into two separate participation problems: one that involves
only positive externalities, and the other that involves only negative externalities.
This is done by simply decomposing the externalities matrix into a negative and a
positive matrix. In the following proposition we show that the decomposition con-
143
tracting scheme, a contract set that is the sum of the two optimal contracts of the
two decomposed participation problems, is the optimal contracting scheme for the
mixed externalities participation problem.
Proposition 8 Consider a participation problem (N,w, c). Let (N,w+, c) be a par-
ticipation problem such that w+i (j) = wi(j) if wi(j)  0 and w+i (j) = 0 if wi(j) < 0,
and let u+ be the optimal full implementation contracts of (N, w+, c). Let (N,w , 0) be a
participation problem such that w i (j) = wi(j) if wi(j) < 0 and w
 
i (j) = 0 if wi(j)  0,
and let u  be the optimal full implementation contracts of (N,w , 0). Then, the decompo-
sition contracting scheme v = u+ + u  induces a unique full participation equilibrium.
Moreover, if agents satisfy symmetry and transitivity with respect to the non-averse rela-
tion, v is the optimal contracting scheme.
Proposition 8 shows that the virtual popularity tournament discussed in earlier
sections plays a central role also in the mixed externalities case as it determines pay-
offs for the positive component of the problem. When symmetry and transitivity
hold, the principal can exploit the positive externalities to reduce payments. In this
tournament i beats j whenever (1) wj(i)  0 and wj(i)  0, and (2) wj(i) > wi(j).
Note that under the non-averse assumptions, the principal provides complete com-
pensation for the agents who suffer from negative externalities, as in the negative
externalities case. Finally, it is easy to show that equivalently to Proposition 5, the
principal’s cost of achieving full implementation in a mixed externalities setting is
equivalent to the positive externalities setup, except that now the principal has to
add the compensation for the negative externalities.
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3.4.5 Non-additive Preferences
We propose here an extension of the model in which we impose no restrictions
on agents’ preferences; i.e., preferences are no longer assumed to be separably ad-
ditive. Using an iterative procedure that makes use of the solution for the additive
case allows us to narrow down the set of potential optimal incentive contracts, even
when no structure is assumed.
A participation problem is described by a group of agents N and their out-
side option is equal to c, as noted previously. We assume a general externalities
structure, which is composed of the non-additive preferences of the agents over all
subsets of agents in the group N. More specifically, for each i, vi : 2Nnfig  ! R.
The function vi(S) stands for the benefit of agent i from the participation with the
subset S  N. We normalize v(∅) = 0. The condition of positive externalities now
reads: for each i and subsets S, T such that T  S we have vi(S)  vi(T).
Arguments similar to those used in Proposition 1 show that the optimal con-
tracting scheme that sustains full participation as a unique equilibrium also sat-
isfies the divide-and-conquer property. Hence, the optimal contracts rely on the
optimal ranking of the agents.
We leave the detailed description of the procedure to the proof of Proposition
9. Instead, we provide an example to illustrate the basic ideas.
A Simple Example
Consider a four-agent example. Given that the optimal solution is DAC for
any given ranking of agents ϕ = fi1, i2, i3, i4g, the DAC contracts with respect to
ranking ϕ are (c, c  vi2(i1), c  vi3(i1, i2), c  vi4(i1, i2, i3)) . Instead of identifying
the optimal ranking, we apply an iterative procedure of N   1 steps to eliminate
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rankings that we infer cannot be optimal. Our starting point is the set of all possible
rankings of the agents; in this example there are 24 such rankings.
STEP 1. Let’s assume that the bilateral externalities vi(j) between the agents re-
sult in the corresponding acyclic graph described below. Therefore the tournament
yields the unique consistent ranking for step one when φ1 = (3, 1, 2, 4).
Figure 7
We argue that any ranking that orders the first two agents in a way that con-
tradicts their relative ranking in φ1 cannot be the optimal ranking. To see this,
consider the ranking (4, 2, 1, 3), which is inconsistent with φ1 with respect to the
relative ranking of agents 4 and 2. We can immediately construct a cheaper rank-
ing by reversing the position of the first two agents, and keeping the position of
the remaining agents ranked lower in the same order. Hence, we can eliminate
(4, 2, 1, 3) from the set of potential optimal rankings. Applying this logic to the en-
tire set of potential rankings we are left with 12 potential rankings; i.e., the optimal
ranking of the original problem must start with any of the following pairs: (3, 1),
(3, 2), (3, 4), (1, 2), (1, 4), (2, 4).
STEP 2. We now proceed to the second iteration in which for each agent located
in the first position we construct a graph that is based on the bilateral relations
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conditional on the participation of the first agent. In particular, we consider the case
in which agent 1 is ranked first and build the graph based on agents’ preferences
conditional on the participation of agent 1; i.e., the externalities matrix is given by
(wi(j) = vi(j, 1)jj 2 f2, 3, 4g).
Let’s assume that preferences take the following form:
v2(3, 1) > v3(2, 1)
v2(4, 1) > v4(2, 1)
v3(4, 1) > v4(3, 1)
Since the graph is acyclic the unique consistent ranking of the second iteration,
conditional on agent 1 being first, is φ2j1 = (4, 3, 2). Again, we require rankings
to be consistent with φ2j1. For example, ranking (1, 2, 4, 3) cannot be optimal since
(2, 4, 3) is not consistent with φ2j1 and transposing the order of 2 and 4 we get
ranking (1, 4, 2, 3), which is cheaper. While there are six rankings in which agent 1
is ranked first, we can immediately eliminate three that do not agree with φ2j1 and
we are left with f(1, 4, 2, 3), (1, 4, 3, 2) , (1, 3, 2, 4)g. However, these rankings must
agree with the constraints from the previous step. This is not the case for ranking
(1, 3, 2, 4), as we can transpose the order of 1 and 3 and get a cheaper mechanism;
thus we can eliminate it as well.26 Hence, if the optimal ranking starts with agent
1 it must be followed by agent 4 ranked second. Rather than discussing the con-
struction of cases where agents 2 and 3 are ranked first, we continue to explore the
case where agent 1 is ranked first and proceed to step 3.
STEP 3. In this iteration we repeat and construct the graph based on agents 2
26 We refer to this check as the interface condition and discuss it more fully in the proof of Proposition
9.
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and 3’s preferences, conditional on the participation of agents 1 and 4. Let’s assume
that v2(3, 1, 4) < v3(2, 1, 4); hence φ3j1,4 = f2, 3g . Thus, the only ranking that can
be optimal in the original problem conditional on agent 1 being first is (1, 4, 2, 3).
General Result
The example above illustrates our procedure for generating the optimal incen-
tive contracts can also be used iteratively to eliminate non-optimal rankings, when
we impose no structure on agents’ preferences.
The starting point is the set of all agents’ rankings. We proceed with an iterative
procedure of N   1 steps; at each step we rule out possible rankings by construct-
ing a graph that is based on the bilateral preferences of the agents conditional on
the participation of the agents ranked above them. We assume that in each step the
resulting graph is acyclic and thus generates a unique consistent ranking. We elim-
inate rankings that are inconsistent with the step’s consistent ranking or with the
constraints imposed in the previous step. The formal description of this iterative
procedure is provided in the proof of Proposition 9.
Proposition 9 Let (N, c) be a participation problem with non-additive preferences, for
which all tournaments in the iterative procedure are acyclic. Then, the set of surviving
rankings is non-empty and includes the optimal ranking.
Proposition 9 demonstrates that the fundamental logic underlying our analysis
of additive externalities also underlies our construction of optimal contracts, while
taking into account the complex structure of externalities among agents.
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3.5 Group Identity and Selection
In this section we consider special externalities structures to demonstrate how
the selection stage can be incorporated once we have solved the participation prob-
lem. Assume that the externalities take values of 0 or 1. In this environment an
agent either benefits from the participation of his peer or gains no benefit. We
provide three examples of group identities in which the society is partitioned into
two groups and agents have hedonic preferences for members in these groups. We
demonstrate how the optimal contracting scheme proposed in previous sections
may affect the selection of the agents in the planning of the initiative.
(1) Segregation - agents benefit from participating with their own group’s mem-
bers and enjoy no benefit from participating with members from the other
group. More specifically, consider the two groups B1 and B2 such that for
each i, j 2 Bk, k = 1, 2, we have wi(j) = 1. Otherwise, wi(j) = 0.
(2) Desegregation27 - agents benefit from participating with the other group’s
members and enjoy no benefit from participating with members of their own
group. More specifically, consider the two groups B1 and B2 such that for
each i, j 2 Bk, k = 1, 2, we have wi(j) = 0. Otherwise, wi(j) = 1.
(3) Status - the society is partitioned into two status groups, high and low. Each
member of the society benefits from participating with each member of the
high-status group and enjoys no benefit from participating with members
of the low-status group. Formally, let B1 be the high status group and set
wi(j) = 1 if and only if j 2 B1 . Otherwise wi(j) = 0.
27 An example could be a singles party.
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Proposition 10 Let (N,w, c) be a participation problem. Let n1 and n2 be the number
of agents selected from groups B1 and B2, respectively, such that n1 + n2 = n. Denote by
v(n1, n2) the principal’s cost of incentivizing agents under the optimal contracts given that
the group composition is n1 and n2. The following holds:
1) under Segregation v(n1, n2) is decreasing with j n1   n2j;
2) under Desegregation v(n1, n2) is increasing with j n1   n2j;
3) under Status v(n1, n2) is decreasing with n1.
In the case of Segregation, the principal’s cost of incentives is increasing with
the mixture of groups; hence in the selection stage the principal would prefer to
give precedence to one group over the other. In the Desegregation case the princi-
pal’s cost is declining with mixture; hence in the selection stage the principal would
like to balance between members of the groups. In the Status case the cost is declin-
ing with the number of agents recruited from B1, who will be strongly preferred to
the members of B2.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed a contracting framework with heterogeneous exter-
nalities. Introducing a complicated structure of externalities allowed us to explore
several aspects of the multi-agent contracting environments that are not apparent
in the homogeneous case. These include the impact of externalities asymmetry on
payments, the implications of externalities structure on the hierarchy of incentives,
and the effect of variations in the externalities structures on both the principal’s
payments and the agents’ rewards.
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Exploring the role of heterogeneous externalities reveals the importance of ex-
ternalities asymmetry within the group. More specifically, greater asymmetry be-
tween the agents’ benefits reduced the principal’s payment in the full implemen-
tation problem. In addition, externalities asymmetry turns out to play a role also
in the selection between partial and full implementation, as it affects the premium
required to sustain full participation as a unique equilibrium. Greater asymmetry
decreases this premium, and thus makes full implementation more profitable.
The hierarchy of incentives is determined by a ranking that results from a vir-
tual popularity tournament. In the simplest case, an agent i is ranked above agent j
if agent i benefits less from joint participation than agent j does from it. We demon-
strated that this ranking of incentives is different from the standard ranking that is
based on agents’ popularity.
The implications of externalities on the rankings of agents may suggest a pre-
liminary game in which agents invest effort to increase the positive externalities
that they induce on others which can ultimately increase the rewards from the
principal. For example, agents can invest in their social efforts to make themselves
more attractive guests at social events. A firm may invest to increase its market
share in order to improve its ranking in an acquisition game. Under certain cir-
cumstances such an investment may turn out to be quite attractive as we have seen
that a slight change in externalities may result in a substantial gain, due to a change
in the ranking. Our analysis contributes to the understanding of how to make such
a strategic investment profitable. The new game will now have two stages. In the
first stage agents’ investment efforts change the exterrnalities they induce on other
members of the group. In the second stage, the externalities determine the network
formation and the consequent incentives provided by the principal. The analysis
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of such a game is beyond the scope of this paper but seems to be a natural next
step.
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A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A. Variable Definitions
Innovation Measures
1. Citations - Number of citations a patent receives from its grant year and the
following three calendar years.
2. Generality - A patent that is being cited by a broader array of technology
classes is viewed as having greater generality. Generality is calculated as
the Herfindahl index of citing patents, used to capture the dispersion across
technology classes of patents using the patent. To account for cases with a
small number of patents within technology classes, I use the bias correction
described in Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002).
3. Originality - A patent that cites a broader array of technology classes is viewed
as having greater originality. Originality is calculated as the Herfindahl index
of cited patents, used to capture dispersion of the patent citations across tech-
nology classes. To account for cases with a small number of patents within
technology classes, I use the bias correction described in Jaffe and Trajtenberg
(2002).
4. Scaled Citations - Number of citations a patent receives divided by the aver-
age number of citations received by all patents granted in the same year and
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technology class.
5. Scaled Generality - Generality measure of a patent divided by the average gen-
erality of all patents granted in the same year and technology class.
6. Scaled Originality - Originality measure of a patent divided by the average
originality of all patents granted in the same year and technology class.
7. Scaled Number of Patents - Each patent is adjusted for variations in patent fil-
ings likelihood and for truncation bias. The truncation bias in patent grants
stems from the lag in patent approval (of about two years). Thus, towards
the end of the sample, patents under report the actual patenting since many
patents, although applied for, might not have been granted. Following Hall,
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), the bias is corrected by dividing each patent by
the average number of patents of all firms in the same year and technology
class.
8. Technology Class - A technology class is a detailed classification of the U.S.
Patenting and Trademark Office (USPTO) which clusters patents based on
similarity in the essence of their technological innovation. Technological classes
are often more detailed than industry classifications, consisting of about 400
main (3-digit) patent classes, and over 120,000 patent subclasses. For exam-
ple, within the communications category, there are various technology classes
such as: wave transmission lines and networks, electrical communications,
directive radio wave systems and devices, radio wave antennas, multiplex
communications, optical wave guides, etc.
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IPO Characteristics
9. Firm Age - Firm age at the year of the IPO filing, calculated from the found-
ing date. Firm age of firms that went public is kindly available at Jay Ritter’s
webpage. I collected the firm age of withdrawn firms from registration state-
ments.
10. Early Follower - An indicator variable that captures the location of a filer within
the IPO wave. Following Beneveniste et al. (2003), a filer is considered an
early follower if filed within 180 days of a pioneer in the same Fama-French
48 industry.
11. Pioneer - An indicator variable that captures the location of a filer within the
IPO wave. Following Beneveniste et al. (2003), a filer is considered a pio-
neer if its filing is not preceded by an IPO filing in the same Fama-French 48
industry in the previous 180 days.
12. Lead Underwriter Ranking - A ranking of the lead underwriter on a scale of 0
to 9, where 9 is the highest underwriter prestige. The ranking is compiled by
Carter and Manaster (1990), Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), and Loughran
and Ritter (2004).
13. VC-Backed - An indicator is equal to one if the firm was funded by a venture
capital firm at the time of the IPO filing.
14. Post-filing NASDAQ returns - The two-month NASDAQ returns calculated
from the day of the IPO filing.
15. Pre-filing NASDAQ returns - The three-month NASDAQ returns leading to
the IPO filing date.
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Financial Characteristics at IPO filing
16. Log Total Assets - the natural logarithm of the total book value of assets.
17. R&D / Assets - the ratio of R&D expenditure to book value of assets.
18. Net Income / Assets - the ratio of net income to book value of assets.
19. Cash / Assets - the ratio of cash holdings to book value of assets.
B. Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Poisson Model
A standard approach in the technological innovation literature is to estimate
count-data, such as patents and citations, with quasi-maximum likelihood (QML)
method. This implies assuming that the conditional mean has the following struc-
ture:
E

Yposti jXi

= exp(α+ βIPOi + γXi) (A.1)
An important property of the QML is that the standard errors are consistent un-
der fairly general conditions, even if the underlying data-generating process is not
poisson. In addition, the estimator can be used for any non-negative dependent
variables, whether integer or continuous (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) and
QML standard errors are robust to arbitrary patterns of serial correlation (Wooldridge,
1997). The QML Poisson reported coefficients reflect marginal effects (derivative of
dependent variable with respect to covariates) to allow easy comparison to the OLS
estimates.1
1 Standard errors are adjusted appropriately using the delta-method.
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The instrumental variable Poisson estimate uses a control-function approach
(Blundell and Powell, 2004). To illustrate this approach, consider first the exoge-
nous case, in which IPOi is not correlated with the error term that satisfies:
E(vijIPOi, Xi) = 1
when vi denotes the error term in equation (4). This will not hold if IPOi is corre-
lated with the error term. Assume that NSDQi (two-month NASDAQ fluctuations)
satisfy:
IPOi = αo + δNSDQi + βoXoi + v
o
i
with
E(voi jXoi ) = 1
then controlling for voi in the conditional mean equation is sufficient to remove the
endogeneity bias. In the estimation, I use the extended moment condition
E

Yposti jXi

= exp(α+ βIPOi + γXi + voi )
Intuitively, the residual voi captures the endogenous variation within the variable
IPOi; adding it as a control variable in the second-stage estimation allows identi-
fying β consistently.
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Table A.1 - Placebo Test of Reduced Form Results
The dependent variable is the average scaled citations per patent over the five years after
the IPO filing. Post-IPO Filing NASDAQ returns are the two-month NASDAQ returns cal-
culated after the IPO filing date. Post-Ownership choice NASDAQ returns are the two-month
NASDAQ returns calculated after either the date of the equity issuance or the date of the
IPO filing withdrawal. When the date of IPO filing withdrawal is not available, I use the
date of 270 days subsequent to the last amendment of the IPO filing (Lerner 1994). The
variables included in the regressions are pre-filing average scaled citations, pre-filing num-
ber of patents, Pioneer, Early follower, VC-backed variable, and the three-month NASDAQ
returns before the IPO filing. Variables are defined in Section A of the Appendix. The esti-
mated model is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and robust Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Scaled Scaled Scaled
Citations Citations Citations
Post-IPO filing NASDAQ returns  0.498**  0.482**
(0.239) (0.237)
Post-Ownership choice NASDAQ returns 0.150 0.162
(0.254) (0.248)
Observations 1,079 1,079 1,079
R-squared 0.242 0.240 0.242
Filing year FE yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes
Control variables yes yes yes
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Table A.2 - NASDAQ Drops are Not Correlated with Long-run Innovation Trends
The table reports the association of the two-month NASDAQ returns after the IPO filing
date with changes in innovation trends within the core technologies of filing firms. Firm’s
technology class is defined as a core technology if the share of patents in that class, in
the three years before the IPO filing, is above the median share of patents across all the
technology classes of the firm. Innovation trends of core technologies are calculated using
all patents granted by the USPTO in the respective technology classes. The dependent
variable in column (1) is the change in average patent quality calculated by the average
scaled citations per patent of all patents approved in each filer’s core technology in the five
years after the IPO filing, divided by the average scaled citations in the three years prior
to the IPO filing in the respective technology. In column (2), the dependent variable is the
change in the total number of patents in the core technologies. In column (3), the dependent
variable is the weighted change in the number of patents, when patents are weighted by
number of citations. The estimated model is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and robust
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient is
statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Weighted
Dependent Variable Patent Novelty Patent Counts Patent Counts
Post-IPO filing NASDAQ returns  0.007  0.055 0.001
(0.053) (0.142) (0.171)
Observations 1,372 1,372 1,372
R-squared 0.789 0.275 0.429
Industry FE yes yes yes
Filing Year FE yes yes yes
Control Variables yes yes yes
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B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
Proof of Proposition 1 Let v = (vi1 , vi2 , ..., vin) be an optimal full implementa-
tion contracting scheme of the participation problem (N,w, c). Hence, v generates
full participation as a unique Nash equilibrium. Since no-participation is not an
equilibrium, at least a single agent, say i1, receives reward is at least as high as his
outside option c. Otherwise, a no-participation equilibrium exists. Due to the opti-
mality of v his payoff would be exactly c. Agent i1 chooses to participate under any
profile of other agents’ decisions. Given that agent i1 participates and an equilib-
rium of a single participation is not feasible, at least one other agent, say i2, receives
a reward at least as high as c  wi2(i1). Since v is the optimal contracting scheme,
i2’s reward equals c wi2(i1), and under any profile of decisions i2 will participate.
Applying this argument iteratively on the first k  1 agents, at least one other agent,
henceforth ik, must get a payoff at least as high as c ∑k 1j=1 wik(j), but again, since v
is optimal, the payoff for agent k must be equal to c ∑k 1j=1 wik(j). Hence, the opti-
mal contracting scheme v must satisfy the divide-and-conquer property with respect
to a ranking ϕ.
Proof of Lemma 1 We will demonstrate that there is a single node with n  1
outgoing arcs. Since the tournament is a complete, directed, and acyclic graph
there cannot be two such nodes. If such a node does not exist, then all nodes in
G have both incoming and outgoing arcs. Since the number of nodes is finite,
we get a contradiction to G being acyclic. We denote this node as i1 and place its
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corresponding agent first in the ranking (hence this agent beats all other agents).
Now let us consider a subgraph G(N1, A1) that results from the removal of node
i1 and its corresponding arcs. Graph G(N1, A1) is directed, acyclic, and complete
and, therefore, following the previous argument, has a single node that has exactly
n  2 outgoing arcs. We denote this node as i2, and place its corresponding agent
at the second place in the ranking. Note that agent i1 beats agent i2 and therefore
the ranking is consistent so far. After the removal of node i2 and its arcs we get
subgraph G(N2, A2) and consequently node i3 is the single node that has n   3
outgoing arcs in subgraph G(N2, A2). Following this construction, we can easily
observe that the ranking ϕ = (i1, i2, ..., in) is consistent among all pairs of agents
and due to its construction is also unique.
Proof of Proposition 2According to Proposition 1 the optimal contracting scheme
satisfies the DAC property. Hence the optimal contracting scheme is derived from
constructing the optimal ranking and is equivalent to minimizing the sum of in-
centives, Vf ull :
Vf ull = min
(j1,j2,...,jn)
"
n  c 
(
1
∑
k=1
wj1(jk) +
2
∑
k=1
wj2(jk) + ...+
n
∑
k=1
wjn(jk)
)#
= max
(j1,j2,...,jn)
"
1
∑
k=1
wj1(jk) +
2
∑
k=1
wj2(jk) + ...+
n
∑
k=1
wjn(jk)
#
Since no externalities are imposed on nonparticipants, the outside options of the
agents have no role in the determination of the optimal contracting scheme. We
will show that the ranking that solves the maximization problem of the princi-
pal is the tournament ranking. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that
the tournament ranking ϕ is the identity permutation: hence ϕ(i) = i, and Wϕ =
∑2k=1 w2(k) + ...+ ∑
n
k=1 wn(k), where Wϕ is the principal’s revenue extraction. By
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way of contradiction, assume that there exists ϕ 6= σ such that Wϕ  Wσ. First,
assume that σ is obtained from having two adjacent agents i and j inϕ trade places
such that i precedes j inϕ and j precedes i in σ. By Lemma 1, agent i beats agent j;
thus Wσ = Wϕ   wj(i) + wi(j) and Wσ < Wϕ.
Note that since ϕ is the tournament ranking, agent 1 beats all agents, agent 2
beats all agents but agent 1, and so on. Now consider unconstrained σ = fi1, ..., ing
such that ϕ 6= σ. If agent 1 is not located first, by a sequence of adjacent swaps
(1, ij), we move agent 1 to the top of the ranking. In each of the substitutions agent 1
beats ij. Next, if agent 2 is not located at the second place, by a sequence of adjacent
substitutions (2, ij), we move agent 2 to the second place. Again, agent 2 beats all
agents ij. The process ends in at most n stages and produces the desired order ϕ.
As demonstrated, any adjacent substitution results in a higher extraction, and so
Wσ < Wϕ. Therefore, the DAC contracting scheme with respect to the tournament
ranking is unique and optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3 Without loss of generality, assume that the tournament
rankingϕ is the identity permutation. Hence, under the optimal contracting scheme,
the principal’s payment is Vf ull = n  c  
h
∑1j=1 w1(j) + ...+∑
n
j=1 wn(j)
i
. Denote
si(j) = [wi(j) + wj(i)] and ai(j) = [wi(j)   wj(i)]. We can represent Kagg and
Kasym in the following manner: Kagg = ∑
i j
wi(j) = ∑
i< j
 
wi(j) + wj(i)

= ∑
i<j
si(j)
and Kasym = ∑
i<j
jai(j)j. Since wi(j) = 12 (si(j) + ai(j)) we can rewrite the principal’s
payment as
Vf ull = n  c  12
"
1
∑
j=1
fs1(j) + a1(j)g+ ...+
n
∑
j=1
fsn(j) + an(j)g
#
= n  c  1
2
 
∑
i>j
si(j) +∑
i>j
ai(j)
!
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Note that si(j) = sj(i) and ai(j) =  aj(i). In addition ai(j) > 0 when i > j as the
tournament is acyclic and ranking is consistent. Therefore,
Vf ull = n  c  12
 
∑
i<j
si(j) ∑
i<j
jai(j)j
!
= n  c  1
2
 
Kagg + Kasym

Proof of Corollary 3.2 The result follows immediately from Proposition 3, where
we show that Vf ull = n  c  12 ∑i j wi(j)  12 ∑ i<j
wi(j)  wj(i), and from Vpartial =
n  c ∑i j wi(j). Taken together, the two yield
Vf ull  Vpartial = 12∑i j
wi(j)  12∑i<j
wi(j)  wj(i) = 12  Kagg   Kasym
Proof of Proposition 4 Let G(N, A) be a cyclic graph. Consider a subset of arcs
S such that G S is acyclic, and the tournament ranking of G S isϕ = (j1, j2, ..., jn).
The payment of the principal Vf ull under the DAC contracting scheme with respect
toϕ is
Vf ull = n  c 
(
1
∑
k=1
wj1(jk) +
2
∑
k=1
wj2(jk) + ...+
n
∑
k=1
wjn(jk)
)
Note that each (i, j) 2 S satisfies an inconsistency in tournament ranking ϕ. More
specifically, if (i, j) 2 S, then i beats j, and agent j is positioned above agent i.
In addition, wi(j) = wj(i)   t(i, j), where wi(j) < wj(i) and t(i, j) > 0. Con-
sider the following substitution: if (i, j) 2 S then wi(j) = wˆj(i)  t(i, j); otherwise
wi(j) = wˆi(j). This allows us to rewrite the principal’s payment as Vf ull = n 
c 
n
∑1k=1 bwj1(jk) + ...+∑nk=1 bwjn(jk)o+ t(S). Note that wˆi(j) = max(wi(j), wj(i)).
Therefore, different rankings affect only the level of t(S), as the first two terms in
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Vf ull remain indifferent to variations in the ranking. This implies that the subset
S with the lowest t(S) brings Vf ull to a minimum. Hence, the optimal contracting
scheme is the DAC with respect to the tournament ranking of G S .
Proof of Proposition 5 As demonstrated in Proposition 4, the optimal payment
of the principal is the DAC contracting scheme with respect to the tournament
ranking of G S . According to Proposition 4, this can be written as
Vf ull = n  c 
(
1
∑
k=1
bwj1(jk) + ...+ n∑
k=1
bwjn(jk)
)
+ t(S)
when wˆi(j) = max(wi(j), wj(i)) . Following the argument of Proposition 3, de-
note si(j) = [wˆi(j) + wˆj(i)] and ai(j) = [wˆi(j)  wˆj(i)] and the principal’s payment
is Vf ull = n  c   12

∑i<j si(j) +∑i<j jai(j)j

+ t(S) = n  c   12
 
Kagg + Kasym

+
Kcyclic.
Proof of Proposition 6 The cost of a full implementation contracting scheme is
simply Vf ull = nc  (1  η)∑i ∑j<i wi(j). If η = 1, then the cost does not depend on
the externalities. If η < 1, the minimal cost is obtained by selecting a ranking that
maximizes ∑i ∑j<i wi(j). This is equivalent to the tournament ranking outlined in
Proposition 4. If η > 1, the participation problem is identical to a standard partici-
pation problem (with fixed outside option) where externalities are (1  η)wi(j) < 0.
In these negative externalities problems the DAC mechanism does not apply and
the optimal scheme requires that the principal reimburse the agents for their total
burden, i.e., c  (1  η)∑j wi(j)),which is a positive number whenever the outside
option and wi(j) are positive.
Lemma 6.1 Let (N,w, c) be a participation problem and T = (T1, ..., Tn) define the
contingency sets. Define wT to be such that wTi (j) = wi(j) if j /2 Ti and wTi (j) = 0
otherwise. Let ϕ be the optimal ranking of the participation problem (N,wT, c), and let
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v(N,wT, c) be the corresponding DAC payment vector. The optimal full implementation
contracts set of (N,w, c) is such that it provides c for agent i if contingencies Ti are vio-
lated, and vi = vi(N,wT, c) ∑j2Ti wi(j) otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 6.1 Since externalities are positive, contingencies allow the
principal to reduce payments. In particular, when exploiting all contingencies al-
lowed in T, the contracting scheme that sustains a unique full participation Nash
equilibrium offers each agent i a reward vi = c   ∑j2Ti wi(j) if contingencies are
met, and c if they are violated. If for all agents Ti = N/ fig , then full extraction of
surplus is possible as a unique equilibrium. However, if only partial contingencies
are allowed, i.e., for some agents Ti  N / fig , then the principal can perform even
better than in the contracts outlined above.
Let’s define wˆi(j) = wi(j) if j /2 Ti and wˆi(j) = 0 otherwise. Consider an
arbitrary ranking of agents ϕ = f1, 2, ..., ng in which the first agent is offered
v1 = c ∑j2T1 w1(j) if contingencies are met, and c otherwise. Agent 1 will choose
to participate. Given the participation of agent 1, we can offer agent 2 the follow-
ing payment: v2 = c   wˆ2(1)   ∑j2T2 w2(j) if contingencies are met, and c oth-
erwise. Hence, agent 2 will agree to participate given the participation of agent
1. Following the same argument, we could offer the last agent in the ranking
vn = c   ∑n 1i=1 wˆn(i)   ∑j2Tn wn(j). This set of contracts will sustain full partici-
pation as a unique Nash equilibrium.
The optimal full implementation contracting scheme is thus achieved by ob-
taining the ranking of agents that will maximize ∑i ∑j>i wˆi(j). Given our definition
of wˆi(j), this is equivalent to finding the optimal ranking of agents in the problem
(N, wT, c) when wTi (j) = wi(j) if /2 Ti and wTi (j) = 0 otherwise. In other words, in
the optimal full implementation contracting scheme, the payment for participation
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for each agent will be vi = vi(N, wT, c) ∑j2Ti wi(j) if contingencies are met, and c
otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 7 Given a contracting scheme v, participation is a domi-
nant strategy for all agents under the worst-case scenario in which all other agents
participate, since ui = ∑ni=1 wi(j) + vi = c for every i 2 N. To show that v is
optimal, consider a contracting scheme m for which mi < vi for some agents and
mi = vi for the rest. By way of contradiction, assume full participation equilib-
rium holds under contracting scheme m. Consider an agent i for which mi < vi.
If all other agents are participating, then agent i’s best response is to abstain, since
ui = ∑ni=1 wi(j) +mi < c. Hence, v is a unique and optimal contracting scheme.
Proof of Proposition 8 See Complementary Note.
Proof of Proposition 9 We proceed in three steps. First we describe the iter-
ative procedure formally. Then we show that the iterative procedure has a finite
number of steps with a non-empty set of outcomes. Finally, we demonstrate that
the optimal ranking of the original problem is among those orders that survive the
procedure.
Formal Description of the Iterative Procedure. The starting point is the set of all
possible rankings of the N agents. We start with the first two positions in the rank-
ing. We construct a tournament ranking in which wij = vi(j) and eliminate all the
rankings in which the first two agents are ordered in a manner that is inconsistent
with this ranking. All rankings that survived the elimination provide a possible as-
signment for the first position in the order. Suppose we have implemented the pro-
cedure k-1 steps and obtained a subset of the assignment to the first k  1 positions
of the order. Let Wk 1 be the set of sub-orders for the first k  1 agents obtained in
step k   1. For each w 2 Wk 1 we denote by Sw the set of agents assigned to one
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of the first k  1 slots in the assignment w. We now define a tournament Tw on the
set of agents NnSw in such a manner that wij = vi(Sw [j) defines the externalities
matrix. Assuming the graph is acyclic we denote by piw the uniquely consistent
order of the agents in N/Sw.
Next, we construct a subset of assignments to the first k slots based on the set
Wk 1 and the orders piw for each w 2 Wk 1. We first look at the set of all orders
of NnSw and eliminate all orders in which the first two agents are ordered in a
manner that is inconsistent with piw. We denote by Pw the set of all ordered pairs
that survive this elimination.
We now do the following check which we refer to as the interface condition: Take
a pair pw 2 Pw. Suppose this pair is iw, jw and let kw be the last player in w. If kw
beats iw then the suborder w, iw is a permissible suborder in step k and is added to
Wk; otherwise it is excluded. We now proceed in a similar way for every w 2Wk 1
and the set of permissible suborders of length k which defines Wk.
Claim 1: The process ends in N  1 steps and results in a non-empty set of permissible
orders.
Proof: We define inductively an order that survives all the steps of this proce-
dure. The first agent in the order is the one ranked first under the tournament
wij = vi(j) of the first step; call him i1. The second agent is the one ranked first
under the tournament Tw where w = i1.
Suppose that the first k  1 slots of the order have been defined. The k-th agent
in the order is the one ranked first under the tournament Tw , where w = i1, ...ik 1
Clearly, the interface condition that we defined earlier will never be violated
since at each step the agent who is added beats all the agents who are not yet
ordered. This implies that the process yields a non-empty set of orders and the
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number of steps is finite.
Claim 2: The optimal order is among those orders that survive the procedure.
Proof: Suppose w.l.o.g. that the optimal order is the identity, i.e., 1, 2, 3, ..., n. We
denote this order by pi. Suppose by way of contradiction that the optimal order is
eliminated at some step k. This means that the interface condition between k   1
and k is violated or that the order was eliminated because the next two agents (say
i, i+ 1) in the order pi are not consistent with their order in the tournament ranking
of NnSw of the current stage. This means that i + 1 beats i in this tournament on
NnSw. This implies that reversing their order will increase the principal’s revenue
in the divide-and-conquer scheme. Consider the tournament in stage k which is on
the set of agents k, k+ 1, ..., n and wij = vi(f1, ...k  1g [ j). Let S be the subset of
agents in k, k+ 1, ..., n such that for each j 2 S the agent j is not placed last under
the consistent order of the tournament wij = vi(f1, ...k   1g [ j). Any such agent
can be the next to be ordered and appear immediately after player k   1. By our
assumption any such agent will violate the interface condition. This means that all
players in S win against k  1 in the tournament defined in step k  1. We now dis-
tinguish between two cases. Case 1: k 2 S. In this case consider the order obtained
by switching the positions of k  1 and k in the original identity order. We denote
this order by pi0. We note that payments in the divide-and-conquer mechanism for
the orders pi and pi0 differ only in terms of players k  1 and k. Furthermore, since
k is in S, k beats k   1 in the tournament defined in step k   1. Hence the total
payment under pi0 is less than that under pi, which contradicts the optimality of
pi. We now move to Case 2: k is not in S. In this case k must be ranked last un-
der the tournament wij = vi(f1, ...k   1g [ j). In particular k + 1 beats k in this
tournament. Consider now the order pi0 which is identical to pi except that k + 1
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appears before k. As in the argument made earlier, payments to all players but k
and k+ 1 are identical in pi and pi0 and because k+ 1 beats k under the tournament
wij = vi(f1, ...k  1g [ j), the order pi0 corresponds to lower total payments to k and
k+ 1, again in contradiction to the optimality of pi.
Proof of Proposition 10 In both segregated and desegregated environments
the externalities structure is symmetric and, following Corollary 5.1, all rankings
are optimal. Consider first the segregated environment. Since all rankings are opti-
mal, a possible optimal contracting scheme is v = (c, ..., c  (n1   1), c, ..., c  (n2  
1)). Hence, the optimal payment for the principal is v(n1, n2) = n  c  ∑n1 1l=1 l  
∑n2 1k=1 k = n  c   n1(n1 1)2   (n n1)(n n1 1)2 . Assuming that v(n1, n2) is continuous
with n1, it follows that
∂v(n1,n2)
∂n1
= n   2n1, the maximal payment is achieved at
n1 = n

2 =
n
2 , and the cost of incentivizing is declining with j n1   n2j. In the
desegregated example, a possible optimal contracting scheme is v = (c, ..., c, c  
n1, ..., c  n1). Therefore, the principal’s payment is v(n1, n2) = n  c  (n  n1)  n1.
Again, let us assume that v(n1, n2) is continuous with n1, in which case solving
∂v(n1,n2)
∂n1
= 2n1   n = 0 results in the minimal payment for the principal in the
desegregated environment being received at n1 = n

2 =
n
2 , and the cost of incen-
tivizing is increasing with jn1   n2j. In a status environment, since group B1 is the
more esteemed group, all agents from B1 beat all agents from B2; therefore agents
from B1 should precede the agents from B2 in the optimal ranking. A possible op-
timal ranking is ϕ = fi1, ., , , in1 , j1, ..., jn2g when ik 2 B1, jm 2 B2, and 1  k  n1,
1  m  n2. Therefore, a possible optimal contracting scheme is v = (c, c  
1..., c   (n1   1), c   n1, ..., c   n1). The principal’s payment is v(n1, n2) = n  c 
∑n1 1l=1 l   n2  n1 = n  c   n1(n1 1)2   (n   n1)n1 = 12 n1   nn1 + 12 n21 + cn. Again,
assuming that v(n1, n2) is continuous with n1,
∂v(n1,n2)
∂n1
= n1 + 12   n = 0 and the
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minimal payment is achieved at n1 = n  12 . Note that V(n1 = n) = V(n1 = n  1).
Therefore, the best scenario for the principal is when n1 = n. Alternatively, the cost
of incentivizing is decreasing with n1.
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